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Abstract
This thesis investigates the concept of ‘race’ and its place within the discourse of 
‘official multiculturalism’ in the Canadian context. More specifically, I explore the ways 
that ‘race’ has been coded in the popular media in my examination o f selected articles 
from the Toronto S tar’s coverage of: Philippe Rushton, human genome research, and 
racial profiling practiced by the Toronto Police Service. Through a textual analysis that 
combines the insights of Barthes’(1972) notion of myth as well as tools derived from 
critical discourse analysis, this research reveals that a conservative racialized discourse 
lies beneath The S tar’s seemingly critical stance on issues of racism. Indeed, although 
The Star appears, ostensibly, to be critical of racism it, nonetheless, maintains and 
perpetuates dominant perceptions of ‘race’ as both an objective genetic entity and a 
permanent category that exists in culture.
Despite my findings and the fact that most progressive social scientists refrain 
from employing the construct of ‘race’ as a determinant of specific social phenomena, 
discussions o f ‘race’ -  as a fixed analytical and descriptive category -  continue to 
dominate popular and media discourses. Such rigid characterizations are also prevalent in 
the official narratives o f Canadian multiculturalism that attempt to define and categorize 
citizens into clearly delineable groupings under the rubric of ‘difference’. This notion of 
‘difference’, couched in the broader ‘liberal’ discourse of tolerance and diversity, 
however, continues to reinscribe ‘race’ as a fixed cultural category. Moreover, such 
formulations tend to contain the vestiges of colonialist legacies.
In order to dismantle the ‘strange fruits’ that ‘racisms’ bear within today’s 
multicultural society, one must first understand, and then demystify the common myth 
about ‘race’ as a social and historical construct imbedded in the colonialist ideologies of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
imperial domination as they are imbricated in the policies and practices of ‘official 
multiculturalism’ in Canada. This undertaking must be premised on the notion that the 
modem concept o f ‘race’ comes out of the existence of racism and not vice versa. 
Indeed, the popular concept of ‘race’ must be reconsidered if  any meaningful anti-racist 
discourse is to be articulated and put into the broader aims of social justice.
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I. IN THE BEGINNING
STRANGE FRUIT -  A Naturalized, Normalizing Discourse
Southern trees bear strange fruit,
Blood on the leaves and blood at the root,
Black bodies swinging in the southern breeze,
Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees.
Pastoral scene o f  the gallant south,
The bulging eyes and the twisted mouth.
Scent o f  magnolias, sweet and fresh,
Then the sudden smell o f  burning flesh.
Here, is fru it for the crows to pluck,
For the rain to gather, fo r  the wind to suck,
For the sun to rot, fo r  the trees to drop.
Here is a strange and bitter crop.
(Abel Meeropol AKA Lewis Allen 1939)
Inspired by the overt racism entrenched in the culture of the ‘deep south’ (USA), a 
young patron of Harlem’s trendy Cafe Society wrote a haunting poem on lynching as a 
represented manifestation of American social injustice in hopes that it would be 
performed by Billie Holliday. Little did he know the impact that his poem would have on 
the world of jazz, blues, popular culture, and -  for the purposes o f this thesis -  a critical 
theory about ‘race’ and its relation to multicultural society. Although composed to 
articulate the racism of a seemingly bygone era, its spectre still haunts new articulations 
of the ‘racisms’1 that plaque society today.
11  Borrowing from Antonia Darder and Rudolfo Torres (2004), I ocasionally refer to racism in the plural. 
‘Racisms’, as opposed to racism, is conceptualized “within the context o f  demographic shifts, changing 
capitalist class relations, and global socioeconom ic dislocations” (Darder & Torres, 2004, p. 3). This 
pluralized conceptualization o f  ‘racisms’ is better suited than its singularized counterpart for theorizing 
about the premise that ‘race’ is not a fixed entity. In light o f  this fact ‘race’ will be frequently typed in 
quotation to draw attention to its arbitrary quality. Attempts to fix ‘race’ in science, religion, culture etc., 
has resulted in a popularized concept o f  racism that has been antiquated amidst the changing order o f  
various social phenomena both locally and globally. In contrast, ‘Racisms’ serve to encompass change 
while preventing static understandings o f  racialized oppressions from being relegated to the dustbins o f  a 
colonial and separatist past. As a result, ‘racisms’ can be seen to take many forms in society today that not 
only accounts for individual acts but also systemic forms o f  oppression.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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As today’s society becomes increasingly diverse, it may seem absurd at first 
glance, to level the accusation that these ‘strange fruits’ still continue to grow. Certainly, 
lynching does not occur in a ‘liberal’ and arguably progressive place like Canada. What, 
then, of these ‘strange fruit’? And how are they relevant to the study of ‘race’ and 
‘racisms’ in today’s multicultural society? In order to address this accusation, one must 
first take a critical look at the discourse that lines the narrative of this poem’s verses.
The pastoral imagery of this poem displays a paradox of values in a society where 
identity is constructed between the narratives of a performative dialectic -  a dialect 
performed between the voice o f ‘se lf and ‘other’; ‘us’ and ‘them’; ‘Western (European) 
Occidental white’ and ‘Non-Western (non- European) Oriental people o f colour’. 
Identities o f ‘se lf and ‘other’ are constructed amidst this play o f difference. A 
relationship of power is formed in the hierarchical categorization of this difference that 
interpolates the former in a position of dominance over the subjugated latter. Following 
in the deep rooted ideologies o f colonial ‘racisms’ that plague contemporary social 
relations, a crisis of identity occurs in the location of ‘se lf through the displacement of 
‘other’ (Bannerji, 2000; Darder & Torres, 2004; Eze, 2001; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Razack, 
2004; Said, 1978, 1993; San Juan Jr., 2002; Walcott, 2003).
In this instance, ‘se lf  comes into existence through the violence perpetuated on 
the populations of ‘other’ as a sure way of demarcating difference. It is assumed then, 
that in order for ‘se lf  to exist, populations o f ‘other’ that exist within the national 
landscape must be categorized and strictly policed (Clarke, 1993; Razack, 2004; Said, 
1978, 1993; Walcott, 2003). By policing ‘other’, especially through violence, order in
2 Throughout this thesis, I w ill often refer to ‘Western’ -  not narrowly defined as a cultural singularity -  
but as a hybrid and heterogeneous Empire derived from dominant/ ruling classes o f  imperialist European 
values.
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society is established as natural. Indeed this is made explicit by virtue o f the ‘strange 
fruit’ (i.e. the dangling black bodies amidst the sweet fragrance o f magnolias). The 
imagery depicts a seemingly natural occurring phenomena (the growth of dangling black 
bodies on the southern trees) hitherto unquestioned, and taken for granted as an 
ornamental part of the common landscape. Difference becomes fixed as lifeless; open to 
the gaze and consumption o f the dominant, conquering, colonizing status quo.
In her book, Regarding the Pain o f  Others, Susan Sontag (2003) illustrates the 
seemingly natural qualities of this discourse by describing how the ‘pain of others’ is 
viewed or ‘examined’3 through the privileged lens of the ‘se lf . Referring to the 
photographs taken o f ‘black victims of lynching’, and the subsequent spectacle that 
ensued after its publication in book format, Sontag (2003) critically explores the act of 
indulging in these representations to help the viewer/examiner understand the acts 
depicted “not as the acts o f ‘barbarians’ but as the reflection of a belief system, racism, 
that by defining one people as less human than another legitimates torture and murder”
(p. 92). Racism, in this sense, is not a simple act of deviance or isolated practices.
Indeed, racism exists as a functional part of everyday society. This is the result of what 
Foucault (2003) refers to when he claims that ‘biopower’ becomes celebrated within the 
‘mechanisms of the State’.
BIOPOWER -  Life & Death; The Struggle to Survive
According to Michel Foucault (2003), modem racism -  practiced through the State -  
takes the form of what he calls ‘biopower’. For Foucault, ‘biopower’ -  as a basic
3 For Susan Sontag (2003), the significance o f  the term ‘examine’ is given a sense o f  agency on the part o f  
the viewer to ‘clinically’ or perhaps critically indulge in as opposed to simply ‘look at’ the images depicted. 
This is an attempt to resolve any feelings o f  guilt or voyeuristic pleasure from inadvertently part-taking, 
second-hand, in the atrocities and suffering o f ‘others’ as they were depicted (p. 92).
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mechanism of power -  essentially forms a break in the biological continuum, creating the 
existence of separate ‘races’ from one; the human ‘race’. In the process of distinguishing 
differences between separate ‘races’, a hierarchy among them is formed determined by 
imagined qualities of superiority and inferiority. By fragmenting an otherwise unified 
biological domain into separate ‘races’, power becomes distributed unevenly throughout. 
Because of this, racism is seen to have two functions.
First, racism functions to fragment society in the interests o f maintaining an
unequal distribution of power among populations. Second, as a result of ‘biopower’,
racism functions to purify those considered to be members o f superior ‘races’ -  as an act
of survival -  by annihilating those whom it considers to be members of inferior ‘races’.
Like the images in Strange Fruit, difference must be separated, managed, and controlled
through the practice of ‘biopower’ in the interests of maintaining the existence of an
imagined ‘superior race’. In the process, subjugated ‘races’ become isolated from the
state mechanisms that define and exhibit power over them, causing a type of civic death
deemed necessary to preserve the civic life of the ‘superior races’. Bridging the gap
between the violent effects of yesterday’s racism -  as seen through lynching -  to the more
contemporary forms of racism -  like ‘official multiculturalism’ and racial profiling -
Foucault (2003) is worth quoting at length here:
In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes 
killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a 
power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first 
line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows 
someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State 
functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous 
function of the State.. .If the power o f normalization wished to exercise the 
old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a 
power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life 
and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and 
technology of normalization, it too must become racist, (p. 256)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The above passage can be interpreted to explicitly explain the way racism works
through ‘biopower’ -  the power over life and death -  in a naturalized environment like
the one described in Strange Fruit. It can also be interpreted to implicitly explain the
ways in which ‘racisms’ continues to work through ‘biopower’ today -  without the overt
violence of lynching -  through the State mechanisms of ‘official multiculturalism’ and
racial profiling. This can be seen when Foucault (2003) goes on to explain that the
meanings behind killing and murder, as justifiable actions within a ‘normalizing society’,
can be taken both literally and figuratively. Life and death are qualities of ‘biopower’
that are no longer considered absolute; they become notions relative to the imagined
boundaries created in discourse.
When I say “killing,” I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but 
also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, 
increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political 
death, expulsion, rejection and so on .. .And we can also understand why 
racism should have developed in modem societies that function in the 
biopower mode.. .Racism first develops with colonization, or in other 
words with colonizing genocide. (Foucault, 2003, pp. 256-257)
The above passages clarify the functions of racism -  rooted in colonialism -  that 
essentially works through ‘biopower’ in a normalizing capacity, exercising control over 
life and death among populations. This normalizing capacity creates the existence of a 
social order that is made to look natural. Through naturalization of this social order, the 
gaps of inequality and injustice become obscured. As a result, when further applied to the 
poem Strange Fruit, the ‘strange fruit’ -  as physical manifestations of the function of 
racism (‘race’) -  are tolerated as objectified parts o f the social landscape. This is a 
reminder, albeit extreme, as to how this society is at the same time tolerant and intolerant 
of difference in the spectacle of identity construction. If we deconstruct this narrative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
further, it becomes evident that the Southern trees (racism) bear ‘strange fruit’ (historical 
and material effects of its harmful discourse through ‘race’) that marks the imagined 
identity of the colonized world.
Strange Fruit happens to be the title of this thesis for what I believe to be very 
current and salient reasons. I use this title because I plan to illustrate that the ‘tree’ of 
racism continues to bear ‘strange fruit’ of injustice and oppression despite the fact that 
overt and physical manifestations like lynching in a presumably ‘liberal’ society such as 
Canada, are now rare. Even though the violence of overt forms o f racisms are rare today, 
more sophisticated and subtle acts of violence have evolved through ‘biopower’ to 
effectively control life and death, symbolically, in the realms of social and political 
struggle. Indeed, as an historical phenomenon, vestiges of the past continue to linger and 
inform the present. In order to understand this point better, a critical perspective on the 
conception of time must be elucidated.
TIME AFTER TIME -  That was then. This is now.
Time is not necessarily linear and intermittent nor is it essentially classified by 
increments defined in space and cultural achievement that carry clear demarcations in 
history. How we interpret our existence by virtue of its temporality is largely a cultural 
undertaking. Referring to T.S. Eliot’s central premise on the relationship between past, 
present, and future, Edward Said (1993) states that “how we formulate or represent the 
past shapes our understanding and view of the present” (p. 4). Under this conception of 
time, past and present are overlapping qualities. There is a large degree of the past in the 
present. Because of this, the legacy of colonialism persists today through the totalizing 
ideological tenets of imperialism.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Edward Said (1993), in his book Culture and Imperialism, picks up where 
Orientalism leaves off in its central question as to whether or not modem imperialism has 
ended with colonialism. In this book Said (1993) articulates clear definitions of 
colonialism and imperialism as historical agents of domination that I find applicable in 
discussing the management of difference today. According to Said (1993), “imperialism 
means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre 
ruling a distant territory; colonialism, which is almost always a consequence of 
imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on a distant territory” (p. 9). However 
narrowly defined on one level, these notions imply a spatial metaphor grounded in the 
acquisition o f foreign territory -  foreign in respect to the positioning the imperial centre 
in relation to the conquered periphery. By virtue of this understanding, colonialism as a 
consequence of imperialism -  where settlements are erected in geographical space -  is 
not as common today. The colonialism of the past, however, has now been transformed 
into a neo-colonialism of the present -  where settlements are erected in social, cultural, 
political and economic spaces -  continuing an imperial legacy of domination and 
oppression.
Applying contemporary notions of imperialism and colonialism to more current 
issues regarding the management of diversity, it becomes evident that imperialism and 
colonialism can imply more than mere accumulation and control o f geographical space. 
Indeed, these terms can be interpreted to represent the accumulation and control of 
cultures. For example, the centre/ periphery metaphor still holds true under the 
‘impressive ideological formations’4, which have become institutionalized in state policy
4 By using the phrase “impressive ideological formations”, Edward Said (1993, p. 9) refers to the 
structures and or mechanisms that support and drive imperialism and colonialism  beyond the acts o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and public discourse, through the fixing and ordering of differences in the public sphere. 
Imperialism still persists in relation to its political, economic, and social capacities to 
subjugate marginalized groups of diverse populations residing within the conquered 
periphery. In sum, as the past and present are intimately related and overlapping, the 
‘impressive ideological formations’ of a colonial legacy are passed on from a colonial 
history of imperialistic exploits that continue to manifest in current social circumstances.
Thomas Holt (2000) illustrates this phenomenon clearly by stating that “the tropes 
of racism are fairly constant whereas the repertoire o f racist practices is all too mutable” 
(p. 27). Within the context of Strange Fruit, a history of marked physical subjugations -  
like lynching -  are transformed into more subtle acts of social and political 
disenfranchisement as seen in today’s more polite, institutionalised ‘racisms’ that 
systematically mark and segregate difference. This distinction is what Stuart Hall (1995) 
refers to as ‘overt’ and ‘inferential’ racism. The latter form of racism, constitutive of a 
naturalized sate of mind, has become so ingrained in the every day functioning of society 
that it often works to name and defeat the former type of racism as deviant (Essed, 2002). 
In so doing, it essentially masks and obscures its own racist actions. This latter racism is 
what Paul Street (2002) refers to as ‘New Age Racism’. Although individual acts of overt 
racism still exist, they have declined considerably as a result o f the growing strength of 
‘New Age Racism’ (Street, 2002). In my opinion, therefore, the more subtle and arguably 
more impressionable nuances of institutional ‘racisms’ have become increasingly 
deserving o f our attention within a purportedly tolerant and increasingly diverse society.
acquiring objects (land and people). For Said (1993) these structures and mechanisms “include notions that 
certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms o f  knowledge affiliated with 
domination” (p. 9).
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In a 1992 essay titled “Public Enemies”, Austin Clarke poignantly outlines this 
concern by stating the importance of analyzing the structure of racism over individual 
acts. “I am not speaking about private, individual intercourse. I am speaking, rather, 
about the entire system, that institutional structure o f unapproachable, unseen power” 
(Clarke, 1992, p .l 1). While addressing the issues o f police violence against racialized 
communities, Clarke goes beyond engaging in the discourse of racism as merely isolated 
and individual occurrences by placing the entire system of racism under scrutiny. For 
Clarke, although these individual acts deserve our serious attention, they should not 
detract from or obscure our focus on the ‘institutional structure’ that lay beneath such 
acts. This is precisely where he believes the true power o f racism resides.
THE STRUCTURE OF OPPRESSION -  Behind ‘A Few Bad Apples’
Analyzing the structural dynamics of racism, this thesis focuses on the 
institutional forms that I believe to be more insidious than the overt acts of ‘a few bad 
apples’5. I consider institutional racism to be more insidious precisely due to the fact that 
it has become a naturalized and functioning part of our current multicultural society.
Take for instance, the brutal torture and beating of a Somali youth by two members of the 
Canadian Peacekeeping forces during the UN intervention o f 1992. Sherene Razack
5 The term ‘a few bad apples’ refers to the overt, pathological, and more or less criminal actions o f  
individuals -  now considered deviant in today’s ‘liberal’ society -  that champion the beliefs o f  white 
supremacy. It is worthy to note here that Windsor’s Chief o f  Police, Glen Stannard, at an October 25th 2003 
panel discussion on racial profiling put on by the Local 200 CAW, acknowledged that racism exists within 
the police service, not in the capacity that the Windsor Police service is a racist organization or that 
systemic racism exits within the institution per se but to the effect that there have been incidents caused by 
‘a few bad apples’ that tamish the services reputation. Chief Stannard made it clear that these ‘bad apples’ 
have made community-oriented policing more difficult and wished to work with the community to put an 
end to it. By limiting the definition o f  racism to the actions o f  ‘a few bad apples’, the Windsor Police Chief 
surreptitiously avoided the implications that his service may be involved in the practice o f  racial profiling, 
while discounting the existence o f  broader systemic racisms as a pervasive part o f  our everyday lives. This 
makes the task o f  ending institutional racisms all the more elusive when the structure o f  every day racism, 
that plague society, are stifled from the onset, preventing any meaningful discussion towards a solution.
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(2004) illustrates the fact that although these racist actions appear on the surface to be 
exceptional with regards to Canada’s peacekeeping initiatives; they speak directly to the 
hidden racisms that underlie Canada’s colonial legacy as bearing the ‘white man’s 
burden’ of executing the civilizing mission in the ‘darkest comers’ of the earth.
The fact that the two soldiers implicated in the beating death of Shidane Arone -  
the murdered Somali youth -  were of Aboriginal origin -  also members of an oppressed 
class -  increases the importance of examining the incident as not wholly exceptional but 
sutured deep within the everyday consciousness of the troops deployed to bring peace to 
an otherwise ‘savage and barbaric land’. According to Razack (2004 a), “to look for 
exceptional and overtly racist acts was to miss the absolute ordinariness and 
pervasiveness of the racist attitudes and practices both in the military generally and 
among the troops deployed in Somalia” (p. 126). Although the Canadian military did 
have self-declared white supremacists among their ranks working in Somalia, few of 
these individuals were directly implicated in the events that transpired. This is cmcial to 
understanding a broader definition of racism -  as a structural belief system that signifies 
the power relationship of dominance and oppression based on phenotype or cultural 
superiority -  and the subsequent dehumanization of the ‘other’ through the ideologies of 
colonialism and imperialism6. To extend this definition of racism, as a system of beliefs, 
a bit further, without alienating or excluding the practices that follow from such beliefs, 
racism can become broadly characterized as a way of life.
Racism, as a way of life, is not exclusively owned by devout pathological 
practitioners o f racial discrimination, nor should it be limited to a narrow definition that
6 Sherene Razack (2004) advocates the use o f  a broad definition o f  racism to imply colonialism and 
imperialism. Borrowing from Said (1993), racism in this sense is “not simply the acquisition o f  lands but 
also the ‘impressive ideological formations’ that continue on into the present”. (Razack, 2004, p. 143)
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targets them exclusively. To solely focus on a narrow definition o f the term would 
effectively sever the deeper historical hatreds and “the material and ideological systems” 
that thrive on them (Razack, 2004, p. 135). Racism has a structure that is woven neatly 
amidst the dominant ways of viewing the world. Because of this, ‘racisms’ are more 
subtle and pervasive than commonly assumed. As a result they have become invisible, 
existing ‘unseen’ as a part of our everyday discourse (Clarke, 1992). Indeed, its effects 
on society, therefore, are not necessarily immediately evident.
Racism, as a common part of everyday life, can be seen as working like 
microwave signals -  invisible forces that can lead to critical illnesses having adverse 
effects on the human body when subject to prolonged periods o f exposure. If  we view 
society like a human body and racism like microwave signals, racism can be imagined to 
collect and fester within the social entity inevitably leading to social anomie, and 
ultimately social death. If  left unchecked for long periods o f time, racism can work like a 
cancer causing agent, slowly eating away at the very fabric o f humanity that essentially 
binds a healthy and socially just civilization. Examples of how ‘racisms’ are currently 
working this way are illustrated in the police narratives of racial profiling that are 
fertilized by the ‘liberal’ discourses of tolerance and diversity which also form the 
foundation of Canada’s notion of ‘official multiculturalism’. Although the practice of 
racial profiling and multiculturalism are not as overt as scenes o f lynching, ‘racisms’ 
continue to grow, masked beneath the seductive scent of ‘official multiculturalism’ that 
continues to be mystified in the Canadian identity -  ‘sweet and fresh’. They still produce 
‘strange fruit’ as they are rooted in the soils of a racist colonial ideology.
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STATE RACISM -  A Collective Cultural Concept
The discourse of race struggle ... will become the discourse of power 
itself. It will become the discourse of a centred, centralized and 
centralizing power. It will become the discourse o f a battle that has to be 
waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true 
race, the race that holds the power and is entitled to define the norm, and 
against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat 
to the biological heritage. At this point, we have all those biological-racist 
discourses of degeneracy, but also all those institutions within the social 
body which make the discourse of race struggle function as a principle of 
exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way o f normalizing society 
... At this p o in t... we see the appearance o f State racism: a racism that 
society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own 
products. (Foucault, 2003, pp. 61-62)
‘Racisms’ -  institutional and individual -  are a common phenomenon within our 
contemporary multicultural society. ‘Racisms’ in Canada are common due to the fact that 
difference has been legitimated as a ‘natural factor’ in the production of the national 
imaginary7. This national imaginary appears to be altogether tolerant and inclusive of 
difference, through various political and economic apparatuses (official multiculturalism, 
affirmative action policies, and ‘liberal’ notions of capitalism etc.), while simultaneously 
retaining the colonial discourse of intolerance and exclusiveness (Hardt & Negri, 2000) 
through the process o f ‘otherizing’ or ‘orientalizing’ difference (Said, 1978, 1993). 
Bearing the ‘strange fruit’ of injustice, this paradox indicates somewhat of a national 
identity crisis -  rooted in an older colonial ideology of racism -  that continues today 
through a ‘liberal’ discourse of tolerance and difference. This crisis o f identity has 
created essentialized, fixed categories of people, further perpetuating a hierarchy of
7 I use the adjective ‘imaginary’ to describe Canada as a national construct composed in the imagination 
o f its citizens. I have borrowed this term to reflect a ‘national imagination’, or as Himmani Bannerji (2000) 
states (in the tradition o f  Benedict Anderson, 1991) a ‘national imaginary’. Further reference to the use o f  
this term can be found throughout her book The D ark Side o f  the Nation. Canada’s ‘national imaginary’ 
can be found on page 65 in reference to a totality o f  collective imaginations. Richard Day (1998) outlines 
the mosaic metaphor, illustrating claims that Canadian identity is structured on a notion that Canadian 
history is multicultural. To quote Day (1998), “although this claim is obviously absurd, that hasn’t 
prevented it from being a nodal signifier in the official Canadian imaginary” (p. 42)
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difference structured in modem notions of ‘race’ and culture8 (Bannerji, 2000; 
Bissoondath, 2002; Walcott, 2003).
‘Race’ as a biological and discursive analytical concept has also been recently 
subsumed by narrowly defined notions of culture (Darder & Torres, 2004; Hardt & Negri, 
2000; Razack, 2004; San Juan Jr., 2002), that can be heard from both right-wing 
conservative voices (D’Souza, 1995) as well as those who speak from a more liberal 
pluralist ideology (Taylor, 1994). In both cases ‘race’ and/or culture serve as 
homogeneous fixtures that define, position, and manage populations in relational 
difference to one another. In some cases, ‘race’ and culture are often used 
interchangeably. This can be seen in the ways that cultural/ racial difference comes to 
overshadow cultural/ racial similarities in conservative discourse.
A NEW RIGHT RATIONALIZATION -  ‘Race’ and Cultural DNA
According to Dinesh D ’Souza (1995) people in general have more shared traits 
than differences overall. Despite this admission, however, he also believes it to be foolish 
to perceive these differences as insignificant. D ’Souza (1995) claims that such
8 Although I occasionally cite criticisms o f  multiculturalism by including N eil Bissoondath, Himani 
Bannerji, Rinaldo Walcott and E. San Juan Jr. in the same reference, it is important to make note o f  the fact 
that their criticisms o f  multiculturalism come from opposing perspectives. Bissoondath’s criticism o f  
multiculturalism comes from a more conservative perspective that can often be coupled with writers such as 
Dinesh D ’Souza. As a result, Bissoondath often appears to be hostile o f  immigrants who resist 
assimilation. For Bissoondath, the problem o f multiculturalism is a problem o f  immigrants who refuse to 
assimilate within a presumably superior Eurocentric way o f  life. Contrary to Bissondath, however,
Bannerji and San Juan Jr. criticize multiculturalism with a more critical focus on the existence o f  a 
racialized political economy. From this perspective, the problem o f  multiculturalism is not due to a lack o f  
assimilation from immigrants but the systematic exclusion and marginalization o f  divergent (immigrant) 
voices from the shaping o f  the political economy towards the benefit o f  all walks o f  life within a given 
citizenry. According to Bannerji and San Juan Jr., assimilation only serves to manage and police difference 
under the ‘liberal’ rubric o f  tolerance and diversity. Moreover, this perspective views multiculturalism as a 
form o f apartheid, segregating citizens rather than uniting them. Despite these contrasting perspectives, 
there are some points o f  convergence that articulate ideas complimentary to their respective differences.
One such notion o f  convergence can be seen in the ways that culture is viewed as a living thing that cannot 
be static or absolute. As a result, differences between cultures cannot be fixed. M y intention behind citing 
these authors together within the same reference was to highlight this particular example o f  convergence 
without implying that they come from the same perspective.
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differences, therefore, should not be overlooked. “Just as variation among individuals 
explains why some individuals perform better than others, so variation between groups 
could explain why some groups do better than others” (D’Souza, 1995, p. 450). Indeed, 
this statement addresses individual differences and group differences alike. The problem 
exists, however, in the uncertain attributes that distinguish the individual from the group.
Although D ’Souza (1995) explores various theories on ‘race’ as naturally defined 
by biological attributes -  many of which contradict each other -  he does not clearly 
define his position on how groups should be distinguished from each other. Instead, he 
quietly escapes critically engaging the contradictory debate over biological determinism 
by simply stating that groups do in fact exist naturally without explaining how or why. 
Seeing that he cannot fix group differences to any one theory o f biological distinction, 
D ’Souza (1995) insists on the salience of cultural distinction by virtue of socialization 
and education as an -  albeit tenuous -  appendage to theories o f natural selection. Culture, 
in this sense, becomes the ‘new biology’ as a matter o f expression.
Culture as the ‘new biology’ does not imply biology in the clinical or scientific 
sense o f the word but can be seen in the ways that groups of people are slotted into fixed 
homogeneous imaginaries of a new heredity, passed on from one generation to the next; a 
“cultural DNA” o f sorts (D’Souza, 1995, p. 472). This ‘cultural DNA’ -  evidence of 
fixed group differences championed by the new polite racists (Van Dijk, 1998, 2000, 
2001) -  serves to explain the ‘pathologies’ and sociable deficiencies of various cultural/ 
racial groupings in society (Podur, 2002). Furthering this perspective, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri (2000) state that “as a theory of social difference, the cultural position is 
no less ‘essentialist’ than the biological one, or at least it establishes an equally strong 
theoretical ground for social separation and segregation” (p. 192). Accordingly, this
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‘cultural DNA’, used by D ’Souza (1995) and his neo-conservative epigones, has served to 
simultaneously justify and deny racism based on the notion of “rational discrimination”
(p. 282).
‘Rational discrimination’ exists as a contradiction in terms whereby it has been 
used to justify policies that boldly legitimate institutional racisms like racial profiling, 
without actually admitting that there is such a thing as institutional racism. This is 
illustrated in D ’Souza’s (1995) belief that institutional racism implicates everybody, in 
some capacity, as being racist. D ’Souza’s (1995) faulty reasoning follows that “if 
everyone is a racist, then no one is a racist” (p. 335). This statement cleverly uses circular 
logic to mask oppression and promote “white complicity” (Razack, 2004a, p. 141) while 
obfuscating the historical and material conditions that enable racisms to exist.
DERACINATING ‘RACE’ -  Towards a Libratory Anti-Racism Discourse
I believe that in order to dismantle racism one must explore the power 
relationships created by overt and individual racisms and their connection to the more 
subtle nuances of institutional ‘racisms’. It is my contention that the modem concept of 
‘race’ and its tenuous, albeit contemporary, connection to an erroneous perception of 
culture -  must first be dissected and ameliorated from the chains o f its objectified position 
in society at large, before being eradicated altogether, if any meaningful anti-racist 
discourse is to be articulated and put into practice in the interest of broader social justice 
aims. This undertaking must be premised on two levels.
First and foremost, the notion that the modem concept of ‘race’ comes out of the 
existence of racism, and not vice versa (Darder & Torres, 2004) must be clearly 
understood and accepted. And the reality of racism, in fact, has absolutely nothing to do
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with the existence of distinct ‘races’. Second, a broader more transitional understanding 
of culture must be liberated from this outdated notion of ‘race’. In order to dismantle the 
‘strange fruit’ that racisms bear within today’s multicultural society, one must first 
understand and demystify the modem myth about ‘race’ as a social and historical 
construct, imbedded in the colonialist ideologies of imperial domination, as they are 
imbricated in the policies and practices of ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada.
This thesis investigates, in a preliminary way, the concept o f ‘race’ and its place 
within the discourse of ‘official multiculturalism’ in the Canadian context. More 
specifically, the ways that ‘race’ has been ‘coded’ and ‘represented’ in the popular media 
through an examination o f selected articles from the Toronto S ta r’s coverage of: Philippe 
Rushton, the genetic discoveries that disprove popular notions of ‘race’, and its expose of 
racial profiling practiced by the Toronto Police Service. Through a textual analysis that 
combines the insights of Barthes’ notion of myth (Barthes, 1972; Gaines, 2001) using 
tools derived from critical discourse analysis (Dellinger, 1995; Huckin, n.d.; van Dijk, 
1998, 2001, 2002), this research reveals that a conservative racialized discourse lies 
beneath The Star's seemingly critical stance on issues o f racism. Indeed, although the 
Toronto Star’s coverage of aforementioned issues appears, ostensibly, to be critical of 
racism it, nonetheless, maintains and perpetuates dominant perceptions o f ‘race’ as both 
an arbitrary social construct and as a construct that exists in and through language 
(Appiah, 1995; Hall, 1995; Pieterse, 1995).
Deconstructing the language of ‘race’, using Barthes’ concept o f myth through 
tools derived from critical discourse analysis (CDA), reveals the ways that ‘race’ has 
become reified as an objective, biological, reality within a popular collective 
consciousness. This is reflected in a common racial discourse practiced in the public
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sphere, represented in the media, and institutionalized through government policy. The 
modem concept o f ‘race’, as a dominant cultural myth in contemporary Western society, 
has been naturalized through ideology and de-contextualized from the material and 
historical conditions of its origin in the process. As a result, ‘race’ has come to exist as 
both an imaginary social construct and as a constmct that has a real material and 
historical impact on the populations that people are positioned by discourse as subjects 
within a broader colonial ideology. This ideology works through myth, obscuring the 
historical context of ‘race’ by naturalizing a language about it. Hiding the real relations 
of power, a colonized discourse about ‘race’ essentially positions people as subjects, 
within distinct populations, along lines of dominance and subordination. This becomes 
evident in the ways that difference is coded through racialized categories that have 
become institutionalized through the policies and ordinary discourses of a ‘multicultural’ 
society like Canada.
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II. O’ CANADA...OUR HOME ON NATIVE LAND?
A PARADOX OF BELONGING -  The Construction of a Common Canadian
‘What does it mean to be Canadian? ’ It means being willing to circulate 
indefinitely about an impossible object, thereby achieving the articulation 
o f one’s embodied subjectivity with the process o f  rational-bureaucratic 
domination, production and consumption that comprise a ‘Canadian ’ life. 
(Day, 1998, p.42)
A common, everyday discourse on cultural diversity is matched by a parallel 
policy on ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada. This concept o f ‘official 
multiculturalism’ signifies the state initiated endeavour at diffusing a national identity 
crisis in the face of: increasing non-European immigration from the third-world leading to 
increased cultural diversity; the emergent tendency towards armed struggles over land 
claims as seen through the American Indian Movement (AIM) among indigenous 
populations within the nation’s borders; and the looming threat of armed struggles from 
Quebec militants that fuelled separatist movements in the province (Bannerji, 2000).
‘Official multiculturalism’ appeared as a gift that Pierre Trudeau offered an
unsettled nation to disarm the radical and militant social movements that were brewing.
Moreover, an official policy on multiculturalism reduced the political and economic
demands of these groups to mere concerns over culture. As a result multiculturalism was
used to incorporate the threat of radical social resistance within a dominant anglo-
Canadian national imaginary (Bannerji, 2000). Indeed, this ‘official’ policy of
multiculturalism came to define a nation amidst a brewing sea of political discontent.
Through the process o f ‘orientalizing’ difference (Said, 1978), diversity, from the outset,
was considered to be a politically perceived public problem (Day, 1998).
The problem of Canadian diversity has always been public, has always 
involved state-sponsored attempts to structure the possible field of action
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of problematic Others, and it has always been articulated with the 
discourse on British-Canadian unity. The reality of Canadian diversity is 
symbiotically dependent upon this will to unity -  without it, diversity does 
not exist and certainly cannot be a problem. (Day, 1998, p.44)
Building upon the state sanctioned introduction of Canada’s Multiculturalism 
Policy of 1971, The Canadian Multiculturalism Act was adopted by parliament in 1988. 
According to a Government of Canada website on Canadian Heritage, the adoption of The 
Act placed Canada on the map as the first nation to pass a law affirming a notion of 
‘official multiculturalism’ as a principle Canadian value (Minister o f State -  
Multiculturalism, n.d.). This value serves to define an imaginary nation through a 
multicultural politics, essentializing fixed cultural differences in relation to a ‘Canadian 
culture’ without regard or input from those whom the policy and The Act essentially 
subjugates (Bannerji, 2000). It is largely based on the notion that diversity must be 
managed in the interest of colonial superiority. Indeed, diversity only became a problem 
when British-Canadian sovereignty was put to the test. Furthermore, what The Act 
assumed and still assumes about immigrants is that they can be defined, classified, and 
fixed as such, strictly along the lines of culture and ethnicity, and loosely along the lines 
o f ‘race’.
With a policy that touts aphorisms implying a richness of difference through 
tolerance -  as a virtuous marker of national identity -  Canada is the perfect site of critical 
analysis to demystify a dominant ‘myth about race’. In this space of tolerance and 
difference, the notion of diversity is essentialized within the identity politics of a 
Canadian multicultural imaginary. Ostensibly, Canadian identity is contingent upon the 
tolerance of difference through the institutionalization of an ‘official multiculturalism’.
In contrast to its American neighbours to the south, who invite or coerce -  depending on
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your political predisposition -  immigrants to assimilate within a homogenous national 
imaginary by relinquishing their original cultural norms as secondary, Canada prides its 
national identity on the notion that many ‘varieties of people’ can retain, practice, and 
preserve their original cultural heritage within its borders. The latter has been termed a 
cultural ‘mosaic’ whereas the former has been termed a cultural ‘melting pot’. (Bannerji, 
2000; Day, 1998)
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN -  Metaphors ‘Melting Pot’ and ‘Mosaic’
A ‘melting pot’, although originally comprised of disparate parts, produces a 
homogenous stew whereby the distinctions between the original ingredients are no longer 
readily apparent. A ‘mosaic’, however, describes a national imaginary that is essentially 
comprised of the sum of its disparate parts. Essential to the composition of a ‘mosaic’ is 
the assumption that it retains the original qualities of the individual parts that comprise it 
as a whole. This further implies that the essence of its composite parts remains intact and 
is easily distinguishable from the other parts that are included within the overall national 
picture. Where the ‘melting pot’ metaphor has been perceivably marked by a process of 
assimilation, the ‘mosaic’ metaphor has been perceivably marked by a process of 
integration.
Richard Day (1998) assesses the definitions of assimilation and integration as two 
main approaches to dealing with diversity. According to Day (1998), the traditional 
definitions of these two terms are presented as binary opposites. Assimilation is what 
integration is not, and vice versa. Where assimilation calls for the abandonment of 
distinctive group traits in the interest of the dominant imaginary, Integration is supposed 
to accommodate diverse groups as they retain their distinct, defining qualities,
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participating equally within the overall social imaginary. A paradox is created by virtue 
of the definition of the latter process. If distinct groups are to retain the qualities that 
make them distinct, how are they to participate equally in the overall social imaginary? 
According to Day (1998), this problem offers an easy solution under assimilation.
Under assimilation, distinct groups give up the qualities that define them by 
undergoing a transformation from a state of “otherness” to a state o f “sameness” (Day, 
1998, p. 57). Under integration, however, distinct groups are expected to retain their 
‘otherness’ while assuming an overall quality of ‘sameness’. This outlines the 
impossibility o f ‘official multiculturalism’ as the defining image o f a unified Canadian 
identity. Day (1998) sums up this paradox quite elegantly by stating that “as the 
Canadian National Thing, the Mosaic functions as the object o f a desire for a Canadian 
identity that forever fails to achieve its goal, and thereby achieves its aim, which is to 
perpetuate itse lf’ (p. 43). This is not to say, however, that the ‘melting pot’ metaphor is 
better suited towards defining a national identity over the ‘mosaic’ metaphor.
It is important at this juncture to state that I am not advocating one metaphor 
(melting pot vs. mosaic) over the other, nor am I pushing for one process (assimilation vs. 
integration) as the ideal model towards dealing with diversity9. Both metaphors and 
processes essentially strive towards the same ends by nuanced and overlapping methods. 
Attempts to attain homogeneity may be attained through overt coercion as well as through
9 While delivering a paper at the University o f  Montreal on February 24th 2005, at 7th Colloquium o f the 
CEETUM for Students and N ew  Researchers, I was asked what approach to dealing with diversity I think to 
be more correct; the ‘melting pot’ or the ‘m osaic’. I was unaware that by discussing both approaches, while 
concentrating my criticism on one, that I may have inadvertently appeared to be championing one metaphor 
over the other. To clarify my position with respect to understanding the structurally racist ties intrinsic to 
both methods o f  managing difference, I had only intended to use both metaphors for the purpose o f  
highlighting the differences in the quality o f  racism between Canada and the United States. It is important 
to note that however different the quality o f  racism may be between these two countries, they share a 
common structural root that, in opinion, is both imperialistic and Eurocentric at its core.
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forms subtle seduction in both models and approaches. Indeed, both models and 
approaches ultimately continue the legacy of imperialistic goals in the exploitation and 
subjugation o f ‘otherness’ through the domination o f imagined differences by virtue of an 
imagined ‘sameness’. For the purpose of this thesis, however, I will be concentrating on 
the latter approach to dealing with diversity; the cultural mosaic as it applies to ‘official 
multiculturalism’ in the constitution o f a ‘Canadian identity’. As seductive or coercive as 
the ‘mosaic’ may appear, it holds unto itself its own sets o f myths containing ideologies 
that obscure the power relations at work among its disparate parts.
An official policy o f multiculturalism solidifies and shapes the cultural ‘mosaic’ 
metaphor. Where the parts that make up the ‘mosaic’ translate into ‘varieties of people’ 
within the Canadian cultural landscape, the entire ‘mosaic’ comes to represent the overall 
Canadian cultural imaginary as a variety o f cultures interpreted officially as multicultural. 
In theory, multiculturalism allows the harmonious intermixing of different cultures to be 
tolerated within the overall national imaginary. Tolerance, however, does not necessitate 
acceptance. As a result, inclusiveness is merely tolerated on the surface.
A concept of Diversity that includes reified notions o f ‘race’ becomes a buzzword 
signifying a sort of multi-cultural ornamentation, conveniently used to decorate an 
imagined national identity10. This is done without allowing equal access for those 
‘varieties of people’, defined as culturally different from those whose power defines 
them, to participate equally in the shaping of the national identity. This creates a notion 
of tolerance that obscures struggles towards justice and equality and masks oppression 
under a guise of privilege. As a result, it becomes assumed -  by virtue of a perceived
10 For more details on an ‘imagined national identity’ in the Canadian context, please see Tony W ilden’s 
The Imaginary Canadian (1980).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
attitude of imperial arrogance -  that immigrants should be viewed as privileged enough to 
be allowed to integrate into a ‘Canadian society’, despite their subsequent marginalization 
and civic annihilation regarding any social, political, and economic input as to what 
should constitute a ‘Canadian society’. Their civic prowess becomes castrated while the 
potential power o f their presence is rendered impotent with regards to contributing to the 
shape of the Canadian imaginary through the official mechanisms of integration/ 
assimilation.
Immigrants, especially those of colour (a designation o f ‘racial’ difference), are to 
be considered privileged as citizens under the civilizing project o f Canadian 
multiculturalism. Difference is tolerated so long as it can eventually conform to the ideal 
European imaginary that has colonized and ‘fathered’ the imaginary that we have come to 
know as Canada. As a result, racism continues to exist surreptitiously within the 
institutional fabric of a ‘multicultural’ Canadian society. What this model fails to realize 
in theory, however, has manifested itself within the strict reality of racist practices carried 
out by the institutions designed to accommodate its parts (varieties of people). Missing 
from the ‘mosaic’ analogy is the fluid quality of culture and its evolutionary propensity 
for change and development.
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III. LOCATING CULTURE IN MULTICULTURE
PERPETUALLY RECEDING HORIZONS -  Constructing Cultural Imaginings
Philosophically, I  do not believe in the purity o f  cultures, or even in the 
possibility o f  identifying them as meaningfully discrete wholes. I  think o f  
cultures as complex human practices o f  signification and representation, 
o f organization and attribution, which are internally riven by conflicting 
narratives. Cultures are formed through complex dialogues with other 
cultures. In most cultures that have attained some degree o f internal 
differentiation, the dialogue o f the other(s) is internal rather than intrinsic 
to the culture itself. (Benhabib, 2002, p. ix)
According to Seyla Benhabib (2002), what we come to know and classify as 
distinct cultures have become “badges of identity” through the faulty epistemic premises 
of what she terms the “reductionist sociology of culture” (p. 4). For Benhabib (2002), 
conservatives and progressives alike base their perceptions of culture on the assumption 
that: they are “clearly delineable wholes”; they can be applied as uncontroversial 
classificatory labels to population groups; and the hybridity and overlap of population 
groups ascribed to more than one culture does not pose a problem for policy (p. 4).
Based on these faulty epistemic premises, policies like the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 
have been institutionalized to reify, essentialize, fetishize, naturalize, and organize 
difference within a public multicultural discourse. It is important, however, not to take 
this perception of culture at face value. More attention must be paid to a critical analysis 
of the structure imbedded in the composition of this multicultural discourse.
Using a “narrative view of actions and culture”, Benhabib (2002) peels back the 
layers of the essentialized cultural perspective used by the “reductionist sociology of 
culture” (pp. 4-5). The starting point for analysis is to differentiate the subject/ object 
relationship between the perspective of ‘social observer’ and the ‘social agent’ with 
regards to the analyzed cultural entity. According to Benhabib (2002), the “social
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
observer.. .is one who imposes, together with local elites, unity and coherence on cultures 
as observed entities” whereas ‘social agents’ -  in contrast, participants in culture -  
“experience their traditions, stories, rituals and symbols, tools and material living 
conditions through shared, albeit contested and contestable, narrative accounts” (p. 5).
This distinction is important in its implications that the former, ‘social observer’ must 
essentially view cultures as distinct wholes for the purposes o f coherence, classification 
and control. This standpoint can only be assessed and imposed from the ‘outside’. In 
contrast, the latter -  ‘social agent’ -  does not need to view what they agree their culture to 
be as a whole because their standpoint is experienced from the ‘inside’.
The ‘social agent’ perspective is a rather telling one, with regards to the structure 
of cultural construction, primarily because cultures are formed through contested 
accounts. According to Benhabib (2002), this is evident for two reasons. The first reason 
is illustrated through a ‘double hermeneutic’. This implies that “we identify what we do 
through an account of what we do” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 6). Indeed, meaning in all 
socially significant action is determined through communication. As a result, action(s) 
gain significance through the accounts of the agent as well as others in reference to the 
action(s) performed. This locates culture as a social entity constituted within webs of 
overlapping and contested narratives.
The second reason that cultures are formed through contested accounts refers to an 
evaluative dimension of actions. Benhabib (2002) considers this evaluative dimension to 
be a “second-order narrative” (p. 7). This second-order narrative implies a ‘normative 
attitude’ towards first-order accounts of actions about narratives. For Benhabib (2002), 
these ‘normative attitudes’ derived from an evaluative dimension form the basis of 
cultures. Because there are two dimensions of contested accounts -  two levels of
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narrative contestation -  cultures cannot be fixed as delineable wholes. They are 
constantly shifting entities that “form a horizon that recedes each time one approaches it” 
(Benhabib, 2002, p. 5). This has very salient implications when applied to notions of 
multiculturalism.
MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CONFINEMENT OF CULTURE
Notions o f ‘official multiculturalism’ are based on the faulty premises of the 
‘reductionist sociology of culture’ (Benhabib, 2002). This perspective, further assumes 
that cultures can be preserved. Because cultures are not the fixed, delineable parts that 
can be frozen in time to comprise a completed national picture, “culture is not something 
that can be preserved nor conserved” (Walcott, 2003, p. 139). Following the logic of this 
premise, if cultures cannot be preserved or conserved because they do not exist as 
delineable wholes -  due to the fact that their form is constituted in contested narratives -  
then they cannot properly fit as parts within a multicultural mosaic. A multicultural 
‘mosaic’, therefore, cannot sufficiently serve as a proper metaphor that identifies and 
defines a complete and inclusive national portrait. Subscribing to a belief on the contrary 
is problematic on two levels.
First, to assume the possibility of a complete national portrait would be to finalize 
the national identity as frozen within time. So doing would essentially position the 
national identity as transcendent to its social and historical context. This would eliminate 
the possibility for change via growth and development. As a result, the national image, as 
it currently exists, could only be interpreted as a-historical. This would mean that it has 
always naturally existed as it is, in its current conception, and it will remain so forever. 
Furthermore, the naturalization of an a-historical national identity would ultimately
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exclude immigrant input as alien from ‘without’, while being antithetical to difference 
from ‘within’. To clarify this point, immigrants could not integrate within the national 
imaginary without first being cleansed of the qualities that make them different in relation 
to those who constitute the national imaginary. Those qualities are essentially what 
constitute their difference as immigrants. As a result, difference cannot be fully accepted 
within the national imaginary because the national imaginary ultimately strives towards 
homogeneity which is actually antithetical to the very notion o f difference that immigrant 
populations represent. These immigrant populations are considered to be necessary 
ornaments within a multicultural ‘mosaic’. Without them, the ‘mosaic’ could not exist. 
For immigrants to occupy space within the national imaginary as immigrants (those 
defined in difference to the national status quo) their input must be viewed as alien to the 
homogeneity that has already been achieved through consensus a priori within the 
imaginary itself (exclusively formed by a dominant colonizing force).
As diversity becomes homogenized under the rubric o f the national imaginary, 
difference (in the ‘liberal’ sense) can only be tolerated and not fully accepted, if  this 
national imaginary is in fact antithetical to the very notion of difference. Despite this 
logic, however, the Canadian identity -  as comprised within a multicultural ‘mosaic’ -  
continues to be premised on a static concept of culture that has become naturalized 
through myth within the national imaginary. (Bannerji, 2000; Bissoondath, 2002; 
Walcott, 2003)
The second level, where imagining cultures as fixed wholes within the national 
image constitutes a problem, can be seen in the current disposition o f the various cultures 
that form the surface o f this national portrait. Because difference cannot be fully 
accepted, these diverse cultures are seen as naturally located outside o f the national
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imaginary despite the fact that they reside within its composition. The centre/ periphery 
image created in the relationships of cultural and economic class holds true in this sense 
as difference is pushed out towards the margins in order to be better managed by the 
colonizing interior. Furthermore, given the problems of locating diversity within the 
national imaginary, an ‘official multicultural mosaic’ as constitutive of the Canadian 
identity is problematic in the way in which it fixes the diverse cultural parts as 
manageable objects.
DEHUMANIZING OBJECTS OF DIFFERENCE AND A CULT OF FETISH
Although the location of diverse cultures appears to exist naturally on the 
periphery, objectified through the ‘impressive ideological formations’ o f imperialism as 
manageable commodities, they are in fact constituted and positioned that way by the 
dominant forces that define them as such. Edward Said (1978) eloquently captures this 
sentiment when he states that “only the Orientalist can interpret the Orient, the Orient 
being radically incapable of interpreting itself’ (p. 289). Because o f this, the limited 
perception of the ‘social observer’ (Benhabib, 2002) is driven by the need to essentialize 
a fixed cultural badge to the object of difference being managed. This fixed cultural 
badge becomes worn like a straight] acket to keep difference confined within the 
trivialities of their subjugated positioning. The diverse cultures that make up the portrait 
of Canada, therefore, are narrowly reduced to one-dimensional caricatures, commodified 
by the fruits of their ‘exotic’ lifestyles.
Material products like food, costume, and music are cultural artefacts that can be 
packaged, marketed, and sold to consumers to concretize an imagined multicultural 
national identity. These cultural parts are themselves fractured pieces o f broader, fluid,
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cultural heritages that are now reduced to the aesthetic shells o f consumption by the 
dominant Canadian imaginary. Seen as nothing more than an aesthetic appeal to the 
‘exotic’, these cultural fragments adorn the Canadian imaginary like ornaments: visible, 
manageable, trinkets of convenience. In the process of fragmenting identity, the 
producers of commodified cultural artefacts become objectified themselves. This 
objectification o f difference is a patently dehumanizing act o f power exercised in the 
interests of the dominant group.
According to Paulo Freire (1970), the act of dehumanization is a crucial marker of 
oppression played out in the dialectical relationship between a dominant class and a 
subordinated class -  both o f which can only exist in relation to one another. For Freire 
(1970), “an act is oppressive only when it prevents men [sfc] from being more fully 
human” (p. 42). The objectification of difference is one such act that is executed by the 
dominant or oppressive class through the exclusive conception of themselves as human 
beings. To clarify this point, one must remember that the notion of ‘se lf  -  the dominant 
‘oppressors’ -  is solely contingent on the definition ‘other’ -  the ‘oppressed’ class. This 
definition of ‘other’, therefore, is not only different from the notion of ‘se lf  but as 
signifiers of identity they are diametrically opposed. For ‘se lf  to lay exclusive claim to 
the status of humanity, ‘other’ -  by default -  must be dehumanized in the interest of 
maintaining one’s humanity solely at the expense of another’s. This is further illustrated 
by the dominant class’ belief that everything -  including other people -  can be objectified 
as commodities to be managed and purchased. Difference, in this case must necessarily 
be objectified and ultimately dehumanized in order for the dominant class to maintain its 
privileged position of power.
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It could not be otherwise. If the humanization o f the oppressed signifies 
subversion, so also does their freedom; hence the necessity for constant 
control. And the more the oppressors control the oppressed, the more they 
change them into apparently inanimate “things.” (Freire, 1970, p. 45)
Difference, therefore, is not accepted, but merely tolerated as an act of imperial 
arrogance. Under this arrogance, reinforced by Canada’s ‘official multiculturalism’, 
tolerance becomes a privilege afforded to alterity by the benevolence o f Empire. 
Accommodating diversity exclusively on a superficial level, so long as the national 
imaginary remains the product o f its colonial founders, Canada’s ‘official 
multiculturalism’ segregates its citizens, constituting a form o f cultural apartheid. 
Alienated from the national imaginary, cultural differences become reduced as objectified 
ornaments of diverse fetishes.
Fetishizing cultural difference allows for the inclusion and spectacle of 
ornamentation (via cultural artefacts or objectified others), while excluding the people 
that produce these artefacts as real citizens within the Canadian imaginary. Reducing 
perceived cultures to random, fragmented aspects o f their hybrid and evolving lifestyles, 
essentially robs the members of these perceived cultures of their potential to participate as 
equal citizens that make up the country. For example, to the ‘social observer’ Chinese 
culture becomes narrowly defined by perceived foods and festivals, patronizingly and 
generically referred to as Chinese. The same can be seen with respect to almost all other 
ethnic groups and perceived cultural wholes that are constituted within the ‘mosaic’. In 
this superficial instance, the visuospatial metaphor of centre and periphery appears to 
dissolve under the rubric of the ‘mosaic’ metaphor, ostensibly implying a sense of 
progress towards the ‘liberal’ notion of equality.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
MULTICULTURAL MOSAIC -  Centre & Periphery Reborn in the ‘Ex-factor’
Within the ‘mosaic’ metaphor, the centre is perceived to be subsumed by the 
periphery. As a result, the illusion of a unified, homogeneous whole is created even 
though it is actually constituted thoroughly by various fluid, heterogeneous parts. This 
occurs primarily due to the fact that a dominant group -  characterized within a racialized 
hierarchy by a value o f ‘whiteness’11 -  has been written out o f the metaphor, as an 
invisible, ubiquitous and creative force that enables the ‘mosaic’ to exist. Indeed, the 
‘mosaic’ is a product o f the dominant group’s creative imagination. As the dominant 
group, impelled by the ‘impressive ideological formations’ o f imperial designs, remains 
‘ex-nominated’ (Barthes, 1972, 1984) in the ‘mosaic’, the metaphor becomes solidified 
and secured. ‘Whiteness’, therefore, serves as a ‘normative’ value in relation to the 
mosaic and is rendered invisible. This invisibility allows ‘whiteness’ as a normative 
value to remain ‘unnamed’. Borrowing Barthes’ (1972, 1984) concept o f denomination, 
the power dynamic intrinsic to the precarious positioning of unnamed engineers of the 
‘mosaic’ is precisely what I would refer to as the ‘ex-factor’. Power, in this sense, 
operates by separating the creator and the object created at safe distances from each other
11 According to Ruth Frankenberg (1993), ‘whiteness’ is structured within a negotiated terrain o f  
historical and material contingencies. Like other racialized constructs -  such as ‘blackness’ -  ‘whiteness’ 
exists as a means o f  articulating lived experiences through ‘race’ and is by no means a monolithic entity. 
Indeed, people who are perceived as ‘white’ are also racialized and exhibit many ways o f  living 
‘whiteness’. Exploring and naming ‘whiteness’, attempts at dem ystifying its apparent normative and 
invisible qualities with respect to the perceived racial neutrality about it. This perceived racial neutrality is 
part and parcel an effect o f  its dominance where subjects are positioned within social, political, and 
economic relations o f  power. The meanings generated about these relations that help to define the positions 
o f  social actors (subjects) situated within them, are socially constructed and are, therefore, susceptible to 
shift over time and are in no way absolute. As a result, ‘whiteness’ can be interpreted as a relational 
category, defined in ‘racisms’ that determine other racialized categories. For the purpose o f  this thesis, 
however, “the term ‘whiteness’ signals the production and reproduction o f  dominance rather than 
subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage” (Frankenberg, 
1993, pp. 236-237).
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discursively. This becomes evident, for example, when examining government census 
data on diversity.
According to the 2001 Census Highlights, produced by the Ontario Ministry of 
Finance, the province o f Ontario appears to be increasingly diverse (see Appendix A). As 
a result, it can be said that Ontario is becoming increasingly multicultural. If  Ontario is 
perceived as becoming increasingly ‘multicultural’, Canada -  by default -  is also seen as 
becoming increasingly ‘multicultural’ since Ontario is a province of Canada (Census 
2001 Highlights). Accompanied by an array of colourful charts, a graph, and statistics, is 
the subheading “Visible Minorities Making Canada Increasingly Diverse.” This 
subheading anchors the statistics that purportedly point to increased diversity without 
truly defining what is meant by diversity. Interestingly enough, however, ‘visible 
minorities’ are defined “as persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non- 
Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” ‘White’ becomes the base signifier from 
which all difference is measured. Caucasian is the ‘race’ -  based on a flawed taxonomy -  
that tenuously connects false notions o f racial designation to narrowly defined notions of 
fixed cultures while remaining invisible beyond the scope of difference.
‘Whiteness’, characterized by subscription to a Western ideology, as a broad 
classification of a dominant racialized group, is known in reference to everything that it is 
not. To explain this further, there are no cultural ornaments that straight]'acket a ‘white’ 
cultural horizon as a delineable whole. ‘White’, as it appears to exist in binary opposition 
to that which it has narrowly defined as “other” or ‘coloured’ is actually based on a 
hierarchical relationship. This is what Edward Said (1993) refers to when he states that 
cultural identities are not essentializations that exist as complete entities in nature -  even 
though the essentializations of cultural identities are considered to be part of their
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“enduring appeal” -  but are in fact “contrapuntal ensembles” formed in an array of 
“opposites” and “negatives” (p. 52). Cultural identity, therefore, is formed within a sea of 
‘contested narratives’ (Benhabib, 2002) that contributes to the essence o f its hybridity. It 
becomes problematic to fair and equal social relations, when one group dominates 
through the realization its own hybridity by denying the hybrid quality o f the ‘other’ 
groups that it subjugates. The hybridity of the dominant cultural entity is already 
assumed in its absence from the ‘mosaic’. The ‘mosaic’, therefore, becomes a 
conceptual tool o f dominance solely reserved to define and manage difference and not 
sameness.
This categorization of difference within the ‘mosaic’ allows for the visibility of
diverse groups to be managed and policed in a surreptitiously different way than other
Canadians o f a less visible stature (or those whose visibility is absorbed a priori in the
constitution of the Canadian imaginary with no fixed status o f pseudo-belonging).
Difference, in this case, becomes coded in relation to an idealized standard o f the ‘self.
As an idealized standard or centre around which difference orbits, the ‘se lf  is defined in
its ‘non-differential’ status. The ‘se lf is titled as such because it is not the ‘other’. Not
only is ‘other’ necessarily defined in difference from the ‘se lf , ‘se lf  also comes into
existence by creating and locating ‘other’ in order to reduce the anxiety created by an
identity crisis (Eze, 2001; Fanon, 1967). The identity of the ‘se lf  is contingent upon the
clarity of difference agreed upon through convention in the production and process of
positioning ‘other’ in relation to what the ‘se lf  believes it is not. ‘S e lf and ‘other’ are
hierarchical subjects in a performative play o f relational difference.
The construction of identity -  for identity.. .while obviously a repository of 
distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction in my opinion -  
involves the construction of opposites and “others” whose actuality is
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always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of 
their differences from “us” . . .Far from a static thing then, identity of self or 
“other’ is a much worked over historical, social, intellectual, and political 
process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions 
in all societies. (Said, 1978, p.332)
Intrinsic to this process, ‘se lf maintains a position of privilege by virtue o f its 
exclusive access to shaping the national imaginary and its subsequent right to establish 
boundaries of membership by naming difference. Indeed, the ‘impressive ideological 
formations’ that fashion and drive imperialism has imbued those positioned as ‘se lf with 
the power to represent and speak for those they position as ‘other’. This relationship, 
perpetuated by unlimited access to the national imaginary, is legitimated through myths 
that serve to enforce and preserve a current balance o f power in society. These myths 
work to maintain privilege for the position of ‘se lf through the imperialistic ideologies of 
racism as they become naturalized by the consensus of the dominant class.
Since notions o f ‘other’ are different from ‘se lf , and it is precisely this difference 
that necessitates the existence o f the ‘se lf, myth is used to naturalize these differences 
creating the least amount of potential for possible resistance. Although gaps are 
inherently created by difference, as it is systematically coded by the ideologies of the 
privileged class positioned as ‘se lf , myth is used to employ ideologies that work to 
smooth out the gaps and potential class conflicts coded through difference. In other 
words, myth serves to obfuscate the social relations o f power -  as seen through the ways 
in which racialized communities are constituted in the social organization of classes -  that 
order perceived cultural differences making them appear natural.
By segregating naturally perceived cultural differences, the formation o f potential 
networked solidarities are discouraged, creating the impression that coalition building is 
an impossible feat based on the illusion of the incommensurability and incompatibility of
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diverse cultural communities. As a result, various racialized communities are placed in a 
relative state of competitiveness with one another; further obscuring any commonalities 
that they may share through the historical and material conditions that constitute class 
distinctions (Bannerji, 2000). According to Bannerji (2000), “a concept of class helps us 
to see the network of social relations constituting an overall social organization which 
both implicates and cuts through racialization/ ethnicization and gender” (p. 7).
Once class relations are obscured in the mythic constructions o f racialized and 
cultured communities, difference of the ‘other’ must be tolerated in order for ‘other’ to be 
positioned as subordinate while creating an environment with the least potential for 
resistance. By positioning ‘other’ as a cultural fetish to be consumed at a moment’s 
convenience, the growth and development of cultures are ultimately restricted. The 
Canadian policy o f ‘official multiculturalism’ is one way in which the gap of difference is 
smoothed over using the ‘liberal’ ideology of tolerance. This limits the scope and depth 
of Canadian cultural identities and ultimately, intentional or not, sanctions racial 
hierarchies as naturalized within the myth about ‘race’.
Despite the current rhetoric of tolerance, ‘official multiculturalism’ serves to 
further perpetuate a notion of exclusion that has very insidious effects on the social 
relations of citizens within the national composition. Based on this ‘liberal’ rhetoric of 
tolerance, ultimately alienating cultures through marked exclusion from the national 
imaginary, ‘official multiculturalism’ has set a precedent for the practices of racism that 
plagues the lives o f various Canadian communities. Inspiring a normalizing discourse of 
‘acceptable’ oppression through the practice of racial profiling by police services like 
Toronto, and the subsequent coding of racialized difference in the ‘liberal’ media, the
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perceived notion o f ‘race’ as scripted within ‘official multiculturalism’, must be explored 
and deconstructed as a signifier constructed in and through language.
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IV. HISTORICAL CONTINGENCIES TO RACIALIZED
REALITIES
LANGUAGE OF RELATIONAL DIFFERENCES -  ‘Race’ of Ancients to Irish
And the mind that has conceived a plan o f  living must never loose sight o f  
the chaos against which that pattern was conceived [...] Thus, having tried 
to give pattern to the chaos which lives within the patterns o f  your 
certainties, I  must come out, I  must emerge.
(Ellison, 1947, pp. 580-581) 
The construction o f ‘race’ through language reveals one of the biggest illusions of 
Western civilization. In contrast to common perceptions about it, ‘race’ is not a bio- 
genetic reality. Traditional notions of ‘race’ as seen through somatic differences, based 
on skin colour and hair texture, come from Western myths of objective realism that 
inform a dominant world view. Grounded in the dominant notion o f reality, ‘race’ 
remains an unrelenting part of some of the most oppressive ideologies (Hall, 1995). Like 
perceived notions o f reality, the material assumptions about ‘race’ are subject to critical 
discursive analysis.
Throughout history ‘race’ has become a way of classifying people of the world 
into groups of relational differences. Constituted in language, these values in difference 
have changed among and between civilizations, over time. Such classifications of distinct 
populations are formulated in systems o f difference that are socially and historically 
contingent. These systems of difference are motivated by discourses that form the 
distinct realities o f separate world views. Because of these factors, ways of ordering 
existence in relation to ‘others’ can be interpreted as arbitrary constructions even though 
they constitute common social knowledge through myth. This is seen in the ways past 
civilizations have ordered their realm in terms of racial differences.
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Kwame Anthony Appiah (1995) offers a brief historiography on the social 
construction of ‘race’. For Appiah (1995), modem racial categories are seen as 
ideological constructs contingent upon the varied histories o f different civilizations.
These constructs are subject manifestations of dominant conceptual frameworks or myth. 
As ideological creations, they become susceptible to the shifting climate of their 
respective historical and material conditions that temper a relative social atmosphere. For 
example, one way that people delineated perceived racial difference was through common 
subscriptions to religious beliefs and practices. This is seen in the ways in which the 
ancient Greeks and Hebrews distinguished themselves as separate from other populations 
that they had encountered.
Delineating themselves as different from the rest of the world, the ancient 
Hebrews culturally located each other in allegiance to the same God. Everyone who 
worshiped the same God, in the same manner, was considered members of the same 
‘race’ (Appiah, 1995). Essentially those claiming membership to the same ‘race’ were 
assumed to be subscribing to the same world view. In so doing, each individual lived 
within the dominant framework of a shared reality. Although the ancient Hebrews had 
one way of interpreting their existence by classifying difference, theocentric myths were 
not the only form of ordering the ancient world.
In ancient Greece, the Hellenes distinguished themselves from the rest of the 
world according to the environment in which they lived. In the fifth century B.C, 
Hippocrates believed his ‘race’ to be naturally tougher and more independent than the 
people of Asia Minor in the West (Appiah, 1995). His belief was largely based on the 
perceivably unique environmental conditions through which the population that he 
belonged to developed and thrived. His reasoning behind this was that the infertile soils
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had forced them to evolve that way. ‘Race’ is distinguished here, not in terms of 
theological affiliation, but in terms of geographical logos and personal worth. Above all, 
this notion of personal worth was based less on biology and more so determined by “the 
nature of the political relationship between peoples which causes a people to be viewed in 
a particular light” (Pieterse, 1995, p. 26). Following this line o f reasoning it becomes 
clear that the concept o f ‘race’ has not always been confined exclusively to a biological 
explanation.
Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1995) argues that the concept o f ‘race’ is not biologically 
grounded at all. As an ideologically loaded construct, the modem assumption about 
‘race’, as a valid biological taxonomy, is in fact a socio-political fabrication. Pieterse 
(1995) examines the ways in which ‘race’ and class intersect through systems of 
domination. Indeed, both of these forms of social stratification are inextricably linked 
through specific histories, ideologies, and the underlying logic o f how power in society is 
distributed (Pieterse, 1995). Although power in society was in some cases defined and 
exercised through class relations it was also defined and exercised in part by differences 
in physical appearances as a result of the imperial conquests o f ‘other’ civilizations like 
those in Africa.
Throughout modem history, where there has been an unequal distribution of 
power in society, people who have been subjugated to the powers of dominant groups 
have been compared to dark skinned Africans either in terms o f status, treatment, or 
appearance (Pieterse, 1995). For example, Chamfort, during the 18 century, referred to 
the poor underclass as the Negroes of Europe (Pieterse, 1995). In this case class 
distinctions were coded as racial difference. Although ‘race’ was also coded on the basis 
of somatic features -  as seen in the ways that the British colonizers referred to East
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Indians as niggers on the basis o f skin colour -  ‘race’ was not always exclusive to 
biological interpretation. ‘Race’ -  as a way of delineating differences between 
populations -  was primarily a way of politically justifying an Empire’s moral right to 
subject conquered populations to powers of domination (Said, 1978, 1993). As an 
imperialistic discourse, the concept of ‘race’ was even used in the British treatment of the 
Irish.
Shortly after the Anglo-Norman invasions, the Irish were considered to be a 
savage and barbaric ‘race’ of people. They were seen, by the British, uncivilized, just 
like the rebellious tribes of Africa and the America’s. From the 19th century forward, the 
British began to depict the Irish as sharing some of the same physical traits that were 
supposedly exclusive to Negroes in various printed illustrations and cartoons. The Irish 
were looked upon as having darker skin than the average Caucasian and were 
characterized as exhibiting ape-like features in many publications and illustrations of the 
time. They were White Negroes (Pietrerse, 1995). This phenomenon was further 
compounded by the sudden influx of Irish immigrants during the famine of 1840, and 
their constant resistance to British rule. The title ‘white negroes’, however, did not 
remain a fixed category in which all Irish would be classified. The Irish were eventually 
able to assimilate into ‘whiteness’ (Postal & Ignatiev, 1997) by identifying with other 
Europeans through somatic features12. A racialized caste system based on somatic
12 American history has recorded incidents o f  European bond-labourers on perceivably equal footing with 
their African counterparts especially during the 17th century. Both groups were initially united by their 
membership in a shared working class and would find solidarity in various revolts and uprisings. In order 
to curb this solidarity to weaken revolts, new forms o f  solidarity were organized, produced and reproduced 
along notions o f  ‘race’. These new forms o f  solidarity were based on skin colour, bringing about a new  
form o f  social control in the ‘invention o f  the white race’. For more information on this transition see 
Theodore W. A llen’s (1994) The Invention o f  the White Race: The Origins o f  R acial Oppression in Anglo 
America.
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differences that created a hierarchical structure for ordering ‘races’ was also initiated 
from the outset of Western and capitalist imperial expansion.
EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF ‘RACE’ AS A BIOLOGICAL TAXOMOMY
As Western empires expanded, under capitalist and imperial endeavours, their 
populations became exposed to other populations that looked ‘exotic’ them. This 
discovery created anxieties among Western populations -  including the poor and the Irish 
-  that led to a crisis of identity. Practicing new customs, the ‘exotic’ beings stood outside 
of any previously held identity profile. Indeed, they were even considered beneath 
Europe’s poor. They had dark skin -  even darker than the poor and the Irish -  and were 
considered to be direct opposites of the Europeans. A new system of categorizing 
individuals into groups was devised to soothe the anxieties caused by the identity crisis 
felt by the colonizers.
Colonizers believed that one way of categorizing everyone, was through ‘sensible’ 
somatic differences. Seeing that these strange beings had features like dark skin and 
coarsely textured hair -  in contrast to the skin and hair of the colonizers -  somatic 
distinctions appeared to be a logical way of coding difference. Difference, in this 
capacity, was quickly appropriated within a dominant biological discourse used to 
distinguish the colonized from the colonizers. These features became naturalized 
demarcations of racial identity. As a result, ‘race’, was, and in some cases still remains, 
biologically defined as a natural way of categorizing differences among people. In order 
to illustrate this continuity in racism, from ancient societies through imperial colonialism 
to present, one must carefully examine the ‘peculiar institutions’ (Wacquant, 2002) that
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continually produce new ‘racisms’ while attempting to maintain fixed notions of ‘race’ 
(Hall, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002).
‘PECULIAR INSTITUTIONS’ AND THE PRODUCTION OF RACISMS
Loic Wacquant (2002) identifies the ways in which ‘racisms’ have been 
perpetuated throughout American history as the result of the development o f at least four 
main ‘peculiar institutions’ that helped to define the social relations of power in American 
society. These four main institutions -  chattel slavery and restricted labour, the Jim Crow 
system of legalized segregation, the ghettoization of urban living spaces, and the penal 
system of mass incarceration -  all contributed to the legitimization, normalization, and 
perpetuation o f everyday ‘racisms’. The existence of ‘racisms’ that emerge as a result of 
these institutions are defined in the specific social relations o f power that operate to 
position, manage, and control populations o f ‘other’ (most noticeably peoples o f the 
African diasporas currently labelled ‘black’) (Podur, 2002; Wacquant, 2002).
Here we can clearly see the historical link between the ‘strange fruit’ of the 
colonial past and the ‘strange fruit’ of the ‘tolerant’ present. What is o f particular 
importance to this thesis, drawing from this sense of historical racial continuity, is the fact 
that racisms emerged and continue to persist as by-products o f the systemic structures of 
society’s ‘peculiar institutions’. For example, slaves were not stolen from Africa simply 
as a means to satisfy racist endeavours. Slaves were initially brought to the America’s 
from Africa for their labour. Racism was produced as an effect o f the dehumanizing 
aspects of slavery.
Slavery, as an institution that exploited the labour of objectified beings for 
capitalistic gain, was in dire need of a system that justified the dehumanizing aspects of
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its practice (Wacquant, 2002). Such a system was perceived as naturally derived from the 
division o f labour based in the conception of racial categories. These racial categories, 
coupled with a disparate market economy, reinforced a racialized caste system of 
hierarchical ordering. This caste system was based on the creation and implementation of 
delineable racial categories that were devised in relation to somatic features like skin 
colour. Racism, therefore, was a not a precondition of slavery but a consequence.
Indeed, racism actually occurred through the justification of an exploitative ‘peculiar 
institution’ in the creation and implementation o f a racialized caste system. In order for 
the caste to work, it had to appear natural and absolute. Difference had to be marked and 
fixed in order to be effectively managed and dealt with. Not far removed from its roots as 
a construct within the market system, skin colour remains a primary signifier of 
difference -  as previously discussed in the Census 2001 Highlights -  even within a 
‘liberal’ society that purports to tolerate diversity.
Although ‘race’ -  commonly perceived through colour today -  was bom a 
construct, it continues to be a dominant defining quality of difference that remains 
couched in a myth o f naturalized orientation. Despite the fact that it is an abstraction, 
‘race’ continues to serve as an objectified social genre that is commonly used to define, 
categorize, separate and control groups of people. Once separated, difference can be 
exploited and controlled more efficiently. Because the imagined existence of separate 
groups -  known as ‘races’ -  have been reinforced in many ways, through various 
‘peculiar institutions’ over time, notions of difference have become taken-for-granted, 
constituting a dominant social myth about ‘race’.
As myth, the social, political, and historical context o f ‘race’ has been removed 
from the dominant discourse about it, allowing it to exist ensconced in nature as an
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autonomous entity, affecting real material and historical conditions o f oppression. As a 
result, there has been the development of some critical schools o f thought that places 
unwarranted emphasis on the concept of ‘race’ as a means within itself that can 
purportedly be useful in organizing anti-racist practices towards social change.
PUTTING THE ‘CRITICAL’ BACK IN CRITICAL RACE THEORIES
Despite the fact that many forms of domination and oppression -  like those based 
on systems o f ‘race’, ‘class’, and ‘gender’ -  are intimately connected (Hooks, 1995,
1997), there have been attempts lately by some critical ‘race’ theorists to forge a critical 
pedagogy that decentres notions o f class in the interests o f centring notions of ‘race’ 
(Allen, 2004; Leonardo, 2004; Lynn, 2004; Parker & Stovall, 2004). Even though their 
best efforts are guided by noble purposes, this centralized notion of ‘race’ is a curious 
undertaking, to say the least, especially when systems of domination and oppression are 
not mutually exclusive and autonomous in relation to one another. For Gregory 
Meyerson (2002), “oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are n o t ... it does 
not follow that multiple oppressions require multiple structural causes”.
Modalities like gender and ‘race’ are forms of social stratification that are 
epiphenomenal attributes of a class based society (San Juan, 2002, 2003). For example, it 
becomes very difficult for a person to address issues of racism without exploring its 
connections to the globalized forms of capitalism that contribute to conditions of 
apartheid world wide (Marable, 2004). For this reason, some other critical theorists 
cannot avoid noticing the importance of class when criticizing racism as systematic 
phenomena (Bannerji, 2000; Cox, 1959; Darder & Torres, 2004; Meyerson, 2000; Sahay, 
1998; San Juan, 2002, 2003; Scatamburlo D ’Annibale & McLaren, 2003, 2004). For
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these theorists, class is not simply one aspect o f identity but a socializing totality marked 
by the mechanisms o f capitalism (San Juan, 2002, 2003). Based on this premise,
‘racisms’ are examined in the ways in which they become produced and reproduced in 
class-based society (Cabusao, 2005). By de-emphasizing class through an emphasis on 
‘race’, some of the self proclaimed critical ‘race’ theorists essentially fix notions o f ‘race’ 
as an autonomous category through which racial oppression must be exclusively handled. 
This only further contributes to the same acts o f fetishizing and reifying ‘race’ that helps 
in maintaining the existence of the ‘racisms’ they purport to be stridently against (Bell, 
2002; Gilroy, 2002; Sahay, 1998). This occurs despite widespread scholarly 
acknowledgment o f the fact that ‘race’ is a social construct.
Even though all critical theorists will agree that ‘race’ is a social construct, some 
scholars insist on objectifying and fetishizing its abstraction, by claiming that it creates 
systems and circumstances for historical and material oppression. The effects of these 
systems and circumstances have been referred to as racism. What occurs is the proverbial 
‘chicken and egg’ scenario. For such theorists, racism is perceived to be the natural 
product o f distinct ‘races’. Because of this they believe that ‘race’ must play a central 
role in critical theory. A contradiction exists, however, in this assessment. ‘Race’ as a 
social construct cannot produce natural phenomena; it can only produce constructs that 
are further removed from a historical and material base. Because o f this, ‘race’ is not a 
useful analytical or discursive construct for effecting change.
As stated at the outset of this thesis, racism produces ‘races’ and not vice versa 
(Darder & Torres, 2004). By virtue of this premise, ‘race’ cannot explain racism 
(Meyerson, 2000). Class division, structured historically in the rise o f imperial 
capitalism, produces the material circumstances that breed racism (Bohmer, n.d.; Daniels,
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1996; Wacquant, 2002). The historical and material circumstances that call racism into 
existence, therefore, has fabricated notions of a hierarchy of distinct racialized bodies, 
commonly perceived as ‘races’. Indeed, the existence of distinct ‘races’ as a biological 
fact is rather a science fiction composed in myth. In light o f this logic, one would be 
more effective in the struggle against various ‘racisms’ by focusing less on ‘race’ and 
more on the process of ‘racialization’. Even though ‘race’ is fictional, many people will 
agree that ‘racialized communities’ are factual, existing in the real systems and 
circumstances of historical and material oppression.
‘RACE’ vs. ‘RACIALIZED COMMUNITIES’ -  Demystification & Emphasis
Distinguishing between notions o f ‘race’ and ‘racialized communities’ is 
important towards the creation of a critical anti-racist discourse. The notion o f ‘race’, as 
touted by pseudo-scientists like Philippe Rushton, is a biological term used for identifying 
subspecies (Wise, n.d.). The notion of subspecies indicates that a degree of genetic 
variance must be significant enough to subcategorize organisms that are on the verge of 
branching off into entirely new species (Wise, n.d.). This notion of ‘race’ further implies 
that the human species can be divided into subgroups as a result of naturally occurring 
phenomena. The term ‘race’ connotes a biological reality and its use is therefore 
problematic when articulating a constructed quality about it. Instead of using ‘race’ as an 
analytic and discursive construct, the process o f racialization -  through which such a 
construct comes into existence -  may be a more useful tool of critical articulation.
According to Manning Marable (2004), ‘racialization’ connotes “the construction 
of racially unequal social hierarchies characterized by dominant and subordinate social 
relations between groups”. For Marable (2004), this process is a global problem that is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
intimately connected to the rise o f global capitalism -  as a ubiquitous colonizing force -  
that causes social relationships characterized by a type of global apartheid. Apartheid is 
an Afrikaans word meaning separateness that is based on the concept that a ‘herrenvolk’ 
or ‘master race’ is destined to rule over other ‘races’ (Marable, 2004). Although 
apartheid has historically defined the white minority rule in South Africa, it should not be 
considered a phenomenon exclusive to racism in South Africa.
According to Marable (2004), global apartheid is “the racialized division and 
stratification of resources, wealth, and power that separates Europe, North America and 
Japan from the billions o f mostly black, brown, indigenous, undocumented immigrant and 
poor people across the planet”. For the purposes o f this thesis, however, the concept of 
apartheid and a ‘master race’ can be translated into the ‘strange fruit’ that poison 
contemporary society through the racist policies and institutions o f ‘official 
multiculturalism’ in Canada. As an overarching, state sanctioned discourse, ‘official 
multiculturalism’ taps into the deep structures of systemic racism that not only naturalizes 
the practice of racial profiling but also fuels the mass media -  as yet another ‘peculiar 
institution’ -  that perpetuates the myth that separate ‘races’ exist naturally.
THE NATURE OF THINGS -  Grouping Populations According to ‘Race’?
As natural as ‘race’ may seem, there is absolutely nothing natural about it.
Indeed, there are gaps and contradictions inherent to the dominant notion that distinct 
‘races’ actually exist in nature. These gaps and contradictions become increasingly 
obvious as we peel back the layers of inter-textuality that constitute a dominant myth 
about ‘race’. As a result, ‘race’ becomes coded, through dominant discourses about it, as 
a concept that exists as a part of an objective and observable reality. Taken to be a part of
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objective reality -  as it is interpreted to exist in nature -  ‘race’, as a fixed subject for 
categorizing populations, becomes canonized as a veritable knowledge claim. This claim, 
however, reveals two main flaws that should not be overlooked.
First, it is virtually impossible to classify every human being into categories of 
skin colour and hair texture. Despite this fact, popular Western myths accept three main 
racial classifications. Negroid - having dark skin and coarse hair; Caucasoid - having 
light skin and straight hair; and Mongoloid - having pale skin and shapely eyes. If 
Negroes have dark skin and coarse hair, and Caucasians have light skin and straight hair, 
where do the majority o f East Indian people fit in? Most o f them have dark skin and 
straight hair. This model of classification also serves to alienate and exclude many 
aboriginal groups as being void of racial distinction. After all, according to these narrow 
traits of classification, some aboriginal groups may fit the category o f Mongoloid because 
of their light skin and shapely eyes; but what of those with dark skin and coarse hair?
Second, if  ‘race’ is biological, why is it not contingent upon other biological 
distinctions that our species share? Why should race be divided along the lines of skin 
colour and hair texture? Why not eye colour and hair colour; or why not blood type, or 
height? To open the dominant narrative to a wider array o f contingencies, would 
challenge the privileged subject association that contemporary myths prescribe as 
knowledge based. As a result, anxieties formed due to an identity crisis would increase, 
creating a shift in the power relationships among the racial hierarchy within society.
It was only relatively recent that ‘race’ was restricted exclusively to physiognomy. 
As discussed previously in this thesis, ‘race’ was also interchangeable with religion, 
nation, class, and/or culture throughout various points in history. People within Europe 
were characterized along similar dimensions to groups of people outside of Europe
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(Pieterse, 1995). Europeans had practiced racial languages that oppressed groups along 
shifting imaginary boundaries. Because of this, ‘race’ can be seen as interchangeable, 
contingent upon negotiated discursive assumptions. Indeed, classifying people along 
phenotypes or somatic differences, as a primary signifier, also carry the prescribed 
notions of secondary signified meanings within a dominant racial language.
SLIDING SIGNIFICATIONS AND THE LANGUAGE OF ‘RACE’
Stuart Hall (1996) examines the power dynamic intrinsic to the ideological bias of 
‘race’ as a socio-political construct. According to Hall (1996), ‘race’ has no taxonomic 
designation by virtue of a bio-genetic ascription. Despite this fact, ‘race’ survives as part 
of a contemporary Western vocabulary, loaded with harmful and oppressive ideological 
assumptions. These ideological assumptions about ‘race’ are manifest in discursive 
practices that have become validated through dominant Western myths.
The dominant myths, about ‘race’, contend that natural characteristics subsume 
value differences between groups along the lines o f intelligence and behaviour. People 
who subscribe to these myths, living within the dominant culture, assume that ‘race’ is a 
real and viable form of classification that constitutes knowledge. According to this view 
it is perceived as commonsense that ‘race’ can be used as a form of obvious and natural 
distinction -  both biologically and culturally. It is considered commonsense, therefore, 
that ‘race’ exists as a natural form of maintaining order among difference, within the 
existing social dynamic that serves to justify existing relations o f power. This implies 
that a universal sense of permanence, attributed to these taxonomic divisions, is rooted in 
a racist colonialist discourse.
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Stuart Hall (1996) claims that there is nothing static or absolute about ‘race’. 
Constituted in language, its meanings are subject to the socio-political atmosphere of the 
historical environment that helps to create it. Because of this, meanings created about 
‘race’ are always susceptible to change. Although classifications and categorizations are 
a fundamental human characteristic used to order meaning through language, these 
meanings are not absolute and should not be interpreted as such. Classifications and 
categorizations become especially problematic when they systematically attempt to 
justify existing power relationships as a way of maintaining an unjust social order by 
fixing differences. Once these differences are perceived as fixed, the corresponding 
systems of classification and categorization become taken-for-granted as myth. This is 
evident in the dominance of a social order based on the bio-genetic classification of ‘race’ 
as it has become and continues to be perpetuated through a dominant social myth. These 
myths can be revealed when the cultural artefacts in which they are coded are read as 
texts.
When read as a text, Hall (1996) perceives ‘race’ as working more like a language 
than a biological entity. As a result, ‘race’ can be seen as a discursive construct working 
as a sliding signifier (Hall, 1996). This statement can be best qualified through a brief 
examination of how meanings are produced through language and communication. 
During the production of meanings, through the discursive process of competition and 
negotiation of preferred readings, meanings can shift. This implies that ‘race’, as sliding 
signifier, cannot be fixed in its popular conception through bio-genetics. Grounded in 
language, meanings surrounding ‘race’ are continually susceptible to contested and 
negotiated perceptions that float through history. This means that the meanings 
surrounding the concept of ‘race’, as a ‘floating signifier’, are contextual and relative. Its
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meanings, therefore, are neither universal nor absolute. Race “floats within a sea of 
relational differences” (Hall, 1996). Given this premise, Hall (1996) has classified three 
main relational positions of difference for interpreting concepts about ‘race’.
First, the Realist position believes that objective, bio-genetic differences exist, 
outside of language, and are accurately reflected in common sense systems of knowledge. 
This Realist position is commonly interpreted from within the culture that considers such 
claims as knowledge. Second, the Linguistic position, discounts any notions that 
objective, physical differences exist, within what people consider to be real outside of its 
construction in and through language. Within this second position, any differences that 
come into existence are a result of their construction in and through language. According 
to this position, language creates reality. A third position, however, considers that there 
are many material differences that exist in what we perceive as reality outside of 
language. It is only in and through systems of language that these differences become 
intelligible. Hall (1996) considers this third position to be discursive.
Subscribing to the Discursive position, Hall (1996) sees three major historical 
phases of discourse that attempted to -  and still attempt to -  justify power relations 
through the categories o f racial hierarchy. All three phases try to fix differences as 
constitutive by absolute knowledge within the dominant myths o f society. These 
differences are an attempt to make nature correspond with culture, by removing any 
historical context surrounding notions o f ‘race’. Indeed, these naturalized assumptions 
become part of a commonsense social discourse within each respective phase of 
understanding. For Hall (1996), these three epistemological phases are constitutive of the 
dominant discourses that have influenced and changed a given culture’s perspective on 
the reality o f ‘race’ over time.
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As the first phase o f knowledge, religion attempted to explain and fix perceived 
racial differences. When Europeans encountered people o f the ‘New W orld’ there was a 
question of whether or not these ‘new beings’ were human like the Europeans. It became 
assumed and understood as commonsense that the indigenous populations o f the ‘New 
World’ were of a different animal species created by God. Knowledge, in this case, was 
reflected and legitimated through religion. As Western empires realized that the new 
populations encountered could be somewhat assimilated into a Westernized culture by 
being converted to Christianity, religion no longer served to be an adequate explanation 
to fix cultural and somatic differences.
Anthropology served as the second phase of knowledge for understanding new 
populations o f people. When it was determined that the people o f the ‘New World’ were 
of the same species as the Europeans, it became assumed as common knowledge that 
these ‘new people’ were at a different stage of evolutionary development. The 
indigenous people of Africa and the Americas were believed to be closer to the original 
species, and were seen as ‘missing links’ on the evolutionary ladder that distinguished 
humans from primates. Anthropological assumptions, in this case, informed and 
determined commonsense, positioning Europeans at a higher stage o f evolutionary 
development over ‘people o f colour’. When anthropology no longer provided a sufficient 
rationale to explain and fix the gulf of difference between the two populations, the 
collection o f ‘scientific’ research and data was used in its place.
Science, as the third phase of knowledge, currently underlies much o f our 
contemporary Western myths about ‘race’. Subsuming previous religious and 
anthropological discourses about ‘race’, claims about modem science is often times used
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to justify and fix racial differences through the study of bone structure, blood factors and 
genetics.
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V. THE SCIENCE OF OPPRESSION
COMPETING SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS -  A Contested Terrain of Inquiry
Scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property 
o f a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need to know 
the special characteristics o f  the groups that create and use it.
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 210)
The theory and practice of Western Science, itself constructed within a discourse 
of related empiricisms (Kuhn, 1962), is subject to ideological scrutiny because it is bom 
within a social and historical context and cannot be divorced from the environment of its 
conception (Adelman et.al, 2003). As the stmcture o f science evolves, the bio-genetic 
reality of ‘race’ can even be challenged through contrasting scientific paradigms (Brace, 
2000; Bamshad & Olsen, 2003). Because of this, the debate among biological 
anthropologists on the reality o f ‘race’ is polarized.
Biological factors classifying people into distinct ‘races’ can yield many 
contradictory results. Forensic anthropologists, working with bone stmcture, believe that 
they can group people as originating from specific geographic regions. Based on this 
data, some of them believe that further inferences can be made on the type of ‘race’ that a 
person belongs to by matching bone stmcture with further speculations on other somatic 
features like skin colour (Gill, 2000). According to this belief, bone stmcture corresponds 
to commonly held assumptions about ‘race’ and is based on inheritable morphological 
attributes. For example, some forensic anthropologists believe that they can classify 
human skulls as belonging to distinct ‘races’. Narrow nasal passages and eye sockets that 
are in close proximity to each other may indicate a Caucasoid, emphasized cheek bones 
may indicate a Mongoloid, and broad nasal passages “shaped like an upside down heart” 
may indicate that the skull belonged to a Negroid person (Rushton, 1995, 1996, 1998,
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2000). On the other side of this debate, however, anthropologists studying blood factors 
disagree.
Serologists show that many biological traits cut across traditional racial 
boundaries. Phenotypical attributes such as skin, hair and bone, are distinct categories 
influenced by natural forces like climate. Blood-factor frequencies are not shaped by 
environmental forces in the same ways that skin, hair, and bone are. Serologists consider 
these physical variations among people as gradients o f change known as clines (Brace, 
2000). With physical variations in appearance being attributed to clines (as opposed to 
clearly distinguishable separations), it is impossible to conclusively delineate one group 
of people as distinct from another group o f people. Differences in skin colour are gradual 
and seamless with no break in distinction from one geographical region to the next. 
Differences from ‘white’ skin to ‘black’ skin, rest on latitudinal orientation and exposure 
to the intensity o f the sun’s ultra violet rays. Without comparing extremes, it is hard to 
discern where one ‘race’ ends and another begins. Despite this fact, academics, 
intellectuals, and scientists alike, still ponder and debate imagined distinctions between 
populations by classifying them in terms o f ‘race’ as a heritable, biological taxonomy. 
Many o f these proponents have made a handsome career off such overtly racist and 
misleading notions. One of the leading proponents o f ‘race’ -  as a scientifically valid 
taxonomic concept -  is Canada’s own J. Philippe Rushton.
J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PARADOX
John Philippe Rushton currently teaches as a tenured professor in the University 
of Western Ontario’s Psychology department. Author o f many controversial journal 
articles and books -  like his most infamous Race, Evolution and Behavior -  Rushton is
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one of Canada’s hallmark figures in a hotly debated ‘reality o f race’ argument. Rushton’s 
(1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) studies attempt to prove that by analysing proposed 
morphological and physiological differences between perceived ‘races’, scientists can 
accurately predict differences in intellectual potential and behavioural patterns -  such as 
aggression and sexual restraint -  that he believes can be attributed to differences between 
the respective racial categories. Furthermore, Rushton (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) 
believes that ‘race’ as a causal factor is not only scientifically verifiable within North 
America but is also consistent globally throughout time. This implies a universality and 
absoluteness to his findings that also highlights a glaring contradiction in his overall 
paradigm. This glaring contradiction -  as I will return to shortly -  ultimately leads his 
main arguments down a path of self destruction.
Rushton’s (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) research, linking perceived racial 
differences to causal behavioural attributes and intelligence, places Asians at the more 
advanced end of the racial spectrum and Africans at the more primitive end. Europeans, 
in this framework, are curiously located consistently in between Asians and Africans. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Europeans are not only located in the middle but 
are actually located in closer proximity to Asians than they are to Africans. His location 
of these three dominant racial categories is supposedly based on research that includes 
data from over 60 social and somatic variables. Some of these variables include: brain 
size gathered from the measurement and volume of skulls, the use o f wet brain weight 
during autopsies, and scans from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI); intelligence based 
on IQ scores, and; sexual habits and temperament derived from the production of 
testosterone, just to list a few. Due to his own admission, the results interpreted from 
these variables, however, are not due to his own empirical studies but are derived instead
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from a compilation of studies done by other researchers -  most o f which are outdated and 
misconstrued. Nonetheless, these variables -  among others according to Rushton -  help 
him to ‘scientifically’ determine that intelligence and behavioural characteristics can be 
linked to existence of clearly delineable ‘races’. Moreover, Rushton believes that his 
findings are conclusive based on the consistency and predictability o f the results 
interpreted through his research framework. In order to reveal the contradictions intrinsic 
to his research, a closer look at how Rushton contextualizes ‘race’ should be examined.
Rushton’s concept o f ‘race’ is derived from the 18th century views o f Swedish 
naturalist, Carolus Linaeus. Dividing the human species into four main categories -  
Asians, American Indians, Europeans, and Africans -  variations on Linaeus’ 
classification system is still commonly used in biology among many zoologists today. A 
definition of ‘race’ that is common to most zoologists implies that a variety or a 
subdivision exists in a given species. Variety that subdivides species is believed to occur 
naturally in a distinct combination of inherited physiological, biological, and 
morphological traits. When grouped together, such traits are interpreted as indicative of 
racial differentiation.
Although Linaeus’ classification system identifies four main ‘races’ of the human 
species, some people would combine the categories that delineate Asians and American 
Indians into one ‘race’. As a result, we are left with three main ‘races’ known 
respectively as Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid. These three ‘races’ form the basic 
categories through which Rushton operates within his research framework.
According to Rushton, racial differentiation occurs over long periods of time 
through evolution. As individuals within one group of people reproduce exclusively 
within their group, remaining confined to a specific geographical location, they are
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believed to have evolved distinct biological features -  like skin colour -  adapted as 
advantageous to the survival o f the subspecies in their respective environment. As 
previously mentioned, these populations of subspecies are what zoologists consider to be 
‘races’. This conception o f ‘race’, however, is commonly accepted as a misinterpretation 
of clinal variation between populations by many leading theorists in the scientific 
community (Adelman et.al, 2003; Brace, 2000; Bamshad & Olsen, 2003). What separate 
these scientists from Rushton are their views on how ‘race’ is interpreted.
For scientists like Rushton and Gill (2000), ‘race’ exists beyond simple arbitrary 
labels. ‘Race’, in this sense, is not only universal but it is also absolute. There is a 
contradiction inherent to the very thought of this statement within the accepted 
evolutionary paradigm of science. For instance, how can evolution -  under its established 
principle of constant change, mutation or development based on environmental factors -  
be subject to stasis, as culminated in an absolute conclusion of a species’ development?
To answer while clarifying this question, Rushton believes that three main ‘races’ 
exist as a result o f the evolutionary development from a single population that originated 
in Africa. Rushton traces this development to outward migration that occurred as the 
original population reproduced and increased. According to this assumption, most people 
within the scientific community13 commonly believe that Homo sapiens first appeared in 
Africa approximately 200,000 years ago. As this population reproduced and increased in 
size, they gradually migrated to Europe approximately 110,000 years ago and into Asia 
approximately 70,000 years later. Rushton (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) believes that the
13 When I refer to ‘the scientific community’ I am by no means implying that consensus exists among all 
those claiming to be scientists. Rather, the ‘scientific community’ here loosely refers to a culture o f  
professionals bound by empirical research methodologies that lead to postulations about consistency in 
observable phenomena. There is no singular ‘scientific community’ as there is no singular notion o f  
culture. This term should not be taken outside o f  its generic construct.
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evolutionary effects caused by these gradual migrations formed the three main racial 
groupings (Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid) that are conceptualized today.
Seeing that evolution indicates a continual state o f development based on 
gradually shifting environmental factors, the perceived permanence about these three 
racialized categories is essentially arbitrary. Even though this process points to the 
arbitrary nature o f classifying populations into distinct ‘races’, scientists like Rushton and 
others o f his ilk use evolution to fix specious distinctions within human populations as 
objective and observable. Indeed, the use of evolution to qualify the existence of racial 
differences is tenuous at best and contradictory to say the least. The reason for this 
criticism is due to the fact that differences cannot be fixed if they have resulted from 
evolution simply because they must continue to be subject to evolution.
If differences within the human species -  like those attributed to somatic 
distinctions commonly interpreted as ‘race’ -  are evolutionary, there should be no 
objective and observable break from one population to the next. As a result, racial 
evolution occurs as a singular process within a species based on clines. Differentiation 
within a species, therefore, does not indicate the development o f a subspecies but more so 
a clinal variation. Nonetheless, Rushton has made himself the authority on where the 
distinction between populations begins and ends by qualifying his arguments through an 
appeal to evolutionary principles in spite o f this glaring contradiction. The 
contradictions inherent to using evolutionary theories, to explain the existence of distinct 
‘races’, is further revealed in the ways that Rushton has trouble grouping the entire 
human population within his three narrow racial categories.
Although Rushton (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) believes that three main ‘races’ 
exist, he also acknowledges that these three main ‘races’ can be further subdivided in
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order to accommodate the logic of his belief in evolution. These further subdivisions are 
a result of increased spatial mobility across geographical boundaries and increased 
reproduction among populations in different geographical areas. Using this logic, the 
principles of evolution remains intact, in order to account for relatively recent mutations 
in populations that do not fall neatly into any of the three main categories. For example, 
Rushton (1998) has trouble classifying Hispanic or ‘Latino’ people.
As per Rushton’s rigid classification system, Hispanics are neither European nor 
Asian. For Rushton (1998), they represent a further subdivision o f the human species that 
indicates the admixture o f a combination of racial attributes. According to Tim Wise 
from Znet (n.d.), however, ‘Latino’ is a term that refers to “an ethnic/ national/ regional/ 
heritage group within which skin color and racial phenotype varies dramatically”. 
Anomalies o f sorts, Hispanic and Latino people, for Rushton, are caught in a virtual 
limbo of evolutionary development, constituting the interstices o f a flawed and arbitrary 
construct. By the logic o f evolution, this further implies that the developments of new 
‘races’ are constantly occurring phenomena. If this remains the case, how then can racial 
categories be anything but arbitrary?
Rushton’s main ‘races’ -  Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid -  are perceived as 
universal and absolute. If this is the case, Rushton’s research essentially contradicts the 
principles o f  evolution. Did evolution cease to work, as it has been for millions of years, 
as soon as J. Philippe Rushton appeared on the scene? Curiously, as Rushton claims to be 
a ‘high priest’ in the evolutionary science and genetics of ‘race’ -  despite the fact that he 
has had no formal training in genetics -  he surreptitiously manages to espouse a heretical 
logic against evolution all within the same research. Therein lies the contradiction
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inherent to Rushton’s racial classification system that essentially undermines his very 
premise on ‘race’ as a causal factor.
Without solid evidence that distinct racial categories do in fact exist -  as Rushton 
(1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) has expertly conceptualized them -  causal factors, like 
intelligence and behavioural attributes, that have been postulated as linked to these racial 
distinctions, quickly disintegrate from scientific knowledge claims and emerge as patent 
nonsense. If this is in fact nonsense masquerading as science, why do people like 
Rushton continue to make a living by misleading the public? The answer to this question 
is threefold and is based on: Rushton’s convictions, sources o f ample funding, and media 
hype.
In most cases researchers, conducting scholarly work or engaged in scientific 
inquiry, conduct their research under the belief that they are advancing knowledge in their 
respective field or discipline. As a result, researchers actually believe in the information 
that they have researched and therefore consider such findings to be knowledge. Clinging 
to the distortion that objective, observable phenomenon can be interpreted purely as it 
exists in reality, scientific researchers do not necessarily set out to intentionally mislead 
(Herman, n.d.). Indeed, Rushton has often tried to defend his research against 
implications that he is a racist, by claiming that he is simply a scientist that tries to reveal 
the truth. Perhaps his views are indicative of an underlying social psyche that yearns for 
some sort o f validation towards hidden racist beliefs (Herman, n.d.). Maybe he doesn’t 
realize that he is racist. Moreover, these hidden beliefs could possibly reveal a part of 
what Henry Giroux refers to as White Panic (Giroux, 1995). Either way, these views can
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be interpreted as bound in essence by what Herbert Marcuse (1969) refers to as the 
‘biology’ of their discourse14.
The ‘biology’ of a group’s discourse is essentially how they make sense of the 
world around them in order to survive as it were. Knowledge in this sense, when 
interpreted under a more critical lens, is revealed as myth. The belief that ‘race’ is a 
biologically real entity becomes taken-for-granted as a natural fact. This occurs through 
the myth constructed about it and justified by the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) that created it. 
Furthermore, propagating this myth about ‘race’ can also be profitable. This brings us to 
the second reason why some scientists make a living on flawed knowledge claims. There 
are underlying political and economic interests at stake, supporting the types of funding 
that keeps such research afloat.
Steve Buist (2000) exposes the fact that J. Philippe Rushton had received close to 
one million US dollars in funding during the 1990’s from an organization called the 
Pioneer Fund. According to Buist (2000), the Pioneer Fund is an American organization 
that has a long legacy of funding ‘race’ research and eugenics. As mandated in its 
charter, the organization is dedicated to the notion of ‘race betterment’. It becomes
14 Herbert Marcuse (1969) criticizes capitalism in the ways that it has become rooted within the organic 
and instinctive nucleus o f  humanity. At this level, the mechanisms o f  global capitalism have been 
subsuming morality for profits. The dive for profits, in order to make a living, has become the basis to 
survival. This basis o f  survival has become entrenched at every dimension o f  social being, including the 
biological. Marcuse (1969) clarifies what he means by biological in his distinction o f  the term from a 
scientific discipline. For Marcuse (1969), biology and biological refers to a second nature o f  sorts. It 
represents the dimension o f  instinct and behaviour that become like vital needs to be satisfied in order for 
an organism to survive. Marcuse (1969) proposes the notion that Socialism must address the need towards 
revolution against global capitalism in order to be successful. Revolution must be enacted, not only in the 
social dimension but in the biological dimension also. However fitting for this section o f  the thesis, 
biology, in this sense, is not intended to be physiological. Although Marcuse’s (1969) formulation o f  
biology speaks to a Socialism that must counter global capitalism, I believe that his theories can be 
applicable to all forms o f  revolutionary struggle. In specific reference to this case, I have taken liberty to 
apply this notion o f  biology to a deep structured cultural instinct throughout Western science for fixing 
categories o f ‘race’ as natural. Although there is no pun intended, the ‘b iology’ o f  discourse is what I 
would like to refer to as myth, in the ways that it remains hidden in culture while organizing a perception o f  
reality. To bring this analogy back to science, change can only occur when the myths propagated in one 
paradigm, encounter the myths propagated in another contesting paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).
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abundantly clear that this notion of ‘race betterment’ implies the proliferation of white 
supremacist ideology through the sponsoring of scientific research that implies the 
existence of naturalized racial hierarchies. Even though Rushton currently holds a 
position on their executive board, he was not the only person funded. The Pioneer Fund 
sponsors other ‘race’ scientists, like Rushton, who demonstrate a penchant for research in 
the hopes that it can be used to prove a hierarchy among ‘races’. Arthur Jenson, who has 
published research on why ‘black’ people have low IQ scores, happens to be another 
recipient of funding from this institute and pulls in even more financial support from the 
Pioneer Fund than Rushton (Buist, 2000).
With all the money to be made from wealthy and powerful racist organizations it 
is no surprise that ‘race’ myths are given voice that continues to be passed off as objective 
science. Whether or not these individuals who conduct this type o f research are racist or 
politically motivated is not entirely the issue at hand. They will be the first to tell you 
that they are scientists and remain secluded in the world of science. They prefer to leave 
the policies and politics to politicians (Rushton, 1998, 2000). The curious thing about 
this statement is the fact that they have no problem accepting money from those who are 
politically motivated, who, in turn, intend to use the research that they fund to effect 
policy as in Hermstein and Murray’s (1994) The Bell Curve. Rushton’s theories, coupled 
with the possibility that his research may be used to affect racist policies and incite 
tensions between racialized communities, have created a great deal of media hype in the 
popular press.
In a January 28th 1989 Toronto Star article titled “An obstinate professor and his 
theories on race. Race superiority theories pure hokum, scientists say”, Rushton is quoted 
as saying:
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I’m not a policy maker and I ’m not a racist. I just think government 
should be aware of differences between the races and take them into 
account when planning. The government may have to be more 
interventionist when dealing with these differences, (p. A8)
Although Rushton claims that he is not responsible for possible policies that his 
research may implicate, he is supportive of government using his findings to effect 
policy. Perhaps such policies could be aimed towards amending the existing policy of 
‘official multiculturalism’ as it can be interpreted to be based on a familiar platform. 
Either way, Rushton’s suggestion is problematic -  not only in the implication that 
government policies should pander to the claims of racial superiority but more so based 
on the assumption that distinct ‘races’ do in fact exist.
On a deeper level, slightly removed from the overtly racist implications of 
Rushton’s research, is the possibility and ease through which the government could 
potentially implement policy based on racial differences. After all -  as previously 
discussed in this thesis -  Canada’s official policy on multiculturalism is a more subtle and 
purportedly more benign way o f managing difference based on culture and/ or ‘race’. 
Rushton’s suggestion that government should consider basing policy on his ‘race’ 
research is promptly followed by scientists who claim that Rushton has misused their 
data, making any policy derived from such research problematic.
One aspect of Rushton’s research -  that The Star highlights as dubious based on 
the criticisms o f scientists -  is the premise that the more recently developed a ‘race’ is, 
the more advanced it is in many intellectual and behavioural respects. Seeing that 
Rushton posits all members of the human race as being evolved originally from Africa 
approximately 200, 000 years ago, he believes that Asians are the most recent to have 
evolved making them the most advanced sub-species of human. According to an article
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in The Star, scientists in the field of genetics and biochemistry consider the data used 
from this premise to be outdated and it has since been revised.
The revised data indicate that a second set of people from Africa have evolved last 
-  even after Asians -  making Rushton’s evolutionary ‘timing and advancement’ theory 
null and void. The same article quotes University of California micro-biologist, Svante 
Paabo as saying, “I don’t know if Dr. Rushton has accidentally or deliberately 
misunderstood our work on evolutionary dating. In any event this whole field is still 
highly speculative. To present it as scientific fact is wrong” (p. A8). Paabo goes on to say 
that “One thing we do know, however, is that it’s ridiculous to compare races because 
they all emerged from one and there has been constant intermingling” (p. A8). This 
statement by Paabo is the only statement that The Star uses that derides Rushton’s 
research on the belief that separate ‘races’ exist. Throughout the rest of The Star’s 
coverage of Rushton, however, ‘race’ is assumed to be a natural fact where differences in 
‘race’ are descriptive markers for different communities. If  The Star were to place more 
emphasis on the illusion o f ‘race’, Rushton’s theories would quickly dissolve without all 
the added hype and spotlight. This is one clear example on how news is made and 
interpreted as opposed to being directly reported from objectively observed phenomena.
According to Richard Ericson, Patricia Baranek, and Janet Chan (1987), news is 
an interpretation o f real phenomena that is structured through the organizational 
conventions that shape its discourse. As such, the facts presented in a news report are not 
self evident; the facts must be invested with significance (Ericson et al., 1987). Indeed, 
the creation o f news involves a process of structuring reality. Although The Star article 
clearly makes the case that distinct ‘races’ do not exist because “they have all emerged 
from one”, it nonetheless continues to use ‘race’ as descriptive categories that signify
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distinct communities. In this case, news is created in the insinuated beliefs that distinct 
communities o f ‘raced’ individuals are subject to racism, without examining the ways in 
which racism structures racialized individuals into separate ‘races’. Studies that question 
the scientific validity o f ‘race’ can even be applied to Rushton’s studies linking brain-size 
to intelligence.
With regards to Rushton’s conclusions derived from brain size data, the same 
article mentioned above quotes University of Guelph neuro-psychologist Michael Peters 
as stating that there are “no reliable, racial brain-size studies” (p. A8). In my opinion The 
Star could emphasize this point in greater detail by stating a reason for this fact. The 
main reason that comes to mind as to why there are “no reliable, racial brain-size studies” 
could be that ‘race’ does not exist as an objective biological quality. Peters goes on to 
state that Rushton “compiles information without having any true expertise in the 
different specialties involved” (p. A8). Out of all the Toronto Star articles surveyed on 
the issue, this was the only article that discussed data that was used to challenge 
Rushton’s research. This is rather telling with respect to the ways in which the public is 
informed about the issues surrounding Rushton’s research and its broader social 
implications.
Instead o f exposing the illusion of ‘race’ as a flawed premise within Rushton’s 
research, The Star seemed content to promote an emotionally charged debate between 
Rushton and his critics. This angle was possibly deemed more newsworthy within the 
organizational structures that shape the discourse o f news. As a result, this debate was 
presented as a ‘hot ticket item’ to be sold to large audiences. Headlines such as: 
“Teachers condemn Rushton’s theory of racial inferiority”; “Rushton’s credibility 
attacked by professors”; “An obstinate professor and his theories on race. Race
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superiority theories pure hokum, scientists say”; “Scholars dismiss Canadian’s racial 
theory”; “Rushton’s crime theories have no basis in fact”, captured the spirit of the 
debate. By taking a closer look at these articles, however, most them -  with the exception 
of two (one scarcely mentions that all people have evolved from one ‘race’ and the other, 
that happens to be an opinion letter to the editor, states that no pure ‘races’ exist) -  
insinuate the belief that distinct ‘races’ do in fact exist and Rushton’s theories are racist 
under the premise that they attempt to justify a hierarchy among the ‘races’. As a result, 
The Star managed to highlight the conflict and divisiveness between imagined racialized 
communities. Indeed, the Rushton coverage was quickly subsumed by questions of 
‘black’ inferiority and ‘white’ superiority.
In a letter to the editor, published in the Opinion section of the March 14th 1989 
issue, Julian Roberts and Thomas Gabor -  from the University of Ottawa’s Criminology 
department -  represent a minority of people published in The Star that challenged the 
credibility o f Rushton’s theories on the premise that distinct ‘races’ exist in pure form. 
According to Roberts and Gabor, Rushton’s theories of racial differences between 
‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ are predicated on false assumptions about racial purity. Roberts and 
Gabor attempt to qualify this assertion by stating that “in North America, many blacks are 
more than half white by lineage and many whites have some black ancestry” (p. A21). 
This is a clear example of how racism is marketed primarily as a ‘black’/ ‘white’ issue. 
Despite the fact that these scholars argue that there are no pure ‘races’, they do not 
attempt to discuss the presumed purity of Asians. This is crucial because, according to 
Rushton, Asians are on top of the evolutionary ladder of racial superiority. Although 
Roberts and Gabor do not go as far to say that ‘races’ do not exist, they do state that pure 
‘races’ do not exist. Upon the basis of that assumption alone, Rushton’s views are
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regarded as bogus science. Despite this criticism, however, commonly perceived racial 
groupings are still preserved in the ways that The Star continued to report on them.
In a March 15th 1989 article titled “Teachers condemn Rushton’s theory of racial 
inferiority”, Bob Mitchell o f the Toronto Star writes that “most scientists insist there are 
no racial intelligence differences that are biologically determined, and that all racial genes 
come from the same evolutionary pool” (p. A7). Despite the admission that all “racial 
genes come from the same evolutionary pool”, the article uncritically quotes Rosemary 
Clark -  a secondary school teacher -  as stating that “we have a significant amount of 
blacks and Orientals in our school ... I don’t condemn research if  it is academically done 
properly. But I do condemn any theory that ranks the races” (p. A7). This quote further 
supports the claim that ‘races’ are preserved as objective biological signifiers of identity. 
For Clark, the problem here is not that Rushton acknowledges the existence o f distinct 
‘races’ -  the fact that “all racial genes come from the same evolutionary gene pool” is 
easily overshadowed by the assumption that different ‘races’ exist in nature. The problem 
for Clark is that Rushton’s research pits the ‘races’ against each other according to a 
postulated evolutionary hierarchy.
In addition to the sensational debate that falls short o f criticizing Rushton on the 
premise that distinct ‘races’ exist scientifically, The Star’s coverage o f the issues succeed 
in showcasing Rushton under a mass mediated spotlight. Moreover, the emotional tenor 
of the coverage sparked by this debate circuitously promotes Rushton’s theories and 
elevates his personage to the rank of a sort of infamous celebrity. As a now famous 
scholar, Rushton’s work reaches a wider, more popular audience beyond the walls of 
academia. Indeed, albeit largely negative, Rushton is given a greater voice through which 
to express his ideas.
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On February 17th 1989, The Star published an article on the front page titled 
“Rushton called a racist at Geraldo taping”. Dan Smith of the Toronto Star reports that 
“Canada’s most controversial academic steadfastly denied heated charges that he was a 
racist” (p. A l). According to Smith, the Geraldo show titled “Sex, Brains and Brawn: Is 
there a Master Race?” was scheduled to air on March 8th 1989 on “more than 190 North 
American TV stations, by far the biggest vehicle the formerly obscure Rushton has gained 
to publicize his controversial views” (p. A2). Smith reports that the taping of the show 
was denounced as “a circus or worse” by “every major participant but the producers” (p. 
A l). Ironically enough, however, although Smith’s tone appears to be critical of the 
media “circus” surrounding Rushton on the Geraldo show, as a venue to further propagate 
his racist views, he nonetheless adds to Rushton’s publicity by alerting The Star’s 
readership, in advance, to the exact time and date that the show was aired.
By further contributing to Rushton’s publicity, dominant points of his research are 
highlighted in most o f the articles concerning him. Few articles, however, take the time 
to systematically deride his work on the level of sound scholarship. In a March 19th 1989 
editorial titled “A weak reaction to academic fraud”, The Star is quite caustic in its 
displeasure over Rushton’s right to academic freedom without detailing expert data that 
proves his work fraudulent. According to The Star it is “without exception” that the 
“academic community” has found Rushton’s conclusions to have no “scientific basis” (p. 
A28). Although it is widely publicized that Rushton’s research is not based in science, as 
it purports to be, there is no mention in this article that his research is based on secondary 
sources that have been largely misconstrued. As a result, The Star has labelled Rushton a 
“charlatan” and the UWO senate decision “preposterous” in their dereliction of their 
broader duty to protect society (p. A28). To further emphasize the perceived threat that
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Rushton poses to society, The Star employs sensational tactics to appeal to the emotions 
of its readership.
Despite Rushton’s strong convictions towards his research findings, the financial 
support he received to conduct his research, and the subsequent media hype that 
inadvertently promoted his work, it is important to note, however, that not all science 
surrounding notions o f ‘race’ is one sided. Despite The S tar’s limited coverage o f sound 
scholarly criticisms, some of the very evidence espoused by Rushton that he considers 
conclusive, is subject to contested interpretations even within the very scientific 
community that he claims membership to.
GENETICS OF ‘RACE’ -  Science Fact or Fiction?
When using somatic factors like skin colour to group people into ‘races’, 
Europeans can be interpreted as having more in common, biologically, with Chinese than 
either of them have in common with Africans. If the distributions of blood-factors are 
used, Africans and Europeans have more in common with each other biologically than 
either of them does with Chinese. Although similarities in physiological features within 
regions can be used towards positing ancestry, current genetic research reveals that 90% 
of human genetic variation occurs within a population whereas there is only 10% 
variation between populations (Bamshad & Olsen, 2003).
University of Utah physician Michael Bamshad and science writer Steve Olsen 
(2004), use genetics to illustrate how common notions o f ‘race’ are actually clinal. 
Bamshad and Olsen (2004) subscribe to the popular ‘out of Africa’ theory which states 
that over the past hundred thousand years, people had migrated all over the world from 
Africa. The regions where people have settled, has created distinct genetic signatures in
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deoxyribo nucleic acid (DNA) based on environmental conditions. Their research further 
reveals that variations in the base pairs that form the building blocs of DNA -  
polymorphisms -  are common and do not directly affect physical traits.
Scientists who have sequenced the human genome (full set of DNA) have 
identified millions o f different polymorphisms. Although distribution o f these 
polymorphisms across populations, reflect the history of a population and the 
environmental effects of natural selection on them, 68% of all genes are identical between 
humans, exhibiting no polymorphic variation (Wise, n.d.). To use this data to group 
‘races’ of people would imply that certain polymorphisms would be present in all 
members of a group, while absent in all members of other groups (Bamshad & Olsen, 
2004).
According to Tim Wise of Znet (n.d), people who are perceived to be on opposite 
ends of the ‘race’ spectrum -  ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ -  share 96.8% of the genetic code 
with a maximum of 0.032 variations in genes between the perceived groupings. 
Differences between perceived groups, on the basis of genetic makeup, are far too 
miniscule to indicate distinct speciation among human populations. Bamshad and Olsen 
(2004) believe that groups have separated too recently, and mixed too much, for 
differences based on natural selection to have any significance. Moreover, this research 
shows that outward physical appearances are largely insignificant regarding a person’s 
genetic makeup.
Although physical features such as skin colour and hair texture, combined with 
geographical origin and culture, are commonly used to group people into racial 
categories, common traits, such as skin and hair, can be regarded as “family resemblance 
writ large” (Brace, 2000). Further more, these ‘family resemblances’ vary gradually
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between populations. Supporting this claim, population genetics provides evidence that 
less than 1% of genes can be linked to heritable somatic features like skin colour (Wise, 
n.d.). Given this assertion, there are no bio-genetic racial differences; there are only 
clines which make racial distinctions between neighbouring populations virtually 
imperceptible. As a result of widespread scientific consensus on the uselessness of 
commonly perceived racial categories, the use of physical features like skin colour and 
hair texture to organize human populations are purely trivial. Despite this data, a 
minority of scientists like Rushton continue to cling to these distortions o f racial 
difference to make sweeping generalizations on intelligence and the predictability of 
behavioural traits based on genes.
According to Bamshad and Olsen (2004), however, it is not only misleading to 
assume that categorizing the human species into groups based on these traits is somehow 
linked to the genes that a person is bom with; it is even more misleading to use these data 
to determine intelligence or predict social behaviours. Genes cannot be used to group 
people into racial categories. Furthermore, using genetic data one cannot interpret such 
categories as universal or absolute. ‘Race’ is more so a product of language than it is a 
product of science (Hall, 1996). This is seen in the ways in which different populations 
interpret and label racial difference.
The definition o f what constitutes membership in racial categories varies from 
region to region. The same person who may be considered ‘black’ in the United States, 
may be seen as ‘white’ in Brazil or ‘coloured’ in South Africa -  where ‘coloured’ is a 
term used to categorize a group that is distinguishable from both ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
(Bamshad & Olsen, 2003; Daniels, 1996). How groups are distinguished in difference to 
one another depends on what genes are isolated and examined. A person may be
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categorized into one group based on skin colour and at the same time considered part of 
another group based on hair texture. This implies that there is greater genetic variance 
within culturally perceived racial groups than there are between them. Although people 
may appear similar on the surface, within the commonly perceived racial group, they can 
be quite different genetically.
The people living in sub-Saharan Africa and the Aboriginal people of Australia 
share a similar skin complexion but are very dissimilar genetically. Likewise, two groups 
that share a similar genetic makeup may be exposed to different environmental factors 
that exaggerate their differences. Furthering this claim, in a study that isolated 
polymorphisms used to estimate the percentage of genes originating from a continental 
region, it was discovered that on average, Americans who considered themselves ‘white’ 
had less than 90% European ancestry according to genetics (Bamshad & Olsen, 2003). 
This implies that common perceptions of ‘race’ are not absolutely reflective of a person’s 
genetic heritage. For Bamshad and Olsen (2003), the value and importance of perceived 
racial differences are shaped by social and political impressions and not scientific ones. 
Despite these findings -  amidst all the media hype propagated about racist scientists and 
their research -  the Toronto Star has not only been slow to report on these issues but 
articles that question the reality of ‘race’ have been scarce.
An article published on October 13 1996 titled “Scientists find we are all the 
same under the skin: No genetic basis for race, say researchers”, offers rare coverage on 
the genetic argument that proves all people evolved from the same ‘race’. According to 
Robert Boyd, in a special article to The Star, “most scientists now reject the concept of 
race as a valid way to put human beings into separate groups” (p. A 14). Despite 
widespread public opinion on the issue, this general scientific consensus comes about
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through “spectacular advances in molecular biology and genetics” and is a culmination of 
work that has been gathered since the 1970’s (p. A14). Quoting Yale geneticist Kenneth 
Kidd, “DNA data supports the concept that you can’t draw boundaries around races” (p.
A 14). Contrary to widespread scientific belief, however, the article does mention that a 
small number o f researchers -  including Philippe Rushton -  still cling to the flawed 
genetic concept o f ‘races’. It is ironic that this article points out that Rushton still clings 
to a distorted view that distinct ‘races’ exist, despite the fact that The Star reproduces the 
same racialized distinctions in other stories.
Another rare Toronto Star article that reports on how current genetic studies have 
disproved the bio-genetic concept of ‘race’ was published on June 30th 2000. This article, 
titled “The other genome project: search for human diversity proves w e’re similar after 
all”, was published in the midst of the media’s coverage o f the Human Genome Project. 
Although the Human Genome Project mainly focused on mapping the entire DNA code 
for the purpose o f medical advancement, the Human Diversity Genome Project15 applied 
much of this information to explore the nuances o f human differences between 
populations. According to Delthia Ricks and Bryn Nelson, in their special to The Star, 
“the project has found no biological basis for the concept o f race. Physical differences 
such as skin colour and hair texture are adaptations to the environment spelled out in 
infinitesimal variations of the same code we all share” (p. F2). This article, however, 
makes no direct mention of the White House press conference on June 26th 2000, where J. 
Craig Venter -  president and chief scientific officer o f Celera Genomics (the private
15 For more information on the Human Diversity Genome Project, please visit the website at 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/morrinst/hgdp/faq.html.
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company that headed the government’s Human Genome Project) -  announced that his 
team of scientist have sequenced the entire human genome.
At the press conference, Venter (2000) announced that his team of scientists had 
sequenced the genetic code of three females and two males. This sample of people 
identified themselves as Hispanic, Asian, Caucasian, or African-American. According to 
Venter (2000), “We did this sampling not in an exclusionary way, but out of respect for 
the diversity that is America, and to help illustrate that the concept o f race has no genetic 
or scientific basis”16. O f the five genomes sequenced, the data remains conclusive that 
there is no way to determine ‘race’ or ethnicity as genetically distinct from one another. 
On the level o f genetics, individuals are all unique due to minute variations in each 
genome. Population statistics, therefore, do not apply.
The fact that some of these arguments only managed to gamer scarce coverage as 
opposed to several articles questioning the social implications o f its research -  as seen in 
The S tar’s earlier coverage of Rushton -  illustrates a rather telling example o f the 
mainstream media’s success in marginalizing the issue. This can be further insinuated in 
The S tar’s uncritical, yet continued use of racial categories in their expose' of racial 
profiling to be discussed in a later chapter of this thesis.
The S tar’s continued use of racial categories in their coverage exhibits a sort of 
institutional amnesia. Either it does not remember that ‘race’ is a social construct or it 
refuses to remember in order to create a more sensational story. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the news is not a reflection of reality but an interpretation of it (Ericson et al.,
16 For the full White House press conference, please refer to the Human Genome Project Information 
website provided through the White House Office o f  the Press Secretary at 
<http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Hunian Genome/proiect/clinton2.shtml>
This website is sponsored by the U.S. Department o f  Energy Office o f  Science, Office o f  Biological and 
Environmental Research, and the Human Genome Program.
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1987). The Star continues to use ‘race’ as an analytic and discursive concept -  commonly 
interpreted as normal via consensus -  as being rooted in an objective reality. Despite its 
publication of the two articles on the genetic studies that disprove ‘race’, in subsequent 
accounts of ‘race’ The Star continues to reinforce a commonly distorted view that does 
not essentially challenge the status quo.
Without challenging popular notions of ‘race’ and re-educating the public in the 
process, The Star misses its opportunity to reveal new truths that may have a profound 
social impact in the struggle against racism. Even though it barely recognizes the fact 
that other truths about ‘race’ currently exist in the form of popular scientific knowledge, 
these truths are marginalized and quickly forgotten. Indeed, ‘races’ and assumptions 
surrounding ‘race’ are essentially ideological, discursive constructs. Despite beliefs now 
popular among most scientists, distorted notions o f ‘race’ persist and have become deeply 
enmeshed within the discourses of our dominant myths that shape our perceptions of 
reality and ourselves through language.
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VI. LIVING THROUGH LANGUAGE
REALITY & ‘RACE’ -  Making Sense of Our Existence through Language
To speak...means to above all assume a culture, 
to support the weight o f  a civilization
(Fanon, 1967, pp. 17-18)
The notion o f myth has many implications regarding the ways that we interpret 
our experiences as subjects within the world. That being said, myth is intimately tied to 
notions of knowledge and reality. Using terms like see and interpret, knowledge, myth, 
and reality are revealed by the ways that meanings are constructed through language.
This is explored in the common discourses o f ‘race’ as historical constructs of Western 
imperialist ideologies.
Like social constructivist notions of reality, ‘race’ exists as a fluid concept 
constituted in a discourse o f ideas. This means that there is no physiological, bio-genetic 
merit to its concept. It exists as an abstraction, through systems of language and 
representation that constitute ways of ordering and interpreting the world through myth. 
Given this assertion, ‘race’ is as real as the theories that bind it within the confines of its 
respective social framework. This theory has very salient implications for the ways that 
‘race’ is represented in the mass media.
The following part of this thesis continues from where my analysis left off in the 
previous chapter. There, I outlined the ways that the Toronto Star reported on issues of 
‘race’ through the hype generated about Philippe Rushton and its subsequent yet scarce 
coverage of genetics and ‘race’. The information presented in this part of the thesis 
attempts to further explore the ways that myths construct a reality o f ‘race’ in the popular 
press through a critical discourse analysis of selected Toronto Star articles from its
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coverage of racial profiling. Here, I intend to further reveal myth by demystifying the 
common meanings associated in the ways in which The S ta r’s codes a language about 
‘race’. Before proceeding with an analysis of the ways myth works to construct and 
perpetuate distorted notions of ‘race’, it is important that a clear understanding of the 
terminology surrounding this study be elucidated.
LANGUAGE & DISCOURSE -  A Brief Description
Language broadly refers to entire systems o f signs as “a principle of 
classification” (Saussure, 1996a, p. 39). The science of linguistics, rooted in semiotics, 
studies the structural anatomy of signs and sign systems including words (spoken and 
written), symbols, and images (Cohan & Shires, 1996). Incorporating the use of language 
and the practice o f how meanings are circulated through interpretive communities of 
ideas, leads to discourse.
Discourse refers to the use of language within a formalized, ideological 
framework (Cohan & Shires, 1996). Articulated through the use o f language, it indicates 
a form of cohesion in the relationship between signs and their meanings. Through this 
cohesion, discourse contextualizes the ideas formed about an object or concept, as steeped 
in relations o f power. For Paul Bove (1995), discourse in criticism is “the organized and 
regulated, as well as the regulating and constituting, functions o f language that it studies: 
its aim is to describe the surface linkages between power, knowledge, institutions, 
intellectuals, the control of populations, and the modem state as these intersect in the 
functions of systems of thought” (pp. 54-55). In this sense, discourse is an active vessel 
of ideology.
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CONCEPTUALIZING IDEOLOGY -  From Ideas to Practice to Resistance
Although there are different definitions o f Ideology used to accomplish different 
theoretical ends, it broadly refers to a system o f beliefs derived from the process of 
producing meanings and ideas. These systems o f beliefs can be attributed to specific 
classes or groups. Socially determined, ideologies carry the weight of cultural values and 
attitudes (Fiske, 1990). To understand the depth and scope of ideology, it is useful to 
articulate some of the concepts that have evolved through its rich history.
Arising for the first time out of the French Revolution, the term ideology is the 
English translation for the French term ideologic. The term was coined by the French 
rationalist philosopher Antione Destutt de Tracy to imply a ‘science of ideas’ (Kavanagh, 
1985). Since its first use during the French revolution, the term has evolved in its 
complexity, beyond references to mere ‘ideas’, encompassing the driving force behind 
real material and historical conditions of existence. This notion o f ideology had since 
gained popularity in Marxist theories (Fiske, 1990).
According to John Fiske (1990), Karl Marx used the term ideology to imply a set 
of ideas that lead to a false consciousness. This notion of a false consciousness attempted 
to explain the ways in which the ideas of the ruling class were imposed on the working 
classes. This notion of a false consciousness, however, is commonly misinterpreted in its 
oversimplification and erroneously ascribed to the writings of Marx.
According to Terry Eagleton (1991), Marx never actually used the phrase ‘false 
consciousness.’ The phrase was used by his colleague Frederick Engels in a letter to 
Franz Mehring in 1893 (Eagleton, 1991). Engels viewed ideology as a process of false 
consciousness, implying that the true motives driving the social agent was masked behind 
sets of surface motives. For Eagleton (1991), ideology in this regard is a form of
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“rationalization -  a kind o f double motivation, in which the surface meaning serves to 
block from consciousness the subject’s true purpose” (p. 89). In this context, ideology is 
socially determined thought that essentially denies its determinacy.
Seeing that ideology is socially determined thought that denies its determinacy, 
the veridical quality of consciousness is layered in purity to the degree from which it is 
based in the historical and material conditions o f existence. As a result, the ‘real’ or 
‘true’ motives that impel social actors are a form of consciousness derived from ‘real’ 
historical and material circumstances. Denying the social determinacy that such thoughts 
carry, by distancing consciousness from the historical and material circumstances of 
existence, ideology can be interpreted as a form of self deception that masks the historical 
and material conditions o f a class-based society. Ideology, in this regard, can be 
interpreted as political rather than epistemological. The importance o f ideology, 
therefore, lies in the function and origin o f such thoughts and not necessarily in the 
veracity of its character per se. Indeed, the “falsity o f ideology in this context, is the 
falsity of class rule itse lf’ (Eagleton, 1991, p. 90).
For Marx (1970), “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” 
(p. 128). Indeed, Marx (1970) considered ideology to be a tool used by the ruling class, to 
manage the working class population within a system that oppresses them. Being 
intimately connected to the economic means of production, Marx (1970) believed that the 
rational science of historical materialism would eventually counter the ideology of the 
ruling class, leading the working classes to realize their material conditions of oppression 
by virtue of a class consciousness. Once the working classes could develop a class 
consciousness -  realizing the root and function of their oppression -  Marx (1970) 
assumed that they would inevitably revolt against the very system of oppression imposed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
upon them by the ruling class. As soon as this working class revolt against ruling class 
oppression was to become successful, Marx (1970) envisioned that the working classes 
would eventually usher in a new epoch of a classless society that would no longer need 
the ruling class ideology. As history progressed further into the 20th century, however, it 
became evident that Capitalism would not be overthrown by a rational realization of the 
economic forces of oppression. To accommodate for this anomaly, a second generation 
Marxist, Louis Althusser, developed a more refined concept o f ideology.
According to Althusser ideology was not simply a set o f ideas but a ubiquitous, 
ongoing practice in which all social classes were active participants (Fiske, 1990). To 
clarify Althusser’s position, the ruling class participated in the production and 
dissemination of ideology while maintaining their social status o f privilege over the 
working class. The working class, likewise, also participated in the production and 
dissemination of ideology, contributing to their position o f subordination and oppression. 
As strange as it might have seemed that subordinated classes participated in their own 
oppression, ideology, nonetheless, was understood as working implicitly from within the 
deeply inscribed ways of thinking and living. As a result, ideology was believed to be 
internalized by all classes (Turner, 1992) and it could no longer be considered the 
exclusive tool that the ruling class used to explicitly subjugate the working class. The 
process by which the working class contributed to their subordination was achieved 
through what Althusser called interpellation (Fiske, 1990).
For Althusser, interpellation was the practice of calling or hailing readers of a 
message to take a position within the ideological framework of a respective social relation 
(Fiske, 1990). Through interpellation, social relations of power, dominance and 
subjugation, were automatically maintained. Because of interpellation, subjects or
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readers would sometimes take the position of an ideological category other than their 
social one. This implied that the dominant ideology was working at its best especially 
when it was accepted by all social classes while maintaining existing relations of power 
by consent. In this model of inexorable ideological frameworks, resistance was seen as 
futile and successful campaigns o f resistance were considered improbable due to a lack of 
agency on the part o f the interpolated subject. To account for the possibility of successful 
campaigns of resistance, the work of another second-generation Marxist, Antonio 
Gramsci, deserves attention.
According Gramsci (1992), ideology was considered a terrain of constant struggle 
and was characterized by a concept known as hegemony (Fiske, 1990; Turner, 1992). 
Placing emphasis on “resistance and instability”, hegemony involved a constant dialectic 
of “winning and re-winning” of majority consent (Fiske, 1990) to the systems that 
oppress them. The ideologies o f the dominant class (a social minority) were seen as 
constantly working to win the consent of the subjugated classes (a social majority). As a 
result, continual resistance was created in the social relations o f class experience.
The experiences of the subordinated classes -  characterized by a combination of 
race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. -  would oftentimes contradict the material and 
historical experiences that the dominant class imposed on them through an ideology about 
them. These dominant ideologies about everyday social relations constituted what was 
known as commonsense (Fiske, 1990). In short, although the real material conditions, 
experienced by the subjugated, were not necessarily consistent with what the dominant 
class told them their experiences should be, hegemony created a model o f ideology where 
commonsense prevailed through the constant struggle for consent. This created gaps in 
the apparently seamless production and dissemination of ideology. These gaps allowed
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the perfect opportunities for conflict, struggle and resistance. Ideology was therefore 
marked by volatile social relations.
In Gramsci’s (1992) model, although resistance has created the possibility to 
overcome various struggles, such struggles could never completely be eliminated. 
Considering a hybrid definition of all three of these models o f ideology, it is safe to 
explore the ways that ideologies work through Roland Barthes’ notion o f myth as a class 
based structure that naturalizes existing social relationships.
THE SEMIOTICS OF MYTH -  Meaning & the Process of Signification 
Myth refers to ‘a chain o f related concepts’ (Fiske, 1990), appropriated by a 
culture or group, that provides a framework for interpreting experience. According to 
Roland Barthes (1972, 1984), ideology is the source o f second-order meanings 
manifested through myth. As a result, myth is seen as a central part of cultural 
perspective that is unquestionable. Taken-for-granted as reality, myth informs a world 
view. Following a tradition of semiologists like Ferdinand de Saussure (1996), Barthes 
(1968, 1972, and 1984) extends the field of semiotics, conceptualizing myth as a second- 
order among two orders of signification.
The first-order of signification refers to the systematic relationships created 
between the sign and the mental perception or image o f the object that it is understood to 
represent in an external reality (Barthes, 1968). The sign is split into two parts, the 
signifier and the signified. The signifier is the physical representation o f the sign itself 
constituting its form (Barthes, 1968). ‘TREE’, in its physical written form, is a 
combination o f marks forming letters on a page. These marks on the page can be taken 
further to represent letters forming a word. If taken for more than just marks on the page,
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the word ‘TREE’ becomes signified in a mental concept that alludes to tree-like qualities. 
Signified represents the content o f a sign through the mental concept formed about the 
word ‘TREE’ (Barthes, 1968). The process o f first-order signification is the theoretical 
correlation o f the physical sign (‘TREE’- signifier) to the mental image (signified) that is 
understood to refer to an object in reality (mental image of a wooded plant that exists in 
an external reality -  exuding tree-like qualities signified). At an elementary level, the 
process o f first-order signification is one way of organizing reality. The term that Barthes 
(1996) used to refer to Saussure’s (1996) notion of first-order signification is denotation.
Denotation, as a first-order of signification, becomes the most obvious, 
commonsense meaning attributed to a sign (Barthes, 1996). The word ‘TREE’ denotes a 
mental image that is understood as referring to a physical object in an external reality that 
exudes tree-like qualities. Regardless of the possible ways that a specific word is written 
(TREE, TREE, tree, tree), it denotes the same object. This order o f signification, 
however, does not address the ways that signs can be interpreted beyond their relation to 
other signs. It does not take into account how signs are used to create meanings within 
culture.
Although Barthes (1972, 1984, and 1996) was not only concerned with signs and 
their relation to other signs, he was primarily concerned with the relationships that these 
signs had once inserted into culture. In order to address this concern, Barthes (1968, 
1996) extended Saussure’s (1996a) process of signification to a second level. In the 
second-order o f signification, Barthes (1972, 1984, and 1996) studied the ways that signs 
worked in two ways: myth and connotation.
Connotation occurs when a sign is absorbed into the value system of a culture 
(Barthes, 1996). Because of this, meanings become more than objective reflections of an
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external reality. They become inter-subjective. The sign alone does not affect the reader.
Readers are affected as much by the sign itself, as they are in the ways that the sign is
presented to them. For example, a picture of a tree may focus on its foliage bearing fruit.
This image may connote food. Another photograph o f the same tree may frame it in such
a manner that it casts a long shadow over the ground. This image may connote refuge.
Denotation addresses what a sign represents, whereas connotation addresses how a sign is
represented (Fiske, 1990). Connotation is the second-order meaning of the signifier,
whereas myth is the second-order meaning of the signified.
In contemporary Western vocabulary, myth has come to be conceptualized in
reference to false stories or fables. Contrary to this notion, Barthes (1972, 1984) used the
term myth to imply “a story by which a culture explains or understands some aspect of
reality or nature [...] a chain of related concepts” (Fiske, 1990, p. 88). According to
Barthes (1972, 1984), the concept of myth has many implications about the perceptions of
knowledge and reality within society:
Semiology has taught us that myth has the task o f giving an historical, 
intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal. 
What the world supplies to myth is a historical reality, defined ... by the 
way in which men [sic] have produced or used it; and what myth gives in 
return is a natural image o f reality ... A conjuring trick has taken place; 
it has turned reality inside out, it has emptied it o f its history and has filled 
it with nature, it has removed from things their human meaning so as to 
make them signify human insignificance (Barthes, 1972, pp. 142-143).
One of the most salient features of myth is the ways in which it takes hold of an
object or subject and works to naturalize it, distancing it from a culture or history about it.
According the second-order of signification, the reality of objects is articulated in and
through language; and language is ideologically entrenched in the social classes of
tradition. While, history becomes socio-politically distinguished from nature, myths
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serve to naturalize a language about objects, disguising their socio-political roots as a- 
historical. As a result, Barthes (1984) considers myth to be de-politicized speech.
As a form o f depoliticized speech, myth masks the objects they refer to under the 
guise of natural semblance. This obscures any cultural link that an object may have to the 
material and historical conditions of its class-based, interpretive dimension. Because of 
its natural semblance, myth makes the objects it colonizes appear eternal and absolute. 
According to Edward Said (1978), “myth does not analyse or solve problems.. .It presents 
them as already analysed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled 
images.. .”(p. 312). As uniform as these qualities appear to present myth, it would be a 
mistake, however, to assume that all forms of myth are the same. Towards the end of 
Mythologies, Barthes (1972) conceptualized differences between ‘myth on the right’ and 
‘myth on the left’. Before unpacking what is meant by ‘myth on the left’ versus ‘myth on 
the right’, it is important to preface their meanings as forms o f speech that reveal what 
myth is in relation to what myth is not.
If  we recall, Barthes (1972) considers myth to be depoliticized speech. An 
inversion of this definition would posit political speech as the direct opposite of myth. To 
clarify what is meant by political language is to articulate forms o f speech that attempts to 
transform nature/ reality. By this I mean that political language is transitive in its relation 
to nature/ reality. Contrary to this notion, however, de-politicized language is a second- 
order language that articulates the actions of the first. Indeed, it exhibits an intransitive 
relationship to nature/ reality. Although this second-order language is not entirely 
mythic, it does form the environment where myth can colonize objects already mediated 
through the first-order of signification. In this respect, a language that is not mythical can 
be seen in the acts o f revolutionary speech as highly politicized and transitive. They are
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transitive in so much as they try to affect change in nature/ reality as opposed to 
preserving an image o f nature/ reality. Indeed, not all forms o f language are mythic 
however.
According to Barthes (1972), revolutionary language cannot be mythic in the 
sense that revolutionary acts are intended to reveal the material and historical dimensions 
of nature/ reality through politicized articulations as opposed to naturalized 
presuppositions. Indeed, it does not attempt to mask the political aspects of objects as 
natural, producing myth; rather it attempts to reveal the political aspects of objects, 
demystifying myth. Now that myth is determined in relation to what it is not, different 
forms of myth can be discussed by distinguishing ‘myth on the right’ from ‘myth on the 
left’.
For Barthes (1972), ‘myth on the left’ -  once characterized by revolutionary 
speech -  attempts to distort and mask its revolutionary qualities. As a result, it settles, ex­
nominated, as an alternative form of naturalized, de-politicized speech. ‘Myth on the 
left’, however, is not essential in its propagation throughout the vast scope of everyday 
social relations. As a matter of convenience, it invests its focus in the rarities of political 
life. As a result, it is ephemeral and limited in scope. This is due in large respects to its 
association with the oppressed classes, whose primary language is that of a revolutionary 
quality. In this respect, ‘myth on the left’ is obvious and not as discrete as ‘myth on the 
right’.
‘Myth on the right’ is characterized by de-politicized speech from the first 
moment it takes hold o f objects in culture. There are no forms o f revolutionary speech 
that preface its existence. As such, ‘myth on the right’ essentially proliferates itself 
ceaselessly, remaining ex-nominated in its process o f colonizing the nuances of everyday
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social relations. Indeed, language used by ‘myth on the right’ does not intend to 
transform; rather it aims at masking the social, historical, and political dimensions of 
objects by eternalizing them as natural.
Although there are no significant inner differences between the respective myths, 
there are varying degrees o f proliferation within them. As a result, some myths expand 
better than others depending on their respective social atmosphere. For instance, 
apartheid -  in its institutionalized form of segregated differences -  is a system where a 
master ‘race’ would exclusively reap the benefits o f social, political and economic 
privilege. In this respect, the myths central to apartheid could only proliferate within the 
confines of an overtly racist society. In comparison, multiculturalism -  in its 
institutionalized form of segregated differences -  is a theory where the notion that 
different cultures/ ‘races’ are believed to equally exist in privileged competition for 
social, political, and economic benefits. In this respect, the myths central to 
multiculturalism could proliferate widely throughout all societies that subscribe to a 
‘liberal’ ideology. Both of these scenarios are bound by myths about ‘race’. They vary 
slightly, however, in the ways in which such myths are interpreted and used within their 
respective social context. Either way, myth offers a useful subject to critically explore 
cultural narratives through a detailed textual analysis.
A textual analysis that reveals myth in cultural narratives, attempts to demystify 
the stories cultures use to understand their reality. As discussed above, there are varying 
levels of effectiveness in the proliferation o f myth. As seen in the example using the 
proliferation o f racial myths in multiculturalism, myths used in ‘liberal’ societies are 
often very discrete. In order to demystify discrete myths, as seen in more ‘liberal’ 
settings, Barthes (1972, 1984) offers some useful rhetorical forms to analyze through
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which mythic signifiers can be arranged. An example o f a rhetorical form can be seen 
through Barthes’ (1984) notion o f inoculation.
Through inoculation, myth incorporates an incidental flaw within a class-based 
society in order to better conceal a principle flaw. For example, the racist practices of ‘a 
few bad apples’ are sacrificed in the interests o f preserving the racisms lived within the 
greater ‘liberal’ society. As discussed in an earlier chapter o f this thesis, the beating 
death of a Somali youth by a Canadian soldier was punishable as an individual act of 
racism. Even though the Canadian soldier who murdered the Somali youth was 
considered by most people to be a member o f an oppressed class, subsequent inquiries 
about the individual act did not raise questions as to the ‘impressive ideological 
formations’ that enabled the act to occur within a broader structure of imperial racisms. 
The individual act, as a signifier o f the broader lifestyle was removed from the larger 
historical context of colonization. This brings us to a second rhetorical form of myth.
Myth positions the object or subject that it speaks o f as separate from history. In 
the example using the beating death of the Somali youth, any sense of a colonial memory 
evaporates during a formal inquiry into the events leading up to the tragedy. It is as 
though the events transpired in a vacuum, robbing a Western institution of any sense of 
collective responsibility. As a result, myth appears as a statement o f fact, leading us to a 
third rhetorical form.
As a statement of fact, myth appears without any further explanation. The 
Canadian soldier who beat the Somali youth to death was not just practising an act of 
racism -  racism being a practice external to who he is, already fully defined. The 
Canadian soldier practiced an act of racism because he is a racist. Not only is racism a 
part of who he is, it is also a part of the collective history he shares with other members of
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armed services who have been socialized within a racist society. Racism, in this case, 
does not offer a self-contained definition. There is more to racism than the individual act. 
In this scenario, notions about racism had been colonized by myth.
Myth colonizes an object or subject within culture as a fully formed sign that
requires no further definition beyond the way it is presented. As a result, myth becomes
invisible, working beyond the conscious perceptions of the groups that employ them
within their given context. Latent beneath the historical layers o f its conception, myths
mask the roots of its social construction by appealing to convention.
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about 
them, makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal 
justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that o f an explanation but 
that o f a statement of fa c t ... it organizes a world without contradictions 
because it is without depth, a world wide open to and wallowing in the 
evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something 
by themselves (Barthes, 1972, pp. 142-143).
Considering myth in a textual analysis of cultural narratives, the analyst is 
primarily concerned with unveiling the historical dimensions o f reality. In order to 
achieve this task, the analyst must expose and articulate the relationships between 
language’s content, and the ways that meanings are constructed around the cultural 
assumptions imbedded in language’s form. In so doing, the analyst must be aware that 
language carries ideological assumptions that appear to be natural; void of historical 
context. This type of analysis reveals the gaps intrinsic to class struggle that ideology 
attempts to mask through myth itself. Given this fact, myth necessarily shifts as soon as it 
enters a stream of consciousness as myth. The existence of myth relies on a conception 
of knowledge and reality that necessitates its latency. In order to exist as such, myths 
must essentially be undetected.
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In order to become aware of myth, the analyst must shift focus from the content of 
the story, to the relationship between the form and content of the story. Analyzing myth 
in cultural narratives requires a shift in perspective from the natural to the socially 
constructed. As a result, the analyst must focus on the rhetorical forms in which mythic 
signifiers become situated through a meta-language.
DISCOURSE, A MYTHIC META-LANGUAGE
According to Barthes (1968, 1972,1984, and 1996), mythic language is a meta­
language. In this regard, a meta-language is a second-order language used to articulate 
the first (Gaines, 2001). Analyzing meta-language can reveal the historical and 
ideological context that meanings are constructed in. Seeing that meanings are imbedded 
within cultural texts and become naturalized through convention, the focus on meta­
language in textual analysis, allows the analyst to interpret the everyday aspects of 
cultural life in new ways. Through a critical perspective, the obvious, mundane aspects 
of everyday life are made to appear extraordinary in relation to the form and content of its 
social, political, and historical constitution. These common aspects o f everyday life are 
articulated through language in the practices of ‘text’ and ‘talk’. As an embodiment of 
‘text’ and ‘talk’, discourse can also be interpreted as a meta-language, and can be a useful 
focus in textual analysis to demystify a ‘mythic language’.
According to Edward Said (1978), “mythic language is discourse” (p. 321). This 
implies that there is a systematic quality to the ways that myth works in culture and 
society. As discourse, the production and practice of myth is not necessarily an effect of 
conscious individual or group agency. The production of myth occurs largely 
unconsciously and involuntarily through ideology and its manifestations in the institutions
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that help to order society. This is how the existence of myth, as discourse, is maintained 
in the process. Narrowing the broad approach of textual analysis to reveal myth in 
cultural narratives, it is the opinion of this author that critical discourse analysis (CDA) is 
the best methodology that can be employed towards these ends.
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VII. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY REVISITED -  From Semiotics to CDA
What a man [sic] sees depends both on what he looks at and also upon 
what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see.
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 113)
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) provides an excellent methodology for studying 
and revealing the ways that myth works within cultural narratives. Similar to the ways 
that Barthes’ (1972, 1984) work extends the field o f semiotics by expanding on the work 
of early semiologists like Saussure (1996a), CDA methods, used by theorists like Bret 
Dellinger (1995), Teun van Dijk (1998), and Thomas Huckin (n.d.) offer some tools that 
can be useful to locate myth. By taking a moment to recap the work of these theorists, I 
intend to highlight the theoretical evolution of the methodology that I plan to employ.
The earlier textual theorists focused on the production o f meaning within 
structured languages. As a linguist, Saussure (1996b) focused primarily on the relations 
of signs with other signs. He established a theoretical model o f signification that focused 
on the differential relationship of signs as they are composed by parts known as signifier 
and signified. This model laid the groundwork for studying systems of signs and their 
meanings. Barthes (1968, 1972,1984, and 1996) furthered this system of signification, 
conceptualizing a second-order in the production process o f meaning. He primarily 
focused on studying orders of signification and how meaning is created in the relationship 
between sign systems and culture. His model examined how meanings were structured 
within cultural stories through “chains of related concepts” known as myth (Fiske, 1990, 
p. 88).
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Expanding on Barthes’ (1972, 1984) work with myth, CDA theorists offer tools 
that can be useful towards a textual analysis of cultural narratives. In short, CDA 
incorporates an analysis of the social relations of power that exist, within the formal 
structures of language, through everyday practices o f ‘text and talk’ (Dellinger, 1995; 
Huckin, n.d.; Van Dijk, 1998). By analyzing aspects of cultures in their narrative form, 
cultures, in this sense, can be read as texts and interpreted through speech acts and 
dialogue. CDA offers a critical reading of cultural texts -  and the subsequent dialogue 
bom of these texts -  by analyzing the ways in which meanings are articulated, 
disarticulated, and re-articulated through discourse. In the process, this method also 
examines the ways in which contested cultural narratives are structured in social relations 
o f power. In order to better understand CDA, a brief description on discourse is 
necessary at this juncture.
THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE & POWER IN CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Previously described as a sense of cohesion between signs and their meanings, 
discourse enters as an intermediary between ideology and language. Drawing upon 
Michel Foucault’s (2003) ‘strategic model of intelligibility’17, discourse contextualizes a 
power dynamic through ideas about an object or concept. Constituted in social 
interaction, discourse is not merely language -  as characterized by the empty signifiers 
within sign systems. Discourse is a force in itself that functions as a weapon; effectively 
producing powerful social effects (Foucault, 2003). By virtue of Foucault’s conception of
17 Discourse as a ‘strategic model o f  intelligibility’ refers to the power relations intrinsic to its ontology. 
These power relations imply an internal logic or ‘strategic coherence’ that operates beyond formal linguistic 
structures to analyze how statements function socially as opposed to how they function semantically. 
(Foucault, 2003, pp. xix-xx)
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discourse -  as a form of ‘strategic intelligibility’ -  power, therefore, becomes a central 
notion to critical methods o f research that analyze discourse.
Power, according to Teun Van Dijk (1998), is a form of control. Dominant 
groups, therefore, are defined as such in relation to the control that they effectively 
exercise over the thoughts and actions of other groups. The other groups that are 
subjugated, under the control exercised by the dominant, are ultimately subordinated in 
the interests o f maintaining this relationship o f power. This is not to say, however, that 
power is absolute.
Many forms o f social control vary, relative to the respective social relationships of 
privilege that it operates within. Access to specific presupposed bases of social resources 
like information, money, legislation etc (Van Dijk, 1998) are all resources through which 
power can be exercised. Coupled with conventions surrounding social interaction, these 
resources can help to determine the form of power. As a result, various groups may 
exercise a relative degree of control over others depending on the situation or social 
domain.
For example, as a professor, Philippe Rushton embodies a form of scholarly 
power over his lectures. As a professor, it is determined through the conventions of 
tenure and the academy that his job is to control the information disseminated to the 
students who participate in his lectures. Within this relationship o f power, Rushton 
subjects his students to the information that he chooses to lecture about. The students do 
not choose the information that Rushton will lecture about. As a result Rushton exhibits a 
form of control over the education of his students. This control is exercised as a result of 
the presupposed expertise that he is believed to possess and is agreed upon through the 
conventions o f his position within the academy.
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Although the exercise of power may oftentimes seem explicitly universal -  as in 
common cases of crime and punishment through the rule of law -  power, however, is 
rarely absolute. In order to illustrate this point, it would be useful to expand upon the 
example using the professor above. Even though professor Rushton can exercise a form 
of power over his students within a lecture setting, his powers as a professor do not 
extend far beyond that setting. His powers, regarding access to the information used in 
his research, become less defined when confronted by the powers o f his peers who 
produce information to refute his research. Moreover, his powers as a psychology 
professor would have no merit if  he were to face criminal charges in a court of law. This 
illustrates that the type of power exercised is relative to the situational aspects of 
interaction within the overall social context. Indeed power embodies many forms of 
social action.
Power can be explicitly embodied through social action, as a judge sentences an 
offender to time in jail or a president declares war on another country. Power can also be 
implicitly embodied, in actions guided by everyday social etiquette, common 
presuppositions, and myth. It is the opinion of this author that the latter embodiment of 
power, as implicitly formed, is very common yet overlooked, and is therefore most 
saliently deserving o f our attention in the ways that it engenders dominance at the 
expense of others. In both instances, however, power is exercised, embodied, or 
committed -  intentionally or not -  through discourse.
In this sense, discourse is “the unit of actual language use in which power is 
enacted” as a form o f social control (Van Dijk, 1998). Those who are considered to be in 
a privileged position of dominance are said to exhibit a degree o f social control in relation 
to those who lack the necessary degree of social control and are often subjugated to the
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will of the dominant. As in the above example, those who exercise more control over 
discourse -  like a professor -  can be said to have more power and are, therefore, 
perceived to be more dominant than those who exercise less control over discourse -  like 
the students in the professor’s class. For Van Dijk (1998), “CDA attempts to focus on the 
abuse o f such power ... on the ways control over the discourse is abused to control 
peoples beliefs and actions in the interest of dominant groups, and against the best 
interests and the will o f others”. An example o f an abuse of power, in this respect, could 
be seen in the ways in which professor Rushton’s control over discourse promoted racist 
beliefs. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I will be primarily using CDA to focus 
on the implicit quality of power -  the ways it is made to look natural and taken for 
granted in everyday discourse -  as embodied in social myth and manifest through the 
practices of ‘text and talk’.
The practices of ‘text and talk’ reveal that a multiplicity o f discourses exists. 
These discourses, some of which are contestable or amendable to each other respectively, 
are only accessible through language. The most common pallets, through which 
discourse can be dissected, exist in the form of artefacts that can be read as texts. A 
newspaper article, for example, can be used as an excellent sample artefact to illustrate 
the ways through which discourse works within a text. It is important to note, however, 
that although discourse can be analyzed through a critical reading of a newspaper article 
(Van Dijk, 2000); the power of discourse is not limited to the written word. It also exists 
in speech, ethics, images, and institutions. CDA, therefore, is primarily concerned with 
the ways in which power is distributed between individuals and groups, within society, 
through forms of social exchange. As a central tenet of CDA, a ‘context-sensitive’
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approach to analyzing the social distribution of power is highly ethical in the ways in 
which its method is ultimately used towards improving society.
According to Huckin (n.d.), the use o f CDA pays close attention to “power 
imbalances, social inequities, non-democratic practices, and other injustices in hopes of 
spurring readers to corrective action”. In its broad outreach towards social justice, this 
method o f analysis locates specific relations o f power within an overall social context 
through which the text and the theorists alike are ultimately situated. Because of this, 
theorists working with tools from CDA oftentimes make no apologies -  and in my 
opinion rightly so -  for the polemical tone of their research. This can perhaps be 
attributed to a view of discourse, which assumes that people’s perception of reality is 
primarily formed in and through social interaction.
Acknowledging the fact that social interaction is mediated through language,
CDA examines the complex power relationship between what the author of the text 
brings to bear on the production of a message, and what the reader of the text brings when 
interpreting a message (Dellinger, 1995). This does not imply, however, that power is 
necessarily distributed equally in any form of social interaction. Recognizing that texts 
are produced within a social and historical context, the analyst interprets the creators of 
texts as socially and historically situated subjects, driven by their own ideological 
agendas. Because of this, members of a dominant group (i.e. professors) consistently 
construct and communicate dominant versions of reality that effectively work to secure 
their own interests (i.e. lecture on topics that exclusively support their research). These 
dominant (research) interests are oftentimes secured at the expense of subjugating the 
subordinated (research) interests of others. This process, however, is not always as 
explicit as it may initially sound. Indeed, the interests of the dominant group are often
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procured in subtle ways that are often taken-for-granted as natural and common-place. A 
theorist will often use CDA to reveal and make explicit these subtle practices of 
domination and subjugation, in the interest of siding with the victims of oppression 
(Huckin, n.d.).
In order to maximize the efficacy of siding with victims o f oppression, it is a 
common goal of the CDA theorists to try and make their work accessible to a large 
readership. According to Huckin (n.d.), the research produced by these theorists must be 
as clear as possible, avoiding unnecessary jargon and highly specialized scientific 
language without sacrificing too much accuracy at the conclusion of analysis. As ideal as 
this goal may appear, there exists an irony intrinsic to this task, especially within 
scholarly circles.
To clarify and perhaps expand upon Huckin’s (n.d.) proposition, the research 
produced by theorists working with CDA must be accessible to a target readership. 
Indeed, the theorist’s research must not only be relatively accessible but more importantly 
the theorist must be conscious o f an intended readership when producing research. For 
example, data collected by scholars and academics, if  produced for scholarly or academic 
purposes, must be presented in a commensurate scholarly or academic discourse in order 
for their research to be seriously engaged by the intended readership. In so doing, the 
relative success o f the message is contingent upon how accurately the encoded objective 
is decoded by the reader of the message.
Keeping in mind that the theorist is also situated within a larger ideological social 
context, this relative success can be measured by the degree to which the reader is 
interpolated by the inscribed ideologies of the text. Although the theorist must employ a 
similar process of communication used by dominant groups to subjugate subordinated
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groups, the struggle over meaning is reversed to affect the process’ liberating potential. 
This is usually done by demystifying an appeal to convention through myth.
MYTH, IDEOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE -  Multidisciplinary Discursive Approach
Objects and subjects, communicated by convention through myths, are understood 
in and of themselves to be natural and commonsense. Discourse arms the analyst with a 
useful conceptual tool to reveal myth by demystifying its commonsensical appeal within 
the cultural perception of reality. As a result, CDA is useful in analyzing both the form 
and content o f media texts. This creates a broader base for a multidisciplinary approach 
to textual analysis.
A multidisciplinary approach to CDA contrasts with the notion o f ideology as 
false consciousness. This method perceives ideology as a foundation o f interpretive 
frameworks that organize the attitudes and values of a social group or culture. In contrast 
to previously held notions, ideologies are not arbitrary beliefs, but specific group systems 
(Van Dijk, 2002). These systems are organized by cultural characteristics that represent 
identity, social structure, and the position of the subject or group within an interactive 
environment. Ideologies are the foundations that determine the content and form of all 
social representations. This definition of ideology may lead one to believe that 
knowledge is essentially ideological. According to Van Dijk (2002), however, not all 
knowledge is ideological.
For Van Dijk (2002) it can be argued that every culture or group relies on a 
commons of shared, undisputed information that they accept as fact. Knowledge, 
therefore, is a shared belief, relative to the culture or group in their present state of being, 
that is socially justified through consensus. Knowledge is a belief that becomes
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understood as indisputable within the confines o f the group. Because o f this, shared 
knowledge is usually assumed to be rooted in the material conditions of existence. In this 
sense, Van Dijk (2002) considers knowledge to be ‘pre-ideological’. Without this notion 
of knowledge as ‘pre-ideological’, Van Dijk (2002) believes that groups would not be 
able to communicate among each other.
Although the concept o f ‘pre-ideological’ knowing makes sense according to the 
framework theorized by Van Dijk (2002), it is the opinion o f this author, however, that no 
such claims are absolutely accurate in the entirety o f their formulations as such. In order 
for information to be labelled as knowledge, it must involve a cognitive process of 
interpreting and articulating reality.
According to Ericson et al., “reality is a result of cognitive processes of 
interpretation, and social processes of construction” (p. 18). These processes cannot be 
articulated as knowledge before passing through the mechanism of language and cannot 
be initially conceived before passing through the mechanisms o f cognition. As a result, 
knowledge must essentially be a form of thought. According to Terry Eagleton (1990): 
“There is no such thing as presuppositionless thought, and to this extent all of our 
thinking might be said to be ideological” (pp. 3-4).
The form of knowledge that Van Dijk (2002) theorizes can be used 
interchangeably with Barthes’ (1972, 1984) notion of myth. To state this point more 
explicitly, all knowledge can potentially contain mythic qualities and all myths attempt to 
articulate some form of knowledge. This being the case, it is impossible then for 
knowledge to exist beyond ideology simply for the reason that myths -  according to 
Barthes (1972, 1984) -  are essentially ideologically loaded, social constructs. Myth 
essentially works to mask language’s ideological foundations through a discourse that de-
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contextualizes an object or subject o f all historical contingencies. Knowledge -  even that 
of a scientific pedigree -  is contingent upon the cognitive process o f interpretation and 
must be subjected to articulation through a system of language, if  it is to be 
communicated as such. As a result, that which is considered as empirical knowledge can 
also be susceptible to colonization by myth. For example, using the principle of 
uncertainty in quantum theory, knowledge cannot be perceived as absolute (Ericson et al, 
1987).
1 8Quoting Werner Heisenberg , Ericson et al. (1987) emphasizes the relative 
quality of knowledge in the empirical sciences by stating that: “What we observe is not 
nature itself, but nature exposed to our methods o f questioning” (p. 18). The similarities 
between myth and knowledge are too glaring to overlook especially in the ways that 
discourse, as a communicative practice, works among the two concepts. Discourse plays 
an important role in the way that ideology is perceived and can illustrate that Barthes’ 
(1972, 1984) theory o f myth is compatible with Van Dijk’s (2002) theory of knowledge.
For Van Dijk (2002), discourse among groups requires a base of common 
knowledge that is perceived to be free of ideological bias in order to maximize 
commensurability in communicative action. Although he believes that some knowledge 
is ‘pre-ideological’, it essentially boils down to the ways in which ideology is perceived 
in relative terms, that holds his argument together, and not necessarily how it actually 
exist in absolute terms. This point is illustrated further when Van Dijk (2002) explains 
that once shared knowledge is manifest in discourse, and articulated through language, it 
becomes susceptible to scrutiny from other groups that do not share the same knowledge
18 For more information on Werner Heisenberg and the uncertainty principle in quantum theory, please 
refer to the American Institute o f  Physic website: < http://vvww.aip.org/historv/heisenberg/p01 ,htm>
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base. Outside groups may find such knowledge ideologically biased, leading the 
perception of knowledge to shift in the same ways that myth shifts when revealed by the 
analyst. In sum, as knowledge is articulated through language, it automatically becomes 
subject to a historical context. If  history is “ideologically and politically inflected time” 
(Dellinger, 1995), knowledge -  like myth -  becomes susceptible to ideological bias when 
articulated through language in spite o f how ideologically neutral it may appear. 
Knowledge, therefore, is not ideologically neutral.
Articulated through language, knowledge claims are ultimately subject to the 
same historical context that language is. This leaves meaning open to possible change. 
Knowledge, in this respect, is evolutionary. Even members of the same group or culture 
may find knowledge from a previous time period, within their group or culture, 
ideological. It is important to note however, that although knowledge may be deemed 
ideological from the standpoint of another culture at another time, it can still be 
considered knowledge from the perspective of the culture that accepts it as such. This 
epistemological relationship is referred to as ‘relative relativism’ (Van Dijk, 2002).
Relativism as a concept is also subject to relative critique. Knowledge is always 
knowledge relative to the perceptions o f the respective epistemic community. Once 
accepted as knowledge within a given culture, in the given temporal context, meaning 
becomes obvious and taken-for-granted as fact by virtue of convention based on 
consensus a priori. This taken-for-granted nature is characteristic o f Barthes’ notion of 
myth. Once the knowledge of a community is considered a belief by an outside 
community, the discourse of that knowledge is interpreted as having an ideological bias. 
In contrast, if the knowledge of a community is deemed to be factual within the said 
community, the discourse o f that knowledge is reflected in the belief systems of that
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community. This shows the complexity of a multidisciplinary approach to textual 
analysis when deconstructing cultural narratives through a context-laden, evaluative 
methodology like CDA.
THE FLEXIBLE QUALITY OF CDA -  A Malleable Methodological Approach
As a highly contextual, multidisciplinary approach to textual analysis, CDA offers 
a broad repertoire of analytic tools that can be used for analysing a number of different 
cultural artefacts as textual subjects. According to Huckin (n.d.), “not every concept 
found in a linguistics textbook.. .is equally useful when it comes to doing critical 
discourse analysis, and even CDA analysts differ somewhat among themselves in the 
kinds of tools they employ”. Depending on the subject analyzed, the tools of analysis 
may differ in combination and type. For example, CDA analysts with a strong 
background in Structural Linguistics may employ tools from semiotics when analyzing 
the signs and sign systems of a cultural text whereas CDA analysts with a background in 
Economics may use tools derived from political economy when analyzing the 
commodification of cultural practices. As a result, “there is no standardized form of CDA 
methodology” (Huckin, n.d.).
Although there is no consistent form of CDA methodology, there are, however, 
common elements and objectives that unify CDA as an analytical approach to research 
methods. Like any other analytical approach to research methodology, CDA employs a 
wide range o f tools to conduct precise analyses as mentioned above. It is at the discretion 
of the researcher, therefore, in conjunction with the subject being studied, to determine 
the appropriate tools for analysis that would best suit the thesis being researched. For the 
purposes outlined in this thesis, I will borrow from some o f the tools and analytical
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approaches used by the aforementioned theorists (Huckin, n.d.; Van Dijk, 1998) that have 
used CDA to analyze the written texts of newspaper articles.
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS -  A Multi-layered Technique
Common to the research conducted using CDA on newspaper articles, are the 
levels and approaches to reading the text. Van Dijk (1998) draws from some basic 
concepts of CDA to formulate a theoretical framework that identifies the relationship 
between discourse, cognition, and society. For Van Dijk, there are at least two levels of 
reading a text that must be bridged by some basic conceptual tools in order for CDA to be 
useful as a unified method of analysis. These two levels o f analysis include macro and 
micro approaches to reading a text.
At the micro level o f analysis, the reader is primarily focused on the ways in 
which meanings are structured within the text itself. This is seen by analysing the use of 
language and formal aspects of communication as interpreted within a personal and group 
context. The macro level of analysis deals with notions o f power and the ways in which it 
is distributed among various interpretive communities within society at large. This level 
focuses on issues o f inequality and dominance, inscribed in the text, as it is situated 
within the broader social context. Although Van Dijk (1998) conceptually formulates 
these levels of analysis as existing on two separate plains, he makes clear the fact that 
both these levels o f analysis are by no means absolute or mutually exclusive. Both macro 
and micro levels are present in any common social interaction. This will become more 
evident through a critical reading of the Toronto S tar’s articles on racial profiling and the 
larger multicultural context through which the articles are situated. Macro and micro
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levels o f analysis, used by Van Dijk (1998) are similar to the three levels of analysis used 
by Thomas Huckin (n.d.).
According to Thomas Huckin (n.d.), there are three main levels of analyzing a 
written text. For Huckin (n.d.) the text is first read as a whole, keeping the possible 
perspective of the ordinary reader in mind. This is the level where myths are most 
effectively inscribed within the public psyche as knowledge. Ideological manipulations 
are more effective at this stage through the types o f discourse used. Once the text is 
recognized and read as a whole -  within the formal structures and conventions of a 
specific genre -  the reader can proceed to interpreting the text on a sentence by sentence 
level.
Reading the text as a collection of separate sentences is the second level from 
which a text can be analyzed. By reading a text sentence by sentence, the meanings of 
sentences are constructed to fit within the conventions of the overall genre. This sentence 
by sentence level o f analysis pays close attention to the ways in which sentences are 
structured into topics that identify and reinforce important meanings. These meanings, 
reinforced through sentence topic, reveal important ways that bias or perspective is 
created in the issues reported. Writers often use sentence topics to articulate their bias in 
their efforts to sway or influence the reader’s perspective towards the interests encoded in 
the text. Once meanings are constructed and interpreted at the sentence level, the reader 
can proceed to analyzing the text at the level o f words and phrases.
The third level of reading texts is the most detailed of all three levels o f analysis. 
Reading a text at the level of words and phrases opens up room to explore additional 
meanings inscribed in the text. These additional meaning are commonly revealed through 
tools derived from semiotics. Understanding the orders of signification with tools like
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denotation, connotation and myth is especially useful when analyzing words and phrases 
in relation to their broader social and cultural contexts. Although these levels of analysis 
are specifically used to analyze single news articles, they can be applied broadly in an 
analysis o f an entire news paper series. Bellow are some tools that may be useful for 
analyzing news paper texts.
TOOLS OF THE TRADE FO R ‘TEXT AND TA LK ’
All o f the aforementioned levels o f analysis can reveal the pervasiveness of myth 
as they are hidden within cultural texts. These myths, masquerading as objective 
knowledge through discourse, can be revealed through tools that assess qualities o f the 
text such as: framing, to determine the overall tone, bias, perspective, and conceptual 
parameters o f the news article; visual aids, to determine the intentional use of 
photographs, illustrations, graphs, charts, diagrams, and or font to attract the attention of 
the reader to certain aspects a news article; foregrounding and back grounding, to 
determine an order o f emphasis on details and information within a news article; 
omissions, to determine what critical information a news article may be leaving out; 
presupposition and insinuation, to determine the ideas or concepts that are taken for 
granted as facts within a news article; discursive differences, to determine the genres and 
variations of language, as they are to be used to their degree of formality, in a specific 
social or group context (register) within the news article; topicalization, to determine the 
value of the subject being placed at the beginning of the sentence in a news article, and; 
connotation, to determine the second-order meanings inscribed within the text through 
metaphors, myths, and metonyms within the news article. All three levels of analysis 
employ a combination o f the analytic tools described above.
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Although these tools are useful when analyzing written texts, they are not absolute 
in their methodological application. As mentioned above, there is no standardized 
methodology to CDA. As a result, the aforementioned tools are relative to the expertise 
of the analyst in conjunction with the subject o f analysis being considered. These tools 
form the textual area of analysis, and are in no way conclusive without careful and critical 
consideration to the overall social, political and historical context o f the written 
document. Once a thorough textual analysis is complete, CDA theorists must sum up 
their research by providing a “contextualized interpretation” (Huckin, 2002) of their 
findings. This methodology rejects notions o f objective research and value free 
knowledge claims.
For CDA theorists, knowledge is a product of continually evolving discourses of 
social interaction. Articulated, disarticulated, and rearticulated through language, 
knowledge is considered as such, by gaining a relative degree of imagined consistency in 
its conquest over scrutiny among a contested field of discursive negotiation. As a result, 
knowledge claims cannot be interpreted as absolute formulations o f objective reasoning. 
Such claims are coded in discourse and validated through myth by virtue of popular and 
authoritative consensus.
Articulated through language and communication, a dominant conception of 
knowledge, or myth, is essential to making sense of reality. As a dominant 
communicative institution, the mass media plays an important role in the production of 
knowledge and the perpetuation of myths. Likewise, knowledge and myths constitute a 
form of collective consciousness that is used as a framework through which to interpret 
reality. Indeed, understanding the role of the mass media in society is crucial to
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understanding dominant perceptions of reality through a mediated stream of 
consciousness.
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VIII. A MEDIATED STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
REALITY AND THE MEDIA’S PRODUCTION OF PERCEPTION
I  am an invisible man ... I  am invisible, understand, simply because people 
refuse to see me... That invisibility to which I  refer occurs because o f  a 
particular disposition o f  the eyes o f  those with whom I  come in contact. A 
matter o f  the construction o f the inner eyes, those eyes with which they 
look through their physical eyes upon reality.
(Ellison, 1947, p. 3) 
Reality is constructed in and through communication (Littlejohn, 1996). As a 
result, reality is agreed upon through language common to a collective community of 
ideas. This collective community of ideas emerges through perpetual dialogue among 
competing and negotiating discourses. Because o f this, interpretations of reality as a 
product o f discourse, manifest in the production and reproduction o f cultural artefacts, are 
articulated and interpreted through language and can therefore be read as texts. The 
meanings generated by these texts are created in the negotiation o f discourse through 
social interaction. Meanings are dialogical. And as a result, we are said to live in and 
through systems of meanings and representations (Shohat & Stam, 1995).
In short, reality is formed in meanings produced by the discourses, negotiated as 
dominant, that emerge out o f our social interactions. These discourses are communicated 
through systems of representation. Indeed, systems o f representation are usually 
mediated through powerful social institutions. It is the opinion of this author that the 
mass media are of the most powerful social institutions today, perpetuating dominant 
discourses that shape popular perceptions of who we are and our notions of reality. As 
such, the media are socializing forces through which power is exercised and can be seen 
as dominant institutions of social control (Kellner, 1995a; Real, 1989).
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Building upon Wacquant’s (2002) thesis, that four ‘peculiar institutions’ helped to 
shape racisms in contemporary American society; I would place the mass media as a fifth 
‘peculiar institution’, which works in a similar way to the previous four. To further this 
claim on the profound role o f the media, in providing materials that influence our 
perceptions o f our identities and our world, Douglas Kellner (1995) is worth quoting at 
length:
Radio, television, film and the other products of media culture provide 
materials out of which we forge our very identities, our sense of selfhood; 
our notion of what it means to be male or female; our sense of class, of 
ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality, of “us” and “them.” Media 
images help shape our view of the world and our deepest values: what we 
consider good or bad, positive or negative, moral or evil. Media stories 
provide the symbols, myths and resources through which we constitute a 
common culture and through which we insert ourselves into this culture. 
Media spectacles demonstrate who has the power and who is powerless, 
who is allowed to exercise force and who is not. They dramatize and 
legitimate the power o f the forces that be and show the powerless that they 
must stay in their place or be destroyed, (p.5)
As illustrated in the passage cited above, the mass media can be seen as pervasive 
pedagogical tools that -  among other things -  teach us: who we are, how to act, and how 
to interpret our surroundings. Michael Real (1989) neatly sums up the pervasiveness of 
these institutions in what he calls super media that serve “as the central nervous system of 
modem society” (p. 13). As a constant reminder of the super media’s role in shaping and 
producing collective and individual consciousness, Real (1989) frequently inserts the 
phrase: ‘our media, ourselves’ throughout the pages o f his book Super Media. This 
illustrates how individual identities blend into media identities in an ongoing dialectic of 
myth making. Identities, therefore, are not individually produced but are social products 
developed in and through the mechanisms of language and representation (Turner, 1992). 
As a result, the super media are instrumental to the ways in which meanings are
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constructed through language and representation. Although the mass media provide us 
with the tools that we use to organize our existence (reality), a dialectical relationship 
between the society, individuals and the media, was not always taken into consideration 
regarding the production of meaning.
MASS MEDIA AND MASS AUDIENCES -  Homogeneity to Heterogeneity
Some early theories of the mass media, deriving out o f positivistic schools of 
thought, including instinct psychology, interpreted the notion o f the audience as a 
homogeneous mass (Defleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). It was assumed further that this 
homogeneous mass was uniformly influenced by any message transmitted through the 
mass media. In this sense, the mass media were, and in some cases still are, perceived as 
powerful and all pervasive propaganda machines that leave little room for dissenting 
voices. This implied a perception that a singular universe o f ideas formed the basis of an 
objective reality. As societies became increasingly diverse, however, theories of cultural 
studies demonstrated that the audience is not a homogeneous mass but a heterogeneous 
mix of diverse interpretative communities (Agger, 1992; Kellner, 1995; Real, 1989; 
Turner, 1992).
Through greater focus on the role of language, it became more apparent that 
various interpretative communities exist, simultaneously, in a multi-verse of ideas. This 
multi-verse of ideas forms the basis of a subjectively interpreted reality. For Turner 
(1992), the power of language creates and locates social relations through its own 
relational systems o f representation. As a result, reality is created as relative through the 
mechanisms of language in culture that sets out to order and define it. Turner (1992) 
sums up this relation by stating that “culture, as the site where meaning is generated and
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experienced, becomes a determining, productive field through which social realities are 
constructed, experienced and interpreted”(p. 15). As logical as this statement may 
appear, it is the opinion of this author that such a perspective dangerously teeters on the 
brink of a linguistic determinism, throwing away any claims for a material reality that 
exists beyond language. Although language offers a strong argument for the discursive 
construction of meaning, it does not necessarily follow that it creates reality per se. In 
order to clarify this point, it is worth briefly returning to Stuart Hall (1997).
Hall (1997) states an important distinction between claims that language creates 
reality, and the claims that language creates meaning in reality. Hall (1997) uses two 
distinct phrases to illustrate his point. The first phrase, “nothing meaningful exists 
outside of discourse” is more accurate than the second phrase that states “nothing exists 
outside o f discourse”. These statements illustrate Hall’s (1996) distinction between 
linguistic and discursive interpretations of reality. While language and discourse are very 
powerful agents o f culture, they do not take away from the fact that there are real 
historical and material conditions that form the basis of reality. O f great interest to Hall 
(1996, 1997) are the ways in which the historical and material conditions of reality are 
interpreted as meaningful within diverse interpretative communities. By stating that the 
only way to understand the world is through representation by no means implies that the 
world only exists through representation.
UNIVERSE AND OR MULTIVERSE -  A Many Sided Reality
Communicated through systems of representation, reality is interpreted as a social, 
cultural, and historical concept experienced and understood in and through discourse. 
Discourse, as a culturally contingent practice, allows for multiple interpretations of reality
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to exist simultaneously. This relationship is oftentimes misperceived by some cultural 
studies theorists in their beliefs that multiple realities exist. A multi-verse is an 
interpretative condition and is by no means absolute. This can be misleading when 
analysing the power o f the media in society.
The interpretation that multiple realities exists, does not presuppose that power is 
concentrated primarily in the actions and interpretations o f the audience and that the 
media have superficial effects that are only symbolic within the subjective interpretation 
of the reader. Communications, and therefore the media, are intrinsically linked with 
power. This power, intrinsic to the media, has the potential to effect real historical and 
material conditions on the populations that participate in them by virtue of their 
socializing mechanisms. Furthermore, understanding that communication is linked with 
power (Hall, 1997), all interpretations or perceptions of reality are not considered equal.
ACTIVE AUDIENCE AND THE POWER OF MEDIA -  Negotiated Dominance
Kellner (1995) warns against placing too much emphasis on an ‘active audience’ 
theory, in the interests o f maintaining the fact that the media have very ‘powerful 
manipulative effects’. For Kellner (1995), cultural artefacts are situated within 
ideologically loaded relations of production and reproduction. These ideological relations 
essentially position cultural forms by the way of either perpetuating or resisting 
dominance or oppression. This occurs as a result o f the discursive process of competition 
and negotiation where dominant perceptions of reality persist in contention with 
negotiated and oppositional perceptions of reality (Hall, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002).
Reality, therefore, is a fractured, interchangeable, and fluid contested terrain. Reality is 
what this author considers to be negotiated potentiality.
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As dominant discourses emerge, in the negotiation o f dominant interpretations of 
reality, the ideologies implicit to its formation serve to fix the dominant discourse as 
absolute. This attempt at fixing meaning through discourse makes the dominant 
interpretation o f reality appear to be natural. Indeed, as contingent as reality is, these 
dominant perceptions remain highly influential in the ways that audiences make sense of 
the world around them through myth.
Myth naturalizes objects and subjects that become encoded into cultural texts as 
knowledge claims. Some of these knowledge claims stand out in culture as a form of 
conceptual and ideological shorthand. As contextual as reality is, when interpreted 
through forms of communication and representation like language, power intervenes in 
the interest o f fixing meanings as absolute and natural (Hall, 1997). And although reality 
exists in a multi-verse of interpreted ideas, myths contain a universe of ideological 
assumptions that exist through the practice of discourse. Indeed, dominant perceptions of 
reality that monopolize media messages constitute what James Winter (2002) terms 
MediaThink.
Based on George Orwell’s ‘prevailing orthodoxy of ideas’ and continuing in the 
tradition of the ‘propaganda model’ (Achbar & Wintonick, 1992; Chomsky, 2002; 
Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Podur, 2002), MediaThink embodies the dominant 
perspective of reality as perceived through the minds of those who control the media 
(representatives of a dominant class). It is important to note, however, that dominant 
perspectives are by no means uniform or absolute. In the competitive process of constant 
discursive negotiation, there are often cracks and fissures in myth that allow for 
alternative perspectives to emerge. In this process however, alternative perspectives are 
often marginalized and or silenced altogether, constantly losing to the overpowering
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
presence of the dominant perspectives (Podur, 2002; Winter, 2002). Furthermore, in very 
rare circumstances, dominant perspectives can temporarily shift appearing to embrace and 
incorporate alternative perspectives as a part of the dominant discourse. This is 
sometimes seen in more ‘liberal’, popular media sources. Accompanied by a relative 
amount o f backlash, this shift is usually marginal and does not end up straying too far 
from deeper layers of dominant ideologies that remain entrenched in its overall message. 
As we will see, this is demonstrated in the Toronto Star’s coding o f ‘race’ in their 
coverage of racial profiling.
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IX. ANALYSIS OF INCORPORATED RESISTENCE
CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGIES AND THE LIBERAL MEDIA
The white man is sealed in his whiteness.
The black man in his blackness.
(Fanon, 1967, p. 9) 
Although the Toronto S tar’s groundbreaking expose on racial profiling, 
practiced by the Toronto Police Service (TPS), appears to be critical o f racism on a 
surface reading, a critical reading of selected articles from its series on ‘Race and Crime’ 
indicates that despite its best intentions, its coverage of the issues actually serves to 
propagate racist narratives. These racist narratives are a culmination o f the deep rooted 
sentiments of a colonialist ideology that has evolved to a current state o f unquestioned 
normalcy. Naturalized through ‘official’ multiculturalism’s ‘liberal’ discourse of 
tolerance and diversity, The S tar’s normalized brand o f racism has been incorporated 
within the overall language of divisiveness and oppression that it so stridently attempts to 
eradicate. Its underlying message continues to bear the ‘strange fruit’ o f racist ideologies 
that undermine attempts at significant change towards social justice and equality. In 
order to examine this perception further, a textual analysis, considering Barthes’ notion of 
myth through some o f tools derived from CDA will be used to explore racism, as a 
systemic way of life, institutionalized through myth within Canada’s multicultural 
society. Moreover, I will be applying these theories to the ways in which ‘race’ is coded 
in The Star’s coverage of racial profiling as practiced by the TPS.
CDA -  An Applied Methodology
As outlined in an earlier chapter of this thesis, tools from CDA can be equally 
useful when analyzing news stories both in series and as individual articles. Usually
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when there is enough information and interest (corporate and or public) to publish a 
number of stories on a particular subject or issue, common themes can be linked to group 
these stories into a series. As a result an entire series can be read in similar ways to a 
single article. This chapter will apply some of the tools from CDA, discussed in a 
previous chapter o f this thesis, to a broad analysis of some of the major themes in selected 
articles from The S tar’s series ‘Race and Crime’. Once the common themes about ‘race’ 
are analyzed within its broader social context on a macro level, a more specific analysis 
of excerpts from five selected articles, published as a part o f the series, will be analyzed 
semantically on a micro level.
When conducting a macro reading of The S tar’s coverage o f racial profiling as a 
series, it appears on the surface that the newspaper is attempting to perform its role as the 
‘fourth estate’. The ‘fourth estate’ is a term that positions the mass media as a 
‘watchdog’ to government or ‘state’ abuses o f power (Winter, 2002, p. ix). In this case, 
the police service functions as an extension of the government or state apparatus that 
works to enforce its laws on the public. In so doing, however, it has become commonly 
perceived by marginalized voices in Toronto that the practices o f law enforcement 
agencies have become selective to the point of discrimination (Ontario Human Rights 
Commission, 2003). As a result public trust in the police service -  as an extension of 
government -  has been violated by the unjust practice of racial profiling that an 
organization like the TPS carries out. Under these circumstances, the erstwhile ‘liberal’ 
news media, as ‘watchdogs’ for the public interest against the state’s abuses of power, 
had a duty and responsibility to the public to report on the issues. In this case, it can be 
argued that The S tar’s coverage on racial discrimination practiced by the TPS is purely 
responsible journalism in the way that it appears to take a position against the agents of
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power (TPS) in the racial profiling debate. However, something is missing in this 
assumption involving the broader role of racism and the mass media in society.
If we will briefly recall from an earlier section o f this thesis, the mass media have 
a relatively large role in the socialization of the status quo -  being a consciousness 
producing industry (Ericson et al., 1987; Kellner, 1995; Real, 1989). Moreover, the 
media have been highly theorized as a form of social control (Ericson et al., 1987). On a 
surface reading, The S tar’s coverage of racial profiling appears to counter this assumption 
about the media. A more critical reading of The S ta r’s coverage, however, reinforces the 
claim that posits the media as a form of social control in the ways in which it reports the 
issues. Although The Star ostensibly appears to side with the victims of oppression, it 
nonetheless propagates distorted perceptions of ‘racial’ differences that can be used to 
further segregate society.
In an October 20th 2002 article titled “Police target black drivers”, The Star
investigative team reported on the issues of racial profiling by using statistics based on
rigid categories of ‘race’ (see Appendix I). According to the investigative team19:
Almost 34 per cent of all drivers charged with out-of-sight violations were 
black, in the group where race was listed. Yet according to the latest 
census figures, Toronto’s black community represents just 8.1 per cent of 
the city’s population. By contrast, 62.7 percent o f Toronto’s population is 
white, but whites account for 52.1 per cent o f the motorists charged with 
out-of-sight traffic offences, (p. A9)
Although the example above highlights a case study of racial discrimination, it 
further perpetuates distorted notions of difference in the process. A closer look at the
19  The Star investigative team that headed up the coverage on racial profiling consisted o f : Jim Rankin, 
Jennifer Quinn, M ichelle Shephard, John Duncanson, and Scott Simmie. A  full archive o f  related stories 
can also be found by visiting the following Toronto Star website:
<http://www.thestar.ca/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagenam e=thestar/Render& =Page& cid:= 
1034935301156>
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example above demonstrates that racial lines drawn between different populations in 
society can be reduced to ‘black’ and ‘white’. Indeed, Toronto is depicted as a segregated 
city that is divided between people perceived as ‘black’ and people perceived as ‘white’. 
As a result, The S tar’s use o f rigid racial categories reinforces dominant distortions of 
‘race’, contributing to the racial socialization of the public in the process. It is a 
distortion, however, to imply that such rigid categorizations exist according to popularly 
perceived notions o f ‘race’. As discussed earlier in this thesis, it is problematic to assume 
that the entire populations can be reduced to ‘races’ that are either ‘black’, ‘white’ or 
‘other’. This is problematic primarily because such rigid categorizations of ‘race’ do not 
neatly correlate to nature as it is implied. Nowhere does the above statement address the 
issues o f ‘race’ as an imaginary attribute of racialization nor does it address the effects of 
racialization on progressive social relations.
Although The Star convincingly exposes the existence o f racial profiling, it does 
little to report on the underlying causes of racism as a way of life that fuel racist practices. 
As a popular part of one of society’s dominant ‘peculiar institutions’, whose role is to 
watch the power brokers so to speak, should not a part o f this responsibility also entail 
greater care when reporting on the issues that could potentially affect positive social 
relations? As a result, it is the opinion of this author that The S tar’s expose on racial 
profiling is not only incomplete but is also negligent in its social responsibility to 
accurately inform the public. To clarify what I mean by negligent, The S tar’s coverage 
continues to reify dominant discourses about ‘race’ while outright ignoring processes of 
racialization that enable it to do so in such a normalized fashion.
An earlier chapter of this thesis reveals that The Star is aware that ‘race’ is a 
scientifically useless construct for categorizing populations o f people. Despite this
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awareness, it continues to publish articles that sensationalize social differences along the 
lines of ‘race’. Many years have passed between The Star’s coverage on Philippe 
Rushton, and the genetic studies disproving the scientific existence of ‘race’, however, 
what remains the same is the Star’s coding of racial difference. It is my contention that if 
The Star were to critically explore the deep structures of racialization, there would be no 
buffer to prevent its analysis from turning on itself as another organization where racism 
can be found. In a series that spans at least four months o f coverage, The Star appears 
content to immerse itself within the sensationalized debate on whether or not racial 
profiling exists.
EXISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING -  Does it Occur in TPS Practices?
Cognizant or unaware, not only do arrest statistics speak volumes about the social 
reality o f racial profiling as a systemic form of racism (Friendly, 2002; Podur, 2002) but 
so does personal testimony (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003). Even for those 
who find The Star’s research methodology to be unscientific and inconclusive, the 
practice o f racial profiling by the TPS is still a plausible assumption to say the least 
(Melchers, 2003).
Racial profiling exists, and I intend to move beyond this claim to shift focus from 
the overt racist actions o f individuals within the institution (a few bad apples as they are 
often referred to) and concentrate on exploring the more subtle nuances o f racisms that 
are produced and produce such individuals within the institution itself. In so doing, it has 
become evident that institutional forms of racisms -  as seemingly invisible products of a 
deep seated socialization that is internalized in the everyday policies, practices, and 
silence -  directly and/ or indirectly contribute to more visible overt acts of discrimination
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and inequality (Wise, 1999). This is evidenced by the ways in which The Star’s own 
subtle racism is overlooked in their accusations that the TPS is an overtly racist 
organization. This is further compounded in the TPS reaction to The S ta r’s accusations 
that systemic racism exists within their organization.
Although an organization like the TPS denies systemic racism based on the flawed 
logic that their policies prevent such acts, the fact that these policies perpetuate the myth 
that distinct ‘races’ exist in our multicultural society eludes critical scrutiny. As 
discussed earlier, if  ‘race’ is an attribute of racism (Darder & Torres, 2004), then the very 
policies erected by the TPS to protect citizens from racial profiling are essentially racist 
and therefore institutionalized. Furthermore, these policies are used to identify racism as 
individual acts carried out through isolated occurrences and do not examine the systemic 
qualities of racism overall. Due to the narrow reasoning and understanding o f racisms 
within TPS policy, it becomes almost impossible for the TPS to see that they are a racist 
institution because the logic of their internal policies negates the possibility that such a 
form of systemic discrimination can even exist. It can be said, therefore, that sometimes 
the policies which are created to protect against racial discrimination end up perpetuating 
the existence o f separate ‘races’ as natural. Discussed in an earlier chapter of this thesis, 
a clear example o f this is seen through the notion of ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada. 
As a result, ‘race’ becomes reified, narrowing the possibilities o f racisms to individual 
and organizational practices while ignoring the subtleties intrinsic to its systemic form as 
a way of life. In this instance, institutional racisms not only becomes perceived as 
impossible for the TPS but also becomes overlooked in The S ta r’s coverage o f the TPS 
discriminatory practices.
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Like the TPS, The Star’s coverage of racial profiling reifies ‘race’ as a natural 
factor, without giving attention to the process of racialization that normalizes a dominant 
discourse about ‘race’. A clear example of this can be seen in the previous section of this 
chapter. Indeed, racisms are more than just practiced. They are lived through myth and 
discourse. As can be seen in the selected headlines and articles that follow, The Star’s 
coverage merely targets the actions of individuals within the institution without fully 
analysing the racist structures o f the institution itself that produces these individuals and 
their respective actions. As a result its coverage alludes to systemic racisms without 
critically engaging in the debate about systemic racism and what it means to society as a 
whole.
In a March 18th 2003 article titled “Singled out”, The S ta r’s investigative team 
reports that: “The Toronto crime data also shows a disproportionate number of black 
motorists are ticketed for violations that only surface following a stop. This difference ... 
suggests police use racial profiling in deciding whom to pull over” (p. A l). This 
information alludes to systemic racism as the organized actions o f members within an 
institution that single out citizens based on notions of ‘race’. This, however, merely 
addresses the practice of racism without challenging the broader social lifestyle that 
enables the practice. The practice of racial profiling is only one aspect of systemic 
racism. It does not address all the issues necessary to eradicate racism from society. As a 
result, The Star only addresses the fact that certain citizens are targeted for criminal 
activity based on perceived racial differences. It does not address the depth and scope of 
racism as a way of life within society. In the process, systemic racism is made to look as 
a though it is a simple matter of police abuses of power. The S ta r’s coverage does little
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beyond this report to expose the underlying social structures, engendering racist ways of 
life, which impel racist actions -  individual or collective.
Although The Star appears to acknowledge that racisms exists beyond the 
individual acts practiced by ‘a few bad apples’ within an organization, it still does not 
present a clear depiction o f the depth and scope of systemic racisms as a way of life. As 
depicted in the example above, The S tar’s understandings o f systemic racisms are merely 
conflated from the actions of individuals to the practices of an entire organization that can 
be as one ‘bad apple’ organization. By focusing on the racist practices o f the TPS, The 
Star’s narrow view of systemic racism excludes its own practices from critical scrutiny. 
Indeed, its accusations o f the overtly racist practices o f the TPS serves to mask the more 
subtle racisms found in the discourse of its own coverage.
Both The S tar’s evasion of its own racisms and the TPS denial o f racisms among 
its ranks, exist as testaments to the pervasive quality o f institutional racisms that exists 
within the myth of a multicultural society that is rooted in colonialist ideologies. Being 
so immersed and consumed within the ideologies of the dominant myths about ‘race’ 
makes it hard to realize the ubiquitous systems of oppression that serve to sustain the 
dominant relations o f power through the process o f racialization. As a result racisms are 
not always a conscious practice and it is not always recognized due to its subtleties within 
a normalized discourse about ‘race’.
As evidenced by the way myths work through normalized discourse, acts of 
racism are not necessarily predicated on conscious intent. Entire organizations and 
institutions can practice and live racisms without being consciously aware. As long as the 
possibility of a subconscious collective agency continues to be negated, systemic 
‘racisms’ will not only remain difficult to prove but also impossible to eradicate. In the
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case of the TPS response to allegations of racial profiling, denial has been the preferred 
way of dealing with social anomie. The TPS has denied allegations of racial profiling to 
the extent that the Toronto Police Association tried to sue The Star for libel.
In a June 25th 2003 article, The Star’s legal affairs reporter, Tracey Tyler, reported 
that an Ontario Superior Court judge had dismissed “a $2.7 billion class action libel 
lawsuit brought against the Toronto Star”. The Toronto Police Association had filed the 
lawsuit claiming that The S ta r’s series on ‘Race and Crime’ implied that all members of 
the TPS were “racists” thus tarnishing the reputation o f every officer on the force. The 
lawsuit was dismissed on the grounds that it there was no “reasonable cause of action” (p. 
A l). While the TPS took legal action to deny their practices of overt racisms, The Star’s 
more subtle racisms can be found throughout its coverage on the issues.
The S tar’s subtle forms of racism can be found in its incomplete expose of 
institutional racisms. By focusing on overt racist actions practiced by the TPS, The Star 
essentially avoids the more subtle racisms innate to the way that they report on such acts. 
As a result, I will not engage in the debate about whether racial profiling exists, but I will, 
however, examine the power dynamic intrinsic to these debates through myth generated 
about common notions o f ‘race’. In so doing, the focus of this analysis turns to the more 
subtle and systemic racisms practiced by the Toronto Star.
As mentioned above, The Star is not exempt from the grasp of institutionally 
racist practices. This becomes apparent from a closer examination o f the ways in which 
‘race’ is coded in the language of its texts. For the purpose of textual analysis, I am more 
concerned with the type of socio-political assumptions imbedded in the language of a 
commonsense racial discourse. More specifically, I am interested in the ways that myths 
about ‘race’ are perpetuated within our commonly held assumptions about it. By
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examining the ways in which The Star perpetuates a common discourse about ‘race’, the 
depth of racisms through myth becomes particularly revealing. As a result, close 
attention is paid to the ways that myth incorporates the Toronto S ta r’s seemingly radical 
coverage of racial profiling within the dominant ideological framework about ‘race’. 
These myths that fuel common perceptions about ‘race’, as seen through the Toronto 
Star’s coding o f racial difference, present a unique and perhaps startling perspective that 
delves deeper into the roots of racisms as a systemic problem, couched in a racist colonial 
discourse and appropriated within the ‘liberal’ ideologies o f difference as it is 
institutionalized and tolerated within a Canadian ‘multicultural’ environment.
COLOUR-CODED -  Visualizing ‘Race’ and the Perpetuation of Myth
In the Toronto S tar’s series on ‘Race and Crime’, ‘race’ is represented through 
skin colour and crime becomes racialized only when people o f colour are involved in the 
discussion20. In this case, the language of ‘race’ used to expose and resist the dominant 
ideology of oppression, unwittingly shares a common myth about ‘race’ as practiced 
through a common racial discourse signified through colour. These representations of 
‘race’ reinforce a dominant myth about ‘race’ by utilizing a mythic language about ‘race’.
Invoking some of the aspects of ideology discussed early on in this thesis, Fiske 
(1990) articulates the concept of incorporation. According to Fiske (1990), incorporation
2 0 For more on how crime is racialized, see the Znet articles written by Tim W ise. In these articles Wise 
lists many acts o f  deviance commonly committed by people perceived as ‘w hite’. For the most part, when 
regarding the crimes committed almost exclusively by ‘whites’, ‘race’ does not appear to be a factor nor 
does it appear to be a cause for concern. For example, ‘race scientists’ like Philippe Rushton and neo­
conservatives like Dinesh D ’Souza, do not race to prove a genetic or cultural deficiency that can be 
generalized to the entire group o f  people perceived as ‘white’. For crimes committed by people perceived 
to be grouped by colour, however, ‘race’ becomes treated as a causal factor for deviance. This shows that a 
colour-blind discourse links ‘whiteness’ with individuality whereas ‘colour’ or ‘blackness’ designates group 
generalities. D iscussed throughout this thesis, racist perspectives that attempt to draw connections between 
‘race’ and crime are reflective o f  our deeper social consciousness. A  colour-blind discourse is also evident 
in the notion o f  ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada as illustrated through the ‘m osaic’ metaphor.
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accounts for the ways in which “the dominant classes take elements o f resistance from the 
subordinate and use them to maintain the status quo, rather than to challenge it” (p. 181). 
This demonstrates how aspects o f The Star’s coverage on racial profiling can be 
hegemonic while at the same time maintaining the appearance o f being counter- 
hegemonic. This can occur when the avenues of resistance contradict a dominant 
framework through a common discourse. When this happens, elements o f resistance can 
become susceptible to incorporation within the dominant framework, thus robbing the 
text of a radical voice. In this case, The Star’s attempt at resistance is incorporated within 
the dominant framework about ‘race’ through practising a shared discourse that is 
supported through the common language of colour-coding. As a result, resistance and 
dominance become equally intelligible through the utilization o f the same language about 
‘race’. This epitomizes the process of hegemony at its best.
Through the process of hegemony, elements of resistance that are historically and 
culturally produced in social relations of power are susceptible to inoculation into the 
culture of the majority by the dominant minority. Discussed in a previous chapter of this 
thesis, inoculation is one of Barthes’ (1984) rhetorical forms o f myth. As a result, the 
subordinate surrenders to the will of the dominant by consent and further perpetuates 
dominant meanings as they become produced in social relations o f power. Moreover, 
resistant forces are positioned, a priori, by virtue of the shared meanings produced by the 
dominant in these social relations of power, to articulate and perpetuate their own means 
of subordination and oppression. Focusing on the language within a text, as well as its 
social implications, colour-coding calls on the readers to adopt and accept dominant 
positions that lead us to believe there are fixed and clearly delineable racial differences 
among us.
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Throughout The S tar’s coverage on racial profiling, ‘race’ is never directly 
defined. It is alluded to through skin colour classification, as a part of the dominant myth; 
it is assumed as obvious that ‘race’ is based primarily on physical appearance. Despite its 
racist implications rooted in a racist science (as discussed in a previous chapter of this 
thesis regarding Philippe Rushton), skin colour, therefore, becomes the prominent 
signifier of ‘race’. In order to clarify this relationship, let us examine the process and 
orders o f signification as they relate to the mythic sign ‘black’.
‘Black’ as a sign, constructed within a process of signification, is robbed of its 
historical and political context once myth takes hold of it. As myth colonizes the sign 
‘black’, it emerges fully developed as a statement of fact and appears to have meaning all 
by itself. Seeing that the sign has been colonized by myth, its significance is made appear 
eternal. ‘Black’ as a sign related to the concept o f ‘race’, for instance, appears as though 
it has always been a natural designation of difference along the lines ‘blackness’ which is 
culturally related to skin colour. This however, is a distortion o f history. Examples of 
this can be seen in a previous chapter of this thesis that outlines shifting histories of 
‘race’. Indeed, this history has been obscured and the sign ‘black’, when used in common 
discourse, has been emptied of any political significance. Myth makes ‘black’ look 
natural, by ignoring its cultural significance.
Umberto Eco (1996) speaks about how cultures condition the colours we see. The 
interpretation of colour is a cultural matter. According to Eco (1996), the “content of a 
signification system depends on our cultural organization o f the world into categories” (p. 
155). Notions o f ‘black’ and ‘white’ are cultural categories used to designate difference 
within a sea of relational differences. When colour is used as a designation of ‘race’, it 
becomes one of many signifiers that float within this sea o f relational differences. For
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instance, the name ‘black’ -  as a signifier -  has no exact colour content. It is a label that 
is arbitrary and empty. It becomes fixed by the meanings attributed to it through a 
network of relational differences that provoke a mental concept about it. For example, 
the signifier ‘black’ provokes a concept of ‘blackness’ that it signifies. It gains 
significance once it becomes inserted into culture where meanings surrounding the sign 
‘black’ is opened up to a second-order o f signification. Indeed, colour must be viewed 
within the context of the interacting semiotic system through which it bears significance.
Colours are semiotic devices that are communicated through the process of 
signification. As a result colours are not physical pigments in and o f themselves but 
expressions correlated to culturally appropriated units. This is how they become strongly 
categorized. The Star uses colour as already categorized and meaningful in and of itself 
without acknowledging that it represents notions o f ‘race’ that are situated within a chain 
of related concepts. ‘Black’ as a sign of ‘race’ is written and spoken in ways in which it 
appears to be a fixed and naturalized category robbed of political, social, and cultural 
significance. It appears to have meaning all on its own without any cultural context. This 
is how ‘black’ is used within The S tar’s coding of racial difference. This occurs when 
myth captures and eternalizes the object signified, through the orders o f signification.
The mental concept created within the first-order o f signification is conjoined with 
other mental concepts invoked from the second-order of signification. These concepts are 
then combined, constituting ‘a chain of related concepts’. Myth colonizes the sign 
‘black’ by eternalizing and naturalizing a notion of ‘blackness’. Once colonized, ‘black’ 
triggers a chain of related concepts can be seen through the ways in which myth conjures 
notions o f ‘blackness’ as a ‘race’ of people who have ‘dark skin’ and are ‘culturally
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different’ from ‘white’. It is important to mention, however, Barthes’ (1972, 1984) 
notion that myth does not falsify the truth but distorts it.
If we take ‘black’ as a signifier that designates ‘blackness’ to a ‘race’ o f people, 
this is not an outright false claim in the way in which difference among groups of people 
are categorized and ordered in the world. It does however distort the ways in which this 
method of categorization can be interpreted as a natural fact. For example, there are no 
‘black’ races with respect to the significance of ‘blackness’ bearing any physical 
correlation to a shade on a colour spectrum. There are however, groups o f people who 
are racialized as ‘black’ and therefore personify a notion of ‘blackness’. Even at this 
level, myth still tries to accomplish a natural and absolute resolution to this assertion by 
letting ‘black’ stand on its own. As discussed in detail throughout the thesis, what 
constitutes ‘race’ is a highly contested terrain of shifting significance. Despite this 
notion, the use o f the sign ‘black’ to refer to a ‘race’ of people is still quite common, 
especially in The Star.
The use of skin colour, to group differences among a population, is deeply rooted 
within a myth about ‘race’ that has been widely proliferated throughout the everyday 
aspects of society. Grouping one another according to skin colour has become a 
trademark signifier o f our socialization within racist frameworks. Throughout the articles 
published in the Toronto S tar’s series on ‘Race and Crime’ the text reveals that: the 
police use skin colour to identify assailants as seen in arrest records databases (CIPS); 
The Star uses skin colour to refer to groups, or communities o f citizens, victimized by 
TPS practices, and; individual citizens and community groups use the same skin colour 
descriptors to identify themselves in relation to others.
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Skin colour is disguised through myth and is presented as pre-ideological social 
knowledge. This becomes clear through a micro analysis o f the semantic features of 
excerpts taken from specific Toronto Star articles on ‘race’ and crime. The tools from 
Huckin’s (n.d.) CDA methodology, combining both sentence level and word/ phrase 
levels of analysis, can be used to conduct Van Dijk’s (1998) micro reading of the text. I 
have taken the liberty o f highlighting the key words and phrases in bold text to better 
illustrate my point.
1) Police target black drivers. Star Analysis o f traffic data suggests racial profiling. -  
October 20th 2002.
Black drivers confronted by the flashing lights of a police cruiser often worry if 
they’re being pulled over for the colour of their skin ... Police traffic offence 
data, obtained and analysed by The Star, shows a disproportionate number of 
blacks ticketed for violations that routinely surface only after a stop has been 
made ... Toronto’s police services board has ordered its officers not to analyse raw 
race-based crime data, arguing racists might use the resulting statistics to 
stigmatize ethnic communities. Police follow that rule, and don’t record race 
statistics for the purpose of ethnic analysis. They do, however, list skin colour in 
most arrest reports when describing a person charged. Its routine in arrests for 
major crimes, while a record of skin colour occurs less often for simple traffic 
offences ... An analysis of more than 7,500 out-of-sight violations found that skin 
colour was listed in about two-thirds of cases where drivers were ticketed with 
only this type o f offence. And black drivers were carrying a heavy load of 
charges. Almost 34 percent of all drivers charged with out-of-sight violations 
were black, in the group where race was listed. Yet, according t the last census 
figures, Toronto’s black community represents just 8.1 percent of the city’s 
population. By contrast, 62.7 percent of Toronto’s population is white, but whites 
account for 52.1 percent of the motorists charged with out-of-sight traffic offences 
... More than a dozen young black Torontonians shared their experiences with 
Star reporters. (October 20th 2002)
2) Racial bias ‘a reality’: Eves. Premier backs talks on treatment of blacks by police. 
-  October 23rd 2002
The investigation showed blacks charged with simple drug possession received 
harsher treatment than whites facing the same charge, and that the 
disproportionate number of blacks were ticketed for offences that would come to
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light only after a traffic stop was made -  a pattern consistent with racial profiling. 
(October 23rd 2002)
3) Black leaders want a say. Not consulted on Dubin move, they charge. -  October 
26th 2002
Black community leaders say they should have been consulted before the 
Toronto police Chief Julian Fantino announced a review of the force’s race 
relations practices that was prompted The Star’s stories on racial profiling ... 
The move follows Star stories that analyzed a police database recording more than 
480,000 incidents. It concluded that blacks charged with simple drug possession 
received harsher treatment than whites facing the same charge and that a 
disproportionate number of blacks were ticketed for offences that would come to 
light only after a traffic stop was made -  a pattern consistent with racial 
profiling. (October 26th 2002)
4) Black arrest rates highest. -  October 30th 2002.
A Star investigation, conducted by analyzing police arrest records, showed that in 
certain cases where police have discretion to use personal judgement, blacks 
receive harsher treatment than whites. Last weekend’s stories prompted by a 
flood of letters and phone calls from black readers who say they have been 
subjected to racial bias by police ... The same analysis o f a police database also 
reveals that a disproportionate number of blacks were charged with violent 
crimes ... The data show that accused black people represent nearly 27 percent 
of the all violent charges; this, although the latest census figures show that only 
8.1 percent of the population lists their skin colour as black ... The Toronto 
police database contains information on 800,000 criminal and other charges that 
were laid between 1996 and early 2002 and was obtained under a Freedom of 
Information request. It lists skin colour in nearly 95 percent o f violent cases.
The data show that people with white skin, who in the 1996 census says make up
62.7 percent o f the population, were underrepresented -  accounting for 52.2 
percent of the violent charges. People classified as having “brown” skin 
accounted for 15.9 percent of the charges, while those in the “other” category 
were charged with 5 percent of violent offences. In most cases “brown” is used 
to refer to people of South Asian descent while “other” mainly represents people 
of Chinese and other Far Eastern origin. (October 30th 2002)
5) Singled out. Star analysis of police crime data shows justice is different for 
blacks and whites. -  March 18th 2003.
Blacks arrested by Toronto police are treated more harshly than whites, a Toronto 
Star analysis of crime data shows. Black people, charged with simple drug 
possession, are taken to police stations more often than whites facing the same
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charge. Once at the station, accused blacks are held overnight, for a bail hearing, 
at twice the rate of whites. The Toronto crime data also shows a disproportionate 
number o f black motorists are ticketed for violations that only surface following 
a traffic stop. This difference, say civil libertarians, community leaders and 
criminologists, suggests police use racial profiling in deciding whom to pull over 
... The finding provide hard evidence of what blacks have long suspected -  race 
matters in Canadian society especially when dealing with police ... But 
Toronto’s black community has long worried about being singled out by police 
-  especially its young black men ... To measure differences in treatment of blacks 
and whites, The Star focused on Toronto’s more than 10,000 arrests for simple 
drug possession over the six year period. Most people arrested on this charge -
63.8 percent -  were classified by police as being white. About a quarter -  23.6 
percent -  were described as black. Remaining skin colour classifications in the 
database are “brown” and “other.” In most cases “brown” is used to refer to 
people o f South Asian descent while “other” mainly represents people of 
Chinese and other Far Eastern origin. Together, these racial categories 
accounted for barely 12 percent of simple drug possession charges, and analysis 
showed that “browns” were released in much the same way as whites, while 
“others” were treated more like blacks ... And six years of internal police records 
show their decision to has often fallen harder on blacks than on whites ... The Star 
analysis o f the police traffic data shows a disproportionate number of blacks 
charged compared to whites. (March 18th 2003)
If we recall some of the tools outlined from CDA, foregrounding is a technique 
that can highlight an object, bringing it to the reader’s attention. The articles above 
illustrate methods of foregrounding on two levels. Foregrounding can set the tone of the 
entire article through visual aids and can also set the tone of a single sentence through 
topicalization. When analyzing these headlines through topicalization -  a form of 
foregrounding at the sentence level (Huckin, n.d.) -  it is no accident that ‘race’ identifies 
the topic or subject of the sentence and ultimately sets the tone for the entire article. In 
this case, skin colour as a signifier of ‘race’ is presupposed or insinuated to be a natural 
factor that is taken-for-granted as connoting cultural difference. These headlines reflect 
the tenor of stories that report on abuses of ‘state’ power within a society perceived as 
naturally segregated. These abuses of ‘state’ power are reported as the actions carried out
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by individuals within a purportedly racist organization. This method o f foregrounding is 
further compounded in the style and size of font used as a visual aid.
According to Richard Ericson et al. (1987), “visualization -  making something 
visible to the mind even if it is not visible to the eye -  is the essence o f journalism.” (p.4). 
Visual aid as a method o f foregrounding can be used in at least two ways. It can be used 
implicitly, through the font size and style of headlines, to capture the reader’s attention. It 
can also be used explicitly, through the use of photographs, charts, diagrams and graphs 
to affect a more direct result.
The use of graphs as a visual aid can be found in both the first and fifth articles. 
These graphs are tools o f foregrounding used by editorial staffs that help the reader to 
visualize the point that The Star is trying to make. In both of these articles, the graphs 
illustrate the disparity between ‘black’ and ‘white’ citizens as they are represented in the 
sample of arrest statistics analyzed. These statistics are communicated in a formal 
register that is discursively framed under the guise of objective scientific authority. When 
communicated in a formal register, supported by the frame of a positivistic discourse, the 
data collected can be interpreted and qualified as indisputable fact. It can be further 
assumed from these graphs that society can be unquestionably categorized in terms of 
racial difference as naturally observed phenomena. Complementing the use of graphs is 
the use headlines that attempt to reinforce the assumption that racial difference is absolute 
and natural.
Headlines o f the news articles are always placed in a larger bold font to grab the 
reader’s attention. This is seen in all five examples of The S tar’s coverage on ‘race’ and 
crime used above. The large bold fonts of headlines are usually the first thing that the 
reader sees when scanning the newspaper for stories. Indeed, ‘race’ as a natural factor is
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given priority and is taken-for-granted as a natural fact. This grabs the reader’s attention 
from the outset by not only appealing visually to their senses, but by appealing to them 
textually in the shared meanings of a normalized discourse about ‘race’. By just reading 
the descriptors of skin colour in the headlines, ‘race’, as a natural way of designating 
group difference is insinuated. Although The Star intentionally grabs the reader’s 
attention through headlines that call attention to racist practices, its own racism is masked 
through what they choose to omit within the text of the articles selected.
Omitted from the headlines are the ways in which the TPS contribute to the 
racialization of difference through their practices of racial profiling. In the process of 
omitting these details, The Star further perpetuates the racialization o f difference by 
foregrounding categories of ‘race’ as a natural group distinction. Because of this 
omission, all that the reader is called upon to take from the articles are that ‘blacks’ are 
victimized by the police because they are naturally different in skin complexion and 
culturally different in world view. It is important to recall that this difference is coded in 
relation to an ideal concept of what constitutes sameness. In this case -  according to the 
ideologies that constitute the ‘mosaic’ metaphor -  sameness is equivalent to that which 
would embody the notion of an ideal Canadian. This illustrates some of the more subtle 
ways in which racism is perpetuated through myth. As a result, The Star further spreads 
this myth by contributing to the same process of racialization that the TPS is accused of 
practising. Illustrated by the discourse of these headlines, The Star subscribes to the same 
myth that works to detach the meaning of ‘race’ from its historical context while masking 
the ideologies at work that produce its meaning.
Described at length in earlier chapters of this thesis, ‘race’, as defined through 
skin colour, has an historical and ideological context that is masked behind a
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commonsense discourse. This discourse naturalizes power relations through the use of 
everyday language. When analyzing the semantics o f the words and phrases used in the 
sample of Toronto Star articles selected, the language used to describe people as ‘blacks’, 
‘whites’, ‘brown’ or ‘other’ illustrates a discourse about ‘race’ coded within our 
normalized mythic assumptions about the world we live in. The language of ‘race’ used 
in these samples is a part of how the journalistic essence of visualization (Ericson et al., 
1987) subtly socializes a mass audience to a dominant view on the reality of racial 
difference.
If you recall a central premise to this thesis, ‘race’ as a product of racism (Darder 
& Torres, 2004). The S ta r’s coding of ‘race’ inverts this premise to read racism as a 
product of ‘race’. As a result, ‘race’ as a natural fact is taken-for-granted as knowledge 
and appears obvious, to a given society, through their everyday use o f language. 
Moreover, The Star insinuates that racism must be dealt with by exposing the practices of 
racial profiling that hinder meaningful social relations among the distinct ‘races’ that 
exist. As illustrated through samples of sentences taken from the five aforementioned 
articles, The Star uncritically reproduces common racial categories when reporting the 
practice of racial profiling by taking-for-granted that such categories are natural. This 
occurs through the abundant use of a normalized language about ‘race’.
The language of ‘race’, used in the Toronto S tar’s series, illustrates how people 
can be read as texts by virtue of their physical features. The body, as a text, is encoded 
and decoded through a racialized language. It is interesting to note, however, that when it 
is overtly represented, ‘race’ falls into either the category o f ‘black’ or ‘white’. No other 
‘races’ exist within these samples, with the exception of ‘brown’ or ‘other’ in samples 3 
and 5. According to these examples, “brown is used to refer to people o f South Asian
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descent while ‘other’ mainly represents people o f Chinese and other Far Eastern origins”. 
The terms ‘brown’ and ‘other’ do not necessarily represent a ‘race’ as much as they 
represent nationality or geographical origin. This is seen where the terms like ‘brown’ 
and ‘other’ must be qualified or anchored by a secondary definition to clear up any 
possibility for confusion. The fact that they are written in quotations connotes 
arbitrariness to their label. ‘Black’ and ‘white’ on the other hand are part o f our 
commonsense discursive vocabulary. They need not be encased in quotation marks. 
Furthermore, secondary definitions of ‘black’ and ‘white’ are deemed by The Star to be 
unnecessary. As a result, ‘black’ and ‘white’ are not defined anywhere in the above 
passages nor are they defined anywhere in the entire series.
Notions o f ‘black’ and ‘white’ are signifiers of social status that bear the weight of 
social, historical, and political significance. As cultural descriptors, skin colours are 
meshed within a larger framework of knowledge that constitutes dominant social myths. 
These myths carry second-order signification that validate a social relation of power.
A person is not just ‘black’ in complexion, but bears the burden of representing a 
larger community in everything they do. For example, when The Star refers to a 
racialized community, they refer to ‘the black community’ -  as though it exists as an 
absolute homogeneous whole. Furthermore, when they refer to leaders of these racialized 
communities, they refer to them as ‘black leaders’ -  as though there is only one type of 
racialized leader to represent one type of racialized community. On the contrary you do 
not see discourses that refer to ‘white’ communities or ‘leaders o f white communities’. 
The category of ‘white’ constitutes individuals within a population as opposed to ‘black’ 
constituting a segregated community within a population. This subtle distinction can lead 
to more overt generalizations of ‘race’ being attributed to crime.
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When coupled with crime, ‘black’ can conjure images o f deviant characters like 
Bigger Thomas -  Richard Wright’s Native Son (Wright, 1998). Such images bear the 
weight of an entire group o f people as programmed deep within the dominant psyche of a 
racist society, multicultural or not. In this type of society, ‘Black’ signifies a type of 
person opposite and unequal to one who is ‘white’. Although there are many contested 
narratives and meanings behind ‘black’ (Riggs, 1995), through myth, the sign ‘black 
man’ is reduced to a homogenized, second-order signifier for the behaviour and 
capabilities of most men who are perceived as ‘black’. This is precisely what Frantz 
Fanon (1967) refers to as being trapped in his body. Although The Star’s coverage of the 
issues appears to side with the victims of profiling, nowhere in its coverage is ‘race’ 
discredited as a natural or causal factor.
By perpetuating the myth that entire populations can be grouped by skin colour as a 
signifier o f ‘race’, The Star inadvertently leaves behavioural assumptions linked to ‘race’ 
open for debate. The easiest way to avoid this debate would have been to address the 
notion o f ‘race’ as a social construct that is produced through racism in the process of 
racialization. Nowhere in over 100 articles on the issue, is the notion of ‘race’ or the use 
of racial categories critically discussed as a factor o f systemic racism. By not critically 
questioning the validity of racial categorizations as definitive group signifiers, The Star 
perpetuates the myth that ‘race’ is a fixed cultural category. As ideologically charged 
signifiers, myths about ‘race’ are constructed in and through language. Indeed, there is 
nothing fixed or natural about ‘race’ therefore it cannot be considered a cultural, much 
less, biological reality
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X. MOVING BEYOND ‘RACE’
CONCLUSION -  Putting to rest the ‘Strange Fruits’ of our Past in the Present
Thus one o f  the greatest jokes in the world is the spectacle o f  whites busy 
escaping blackness and becoming darker everyday, and the blacks striving 
towards whiteness, becoming quite dull and grey.
(Ellison, 1947, p. 577) 
Despite my findings and the fact that most progressive social scientists refrain 
from employing the construct of ‘race’ as a determinant of specific social phenomena 
(McLaren & Torres, 1999; San Juan Jr., 2002), discussions o f ‘race’ -  as a fixed 
analytical and descriptive category -  continue to dominate popular and media discourses. 
Despite the fact that notions of ‘race’ have no basis in science, The S tar’s coverage of 
Philippe Rushton and racial profiling, abound with rigid conceptions of ‘race’. Contrary 
to this coverage, The S ta r’s reporting on the genetic discoveries that disprove such rigid 
classification of ‘race’ has been scarce. Such rigid characterizations are also prevalent in 
the ‘official’ narratives o f Canadian multiculturalism that attempt to define and categorize 
citizens into clearly delineable groupings under the rubric o f ‘difference’. This notion of 
‘difference’, couched in the broader ‘liberal’ discourse of tolerance and diversity, 
however, continues to reinscribe ‘race’ as a fixed cultural category. Moreover, such 
formulations tend to contain the vestiges of colonialist legacies (Bannerji, 2000).
In short, popular myths about ‘race’, as they have become institutionalized and 
canonized in ‘official’ notions of multiculturalism and perpetuated through consciousness 
producing industries like the mass media, continue to obscure existing power relations 
and power structures (San Juan, Jr., 2002; Meyerson, 2000). This engenders an 
environment that implicitly privileges certain communities at the expense of others 
through lived racialized beliefs and practices such as those seen through the policies of
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‘official multiculturalism’ and practices of racial profiling. These beliefs and practices, 
however, are premised on a flawed notion of ‘race’.
As discussed throughout this thesis, ‘race’ is a product of myth: an ideologically- 
loaded, discursive construct, manifest through language and produced in social relations 
of power. Seeing that ‘races’ come from racism (Darder & Torres, 2004), the myths that 
produce ‘race’ in social relations of power, constitute a conception o f racism as a way of 
life. Indeed, racism as a way of life implies a process of socialization that normalizes our 
everyday thoughts and actions about fixing differences.
The process of socialization that institutionalizes categories o f racial difference -  
sometimes referred to as racialization -  is seldom analyzed in a critical fashion. Instead, 
racism is often talked about as an important social problem experienced through the 
isolated actions o f individuals and organizations. When narrowly conceptualized this 
way, racisms are often examined through trivial fixations on reified notions of ‘race’. As 
a result, racism as a problematic way of living has yet to be remedied. This is based on 
the homogenization and trivialization of the premise that we construct about it.
Moving forward, if  racism is something that we truly want to rid society of; we 
need to attune our focus not on ‘race’ but on the processes o f socialization (racialization) 
that impel its effects. As a collective society, we need to come together not as divergent 
individuals, preserved in a static sea of difference, but as conversation partners 
(Benhabib, 2002) united to solve a common crisis. We need to find ways in which to 
communicate more effectively towards a counter-socialization that can destroy ‘racisms’ 
at its root. Although there are currently no standardized formulae for dismantling 
‘racisms’, solutions to social problems are dialectical and can only occur through 
participatory democratic intervention that recognize the hybridity o f cultural identities.
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This cannot currently be achieved through policies o f ‘official multiculturalism’ nor can it 
be achieved through the constant barrage o f media texts that reinforce imagined 
differences.
‘Official multiculturalism’, premised on the preservation o f cultural wholes, 
presents more harm than good by managing difference as a social problem. As a result, 
the fixing o f cultural differences and the reification of ‘race’ has led some scholars to 
revaluate and abandon the concept of multiculturalism in favour of polyculturalism. 
Instead of ‘tolerating’ or managing fixed racial or cultural differences, polyculturalism 
recognizes the plurality and fluidity of cultures. Cultures in this sense are seen as living, 
hybrid entities in the constitution of identity as a work in progress (Albert & Podur, 2003; 
Kelley, 2003). The media, however, continue to portray cultural differences contrary to a 
more fluid notion of culture.
Throughout the selected Toronto Star articles analyzed, ‘race’ has been coded as a 
fixed, cultural and biological entity. This is seen through its coverage o f the Philippe 
Rushton as well as its expose' on racial profiling as practiced by the police force. 
Curiously enough, however, the one subject o f news that was grossly underrepresented 
was The Star's scarce coverage of developments in genetic research that disprove 
common notions about ‘race’. It is interesting to note that The S tar’s coverage on the 
genetic evidence occurred between its coverage on Rushton and its coverage on racial 
profiling. The fact that The Star continued to report on ‘race’ the same ways after its 
publication o f the genome evidence as it had before its publication, is rather telling about 
the selective nature of its institutional memory.
Even years after its original series on ‘Race and Crime’, issues o f racial profiling 
have resurfaced. This time reports come from the city of Kingston Ontario instead of
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Toronto, where the Kinston Police Service has provided their own study that admits to the 
practice o f racial profiling. A May 28th 2005 article published in the Toronto Star echoes 
the same reporting tactics as seen in its original series on ‘Race and Crime’ that occurred 
three years ago. As seen in this most recent article, The Star continues to code ‘race’ 
uncritically, as a rigid statement of fact. This indicates that little has progress has 
occurred in the ways in which we categorize each other. We still continue to live the 
myths o f social difference through rigid categories of ‘race’. As a result, further study 
should be dedicated towards theorizing alternative models to the ways in which we live 
the myths of social differences through notions o f ‘race’.
As a collective problem, in which all citizens have a stake, individual solutions are 
often inadequate and will not occur overnight. Seeing that this problem requires 
collective solutions, which push for a counter-socialization stemming from a critical 
consciousness, change will involve a process on the level of evolutionary proportions to 
re-naturalize a new world view. As daunting as this task may seem, the battle can only be 
won in small victories. These victories are evidenced in the various struggles and 
accomplishments for civil rights that have led to models of critical race theories, 
feminism, anti-corporate globalization movements and the like. The struggle towards 
social justice, however, did not begin and end with these models and theories. What are 
required now, in the changing face of newer ‘racisms’, are models and theories that can 
directly address the constantly evolving issues that the new ‘racisms’ create. Such 
models should stress the fact that ‘racisms’ cannot be dismantled through ‘race’ but 
should guide policies that addresses the roots of the problem through close attention to 
racialization.
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To invoke the horticultural metaphor once more, ‘races’ are the ‘strange fruits’ 
that the trees of racisms produce. Like weeds, these trees continue to grow through 
‘biopower’ (Foucault, 2003), choking off the life of other vegetation guided by 
acceptance, equality, and justice in the process. One cannot solve this problem by solely 
concentrating on plucking the fruit. One must essentially uproot the entire tree. In order 
to do so, one must learn to visualize the scope of the problem at the root and not by the 
fruits that the problem produces.
Visualization, structured in the process of socialization through myth, requires a 
counter-process o f critical consciousness to affect these desired changes. As a dominant 
industry of visualization, the mass media are avenues where a counter-socialization 
movement must begin. Unfortunately at present, however, the media still view ‘race’ as 
distinguishable, via naturally distinct cultural and bio-genetic traits. The ways in which 
they continue to effect a visualization of this conception, contributes to the production of 
our dominant social perception that becomes normalized through myth. The mass media, 
therefore, as a site for the production, reproduction, and transformation of ideologically 
loaded myths, harbour our dominant perceptions of ‘race’. This is particularly evident in 
The S tar’s practice o f racial profiling in its reporting o f Philippe Rushton and its coverage 
of racial profiling that the Toronto Police Service carries out.
Through The S tar’s accusations that racial profiling exists, the issues of racism 
become compounded. This occurs primarily because The S ta r’s series on ‘Race and 
Crime’ misses the opportunity, in their coverage of racial profiling, to explore the roots of 
racism’s social mechanisms by the ways in which it participates in a dominant discourse 
about ‘race’. Although the Toronto Star was in the vanguard in its coverage of ‘race’ and 
crime, in the way that its investigation into racial profiling practiced by TPS exhibited a
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critical step towards exposing the pervasiveness o f systemic racism, it merely scratched 
the surface of social issues deeply rooted in the historical context o f power relations.
Functioning within the dominant myths about the reality o f ‘race’ the Toronto Star 
ultimately succeeds in preserving the existing racial categories as commonsense 
delineations of a Canadian multicultural imaginary. These notions of ‘race’ -  cultural and 
‘scientific’ -  legitimated and institutionalized through ‘official multiculturalism’ in 
Canada contribute to a form of apartheid that is ultimately restrictive to equality and 
justice for all citizens within Canada’s borders. This further illustrates the ways in which 
vestiges of a colonialist legacy have found a home in the broader ‘liberal’ notion of 
tolerable difference.
Inscribed within the rhetoric o f ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada, the ‘strange 
fruit’ o f this legacy survives in the Toronto S tar’s representation of ‘race’. Rooted in 
racist colonial ideologies, the ‘strange fruit’ o f these representations are manifest in the 
myths of our seemingly fixed and divided existence. As a result, the media have a large 
role in determining and reinforcing how groups are distinguished in difference to one 
another by the myths that they propagate. By focusing less on the fruit of ‘race’ and more 
on its roots through the process of racialization, the mass media have an important role to 
play in communicating and teaching anti-racist discourses towards social justice.
It is important to note, however, that racisms are not restricted to the overt 
phenomena of individual actions, nor are they restricted to the ‘liberal’ ideologies that 
inform a Canadian imaginary. Moving forward, a burgeoning field o f literature is 
emerging in assessing the intimate relationships between modem forms of racism and 
contemporary trends towards globalization (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Marable, 2004; San 
Juan Jr., 2002). Studying these phenomena on a critical level will present unique and
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original challenges that I believe to have merit in deconstructing barriers in the journey 
towards a global social justice. Without tackling racism as a global issue, where everyone 
has a stake in its resolution, it becomes all the more difficult to uproot its existence from a 
more local Canadian perspective. I find it particularly fitting to end at this juncture with a 
quote from the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (Dorrel, 2002)
Injustice anywhere, is a threat to justice everywhere.
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Visible Minorities Making Canada Increasingly Diverse
■ Visible minorities are defined as persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are 
non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.
■ Almost 4 million Canadians identified themselves as a visible minority in the 
2001 Census, accounting for 13.4% of the total population. This was an increase 
from 1996 when the proportion was 11.2% and a major change from 1991 (9.4%) 
and 1981 (4.7%).
■ At the provincial level, British Columbia had the highest proportion of visible 
minorities, representing 21.6% of its population, followed by Ontario at 19.1%.
■ People of Chinese origin are Canada’s largest visible minority group, with a 
population of more than one million. In 2001, they made up 3.5% of the country’s 
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Ontario Home to 54% of Visible Minorities in Canada
■ There were 2.2 million visible minority individuals in Ontario in 2001, accounting 
for 19.1% of the province’s population. They represented 54% of all visible 
minorities in Canada.
■ Among visible minority groups, South Asians (554,870) accounted for 26% of 
visible minorities, followed by Chinese (481,505) at 22%, and Blacks (411,095) at 
19%.
■ In 1991, Blacks were the largest visible minority group (311,000 or 3.1 % of total 
population), with Chinese second (290,400 or 2.9%), followed by South Asians 
(285,600 or 2.9%).
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Office of Economic Policy 
Labour and Demographic Analysis Branch21
21 Please note that the webpage referenced in this appendix has been edited to fit the format o f this page, 
keeping only the information pertinent to this thesis. For the full webpage, please refer to the website 
referenced at the top o f this appendix.
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